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THE

# PANIDÈA:

OR,

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## AN OMNIPRESENT REASON

CONSIDERED AS

## THE CREATIVE AND SUSTAINING

## LOGOS.

Durfee

By THEOPTES.

Δ602.10

> And I have felt
> A presence that disturbs me with the joy
> Of elevated thought; a sense sublime,
> Of something far more deeply interfused,
> Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
> And the round ocean, and the living air,
> And the blue sky; and, *in* the mind of man,
> A motion and a spirit, that impels
> All thinking things—all objects of all thought,
> And rolls through all things.

BOSTON:
THOMAS H. WEBB & CO.
1846.

3727

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July 24, 1854.

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* Theanthropoid is a Greek compound, formed from the words Θεός, (God,) ἄνθρωπος, (man,) and εἶδος, (form.) It may be well here to add that the title Panidèa is, likewise, a Greek compound, formed from the words πᾶν (all) and ιδεα, (idea,) and is pronounced with the accent on the last syllable but one, as in panacèa.

# THE PANIDÈA.

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## CHAPTER I.

### INTRODUCTION.

Nature, that veiled Isis, ever stands at the portals of existence, as at the gates of her own temple, and puts these questions to every human being that enters: What am I? Whence am I? and, To what end? Day and night, ever since the birth of Humanity, she has repeated these questions without pause, and still, for the want of a perfect answer, will continue to repeat them through all time to come. Yet it is not the mere image, that visible and palpable form which stands before him who is thus addressed, that is the real interrogator; but the Divinity—the soul that dwells within it. The image is a mere form, through which the Deity ventriloquizes these queries, concerning this particular phase of his existence. When we find ourselves interrogated by such a being, we may well ask what the questions imply, with a full confidence that every one of their necessary implications is a truth. And

### What are their necessary Implications?

Do they not necessarily imply an ability in him, who is interrogated, to return an answer in some sort true? Do they not necessarily imply a command to answer? Do they not necessarily imply a duty to obey the command according to the ability of him who is so questioned ? Truly these are the necessary implications of questions propounded by a *divine* querist.

Humanity has not neglected her duty, or been slow to obey the implied command. She has freely used her abilities, whatever they may have been, and in her efforts to answer the questions, she has served herself. In what condition would she now be, had she ever turned a deaf ear and stood mute before the divine querist ? She would be without religion, without philosophy, without science, without its resulting art ; without government, without law. The African, who worships the beetle, or fetich, has not been entirely mute ; and is decidedly in advance of the condition of absolute disobedience to the high command.

Humanity necessarily began her efforts to solve the problem, thus presented, with a blended philosophy and religion. These resulted in scientific discovery ; scientific discovery reflected itself back on religion and philosophy, which, rectified or confirmed thereby, gave new direction or new energy to scientific investigation ; and thus has the progress of the race been urged on, from generation to generation. All have been, consciously or unconsciously, engaged in solving the grand problem. No step has been taken in human progress—no new truth has been revealed, that has not been an advance toward this still ever receding goal.

The problem itself is, indeed, a theme as ancient as the human mind ; and, if the solution has been attempted from like cause, and with like means of investigation, it certainly cannot be surprising if like ideas have been again and again evolved, and like systems again and again brought forward, with no other claims to novelty than what they might derive from some really new, or pretendedly new combination of the same anciently recognized elements. Therefore, in offering any seeming solution of a problem, which has been thus a subject of scrutiny through all time, no one should flatter himself with the idea that he has any element of thought to present which has not already been a subject of discussion. The most that he can hope to accomplish is, perhaps, to offer some new mode of illustrating old thoughts, or to reveal some new test of their truth, which shall give combination and unity to ideas hitherto without an approved system. If he can accomplish this, he may, thereby, be enabled to present, in some sort, (since all truths subsist together in harmony,) a solution not inconsistent with, but supported by the existing state of science, and which shall be so illustrated, so cleared of all mysticism—if in any respect it be obnoxious to the charge—as to render it intelligible to the general mind, on the simple condition of a fixed attention and earnest desire to understand its process.

In the chapters which are to follow, there may be few thoughts that fundamentally differ from those which are already the common property of the philosophic world. Indeed, he, who gives but a little attention to the history of Philosophy, cannot fail to learn how true is the maxim of the wise man of old, who could discover nothing new under the sun. Yet, though there may be nothing new, in the leading ideas of the system which shall be presented for the consideration of the reader, since those ideas may be found scattered in various systems, there may be something new in their combination. And should this combination be the legitimate result of some *one truth*, it will acquire, from that fact, that kind of consistency and unity, which are essential to the clear understanding of, and full faith in, any system. The author will endeavor in the following chapters to show, not *a priori* merely, but by an experimental process, yielding an appropriate formula, that there is a truth which is competent to produce such a combination. He hopes to show that this truth, on its application to all sensuous and intellectual phenomena, operates as a law of unity, whereby it reveals, in a manner not altogether unlike the Newtonian idea of gravitation, the fact, that one grand order, subsisting from the Absolute Unit, pervades all matter and mind; and that all existences, whether spiritual or material, subsist as one infinite whole, in the Eternal Soul of all things.

And now it may be a matter of some interest to the reader, to be informed what this truth or fact is, which promises such results. It is a truth, whose expression or formula, furnishes the author with his method of treating his subject, and to the end, that the reader may more clearly understand the bearing of this truth on the problems to which its formula applies, he proposes, in the first instance, to distinguish between the method which it gives, and that which is in general use. In other words, to show where the latter method ends, and the former begins.

The ordinary method ends, not merely with the phenomena of consciousness—that is with perceptions, conceptions, imagination, memory, and generally with the laws of thought—but with the necessary inference of the existence of something distinct from the consciousness, whence these phenomena and these laws proceed; or which, subsisting centrally in the consciousness, is itself the life and the law thereof. Every one, who has attentively observed the facts of consciousness, must have remarked that our thoughts arise and succeed each other without any special act of the will. We may, indeed, arrest a particular thought, or train of thoughts, and examine it in all its relations; nay, we may, by one of these relations, pass to other thoughts; but by no act of the will can we pass, as by a leap, from this, to that distinct thought, having no connection with the former. Their connection or relation must be *felt*, and when it is felt, and apperceived, thought succeeds thought spontaneously, and as by a power or energy its own. In this, we witness the acts of the will on one side, and the acts of that which is not of the will on the other; in other words, of the self or me, and of that which is not the self, or is the *not-me*. We thus discover a power within, yet foreign to us, which gives law to thought, and is in fact the parent of every mental phenomenon, that is not a mere volition.

Now I may designate this power, as the perfect Reason, the Logos, the Divine Presence;—psychologically considered, it matters not what I call it, provided I ascribe to it no attributes other than those which it reveals in the consciousness. And this, I apprehend, is the utmost limit of the ordinary method, inward or upward.

But I may be satisfied, from observation and experience, that all other human minds present the like phenomena, and are governed by the same laws, which I observe in my own; and must I not, then, infer that the same Reason, or divine power, or being, is present in all minds just as it is in my own? This is an inference which cannot be resisted; and then, if it be Deity, that is thus present, does he exist by diffusion, or does he multiply himself, and exist as so many distinct beings in the hundreds of millions of human minds that are now acting their distinct parts on this our planet?

Here are grave questions, to either of which, an affirmative answer involves an apparent absurdity. I am therefore forced to the necessity of questioning my ideas concerning space and extension—concerning unity and plurality. What are they, and whence ?

It was during a consideration of this question, that a fact was evolved, new at least to me, and which had, as I supposed, a material bearing upon it. It was a fact which gave, or seemed to give, a complete answer to the question, and with it, what may be called a new method of investigating, arranging, and of resolving into absolute unity, all spiritual and material natures, without disturbing their identity, or marring the unity into which they were resolvable—a method, which, without interfering with the before mentioned strictly psychological method, aided it by giving logical combination and unity to its results. Indeed it seemed to go something further. It seemed necessarily to result in a system, in which my own conscious being was resolved into a type, representative of the great whole. It revealed a being, in this not-me within, that seemed to involve all things in itself, and to be at once present to my own, and to every other human mind—and that, without division or diffusion. The result of this new idea of the Presence was, that it produced combinations, its own—perfectly coincident, however, with all that falls within our experience. It brought like to like, revealed a law of assimilation, and resolved all the infinitude of particulars into entireties, and then the entireties themselves, in the last result, into the unity of the Reason or Logos. Yet it avoided pantheism, unless it were on the incomprehensible scale of the infinite, by recognizing a limited or quasi freedom in the human will.

And now, what is this fact ?

I have no name for it ; but I will endeavor to give the reader some idea of it by an illustration, or proof, drawn from the phenomenon of the single perception of an object from the double images of the retinæ.

Whilst engaged in studying Hartley's theory of vibrations, in reference to this phenomenon, the thought occurred to me, that it might be accounted for on the principle that the space between the two images was not, to the percipient faculty, an object of visual perception; in other words, that two similar images would necessarily be as one, if there were no visible objects between them. The correctness of this conclusion I endeavored to establish by actual experiment—with what success the reader will judge when he has perused the next chapter.

Upon applying the formula which the experiment gave, I found that any number of similar visible objects was resolvable into unity, by the mere ideal abstraction of their separating spaces; and it hence followed, that space, abstractly considered, was nothing but the ascription of the Reason or Logos, or of some power operating as a law to the consciousness, of geometrical relations to a coexistent plurality of objects. And then, since we determined the extent of bodies in themselves, by the relations of part to part, and of each part to the whole, any coexistent plurality—say resisting mathematical points or forces, having no dimensions, but by their resistance made obvious to the senses—would bring with it the idea of extension. But if this were so, then all objects of sense—the whole material universe, myself included, were resolvable into this Reason, Power or Presence. And I felt no difficulty in conceiving that ideas or imagery of the divine mind, subsisting from the absolute will, might be to me—a coordinate image and a finite will—the stern and unyielding realities which they seemed to be. Matter itself might be but the repetition, ad infinitum in the degree of the infinitesimal, of the absolute unit, and the various forms which it took, but the ultimates of ideas or conceptions in the divine mind.

Nor, by the aid of the same formula, was it difficult to show how the Supreme Reason, in the unity of the personal divine, could be present, even in its *entirety*, as the central being of every human soul. For to it, in the absolute esse, there were no separating spaces, and all entities were as one. Nor did it seem difficult to conceive of an order of presence and a resulting law of assimilation, in and by which, like was classed with like, and the each and all, of the individualities of each class, made to subsist as one idea, one image, in the divine mind. This I hope to make very clear in the following chapters; but for the present, I draw an illustration from our ideas of number.

The idiot, according to Hobbes, counts the strokes of the clock, one, one, one, on to twelve; yet he has no idea of twelve, as an entirety—as a sum, or abstract idea—which embraces within itself all the several units, and sums of which it is composed—that is every unit and every sum which may be formed by any number of them, from two to twelve.* Yet such is the idea which the word twelve represents and expresses. Now, just as this idea involves all the units and sums that compose it, so this Reason or Logos, by virtue of its presence, involves within itself—within its own unity—all individualities, species, genera, orders, classes; and gives the all to subsist as one idea—one form—within itself. And this I hope may excuse, if it cannot justify, the perhaps too ambitious language of the title page.

In endeavoring to prove the truth of this system, I shall not confine myself strictly to ontological and psychological methods. The point, from which I am to view the great problem, enables me to draw illustrations and proofs from the material world, and even from the history of the race; and I may at a future period, for the purpose of showing the conformity of the system even to the course of human events, conclude this treatise, by educing from the premises which it affords, a brief philosophy of history which shall appropriate, as a necessary part of it, the essentials of revealed religion.

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* So one may count days, one, one, one, until they amount to a century, and yet form no idea of any combination of them as a unit, such as a week, a month, a year, a century. Each of these embrace their fractional parts, (which are themselves entireties,) as well as their combinations. The day, the week, the month, the year, the century, are all equally units and entireties.

Being in possession of a formula which gives a method, and discloses results, thus consonant to our experience, knowledge, and hopes, I have thought that it would, at least, be excusable to obtain from it whatever results it might fairly yield. And if I in doing this may seem to be too daring, let the reader recollect, that I am only following what I deem to be a fact, to its necessary results; and that I am responsible for those results, only to the extent of my responsibility for the truth of the fact from which they are educed.

But there may be those who will shrink from the perusal of a treatise which recognizes the divine attributes in aught that manifests itself in humanity; and who will confound the words 'The Reason, The Logos,' &c., as here used, with those which designate a faculty deemed merely human, and therefore fallible. For there are many of the best minds, who almost unconsciously adopt a sort of mechanical system of philosophy, which regards Nature as a whole, and even the mind of man itself as mere machines, which Deity has indeed created, but which he has left to move on to their destinies, under the government of impulses or laws which he has given them, but from which he has withdrawn his presence, as the essentially vital and actuating power. It is due to such persons—it is due to *my-*

*self*, on *their* account—to state, more particularly, in what sense I use these terms.

The word Logos, is Greek. It is translated, in the first chapter of John the Evangelist, "The Word"—"In the beginning was the Word." But it also signifies the Reason, the Wisdom, and the like. I have adopted it here, following other writers on like subjects, as synonymous with the phrases, The Perfect Reason, the Supreme Reason, The Absolute Reason, The Omnipresent Reason, and others of corresponding import, varied to suit the phase, in which the idea is regarded; and I use the term Logos, frequently in connection with these phrases, merely for the purpose of keeping constantly in the mind of the reader the recollection, that that, which these phrases designate, is, although it appear in the mind of man, something distinct from, and infinitely above the mere individual will, or aught that belongs to the individual self, or Me.

In this Reason, or Logos, we recognize the Divine Unit, from which all things have proceeded, and in which all things are. In it, we recognize Deity, as he manifests himself in the microcosm, man. When we recognize this Reason as not human—save when we pervert it—but as the Divinity within us, we recognize God in the centre of consciousness; and then we have a right to infer, He being a unit, and every where present, that what He is there, He is, *mutatis mutandis*, every where. Let me illustrate these ideas, by tracing the manifestations of this being, within the sphere of my own consciousness.

In the most elevated sphere of cognition or inference, I recognize Him as that absolute or supreme Reason, in which space, extension, and all the forms of the world of the senses are still ever immanent and ever subsistent, as a one continuous thought or conception. In this sphere, his dominion is *absolute.* But when I recognize the same being, as acting within the limited sphere of my finite self—which he has indeed created, but created finite—I recognize him as a reason which rules according to those partial and imperfect ideas, notions, or forms of thought, that by his presence he causes to arise within me, by occasion of the blind groping of the will. This Reason, or Deity even then, however, still rules, and conducts us logically sometimes to the demonstration direct, sometimes to the *reductio ad absurdum ;* as the premises may chance to be perfect or imperfect, true or false—and it thus becomes what may, for the purpose of distinction, be called the *reflective* reason.

I will give instances of both forms of this·reason, which fall within the sphere of our own observation and decidedly manifest the source from which they emanate. When I witness a change in any object of sensation, I instinctively ascribe it to a cause; I have no choice but so to do. It is the dictate, the impulse of this reason. Here this reason is *absolute —irreflective.* But when I go in quest of the cause, this same reason is still my guide, yet it has now passed from the sphere of the infinite, to that of the finite ; and can only refer me, for the cause, to such ideas as are to be found within the sphere of my individual consciousness. In this sphere, it becomes the *reflective* reason, and puts on the appearance of human fallibility.

In the sphere above—that is, in its essential and absolute being—it is the all-creative energy, ever present at the centre of our consciousness ; and that, which is to us the material universe, is but one of its conceptions; in the sphere beneath, or exterior to it, that is, in the perceptive consciousness, it puts forth the same conceptive power, but puts it forth only in accordance with the blind promptings of the human will; and then acts on the partial and imperfect conceptions, which it has thus produced, to whatever results they may yield at the demand of individual volition.

Such is the distinction between what is here called the Reason, considered as the divine unit that comprises all things, and in which all things are ever immanent, as the forms of its thought, and the Reason in its limited relations to the conscious me, or homo individualis. And if it be true, that this self-subsistent entity gives law to the will conditionally, and thus rules in thought, it must be apparent that what we call the self, is rather an object of its action, than a part of itself. Accordingly, in this treatise, I distinguish it from that which constitutes the personality or self, by naming it the Not-Me; meaning thereby to embrace all that subsists in, or from it, distinct from the human will; whilst I designate the will itself as the Me; meaning, thereby, to designate the conscious identity—the indestructible feeling that *I am*.

Yet should it be perfectly understood, and the idea should be ever present to the mind, that between the Reason and the Will, the Not-Me and the Me, the union, in some sense, is most intimate, though the entities be most distinct. The moon is not in the ocean; yet is her presence manifested by the tides, in every drop of the mighty mass, and at the same time, in the whole, as in every single drop. The Reason or Logos subsists, in like manner, by its laws, and the results of those laws, in each and all of the entire man; but with this difference,—it acts from within outward, and acts in, and on, an entity, conditionally free. The Me governs the body as a whole, or entire instrument, but it does so, only by putting in requisition the laws or energies of the internal structure, (as of nerve, muscle, and so forth,) which are of the Reason, Logos, or Not-Me; and about which it knows no more, than it does of the constitution of the mind. The Me puts in action the soul as a whole, or rather is itself that whole, considered as an active entity; but the internal action of that whole is of the Reason, or Not-Me. It puts in requisition the memory, the imagination, the reflective reason; but the action of each of these is of the Reason or Logos. The union of the Me and the Not-Me, or Logos, is so intimate, that what is in the entirety, the Me, is, in its constituent elemental power, forces, or laws, the Not-Me, or Logos. The Not-Me is ever the internal law or energy of the Me, even to infinitesimal degrees. The two entities seem, as it were, to interpenetrate each other, and still to subsist without blending; so that if viewed on one side, the Not-Me, or Logos, alone appears; if on the other, the Me alone is manifest.

The system which I shall now endeavor to establish, is, in fact, a doctrine of *entireties*. The principle, which gives it order and combination, is such as to be susceptible of embracing all entities, whether of the world of spirit, or the world of matter. And, if in this respect it be something novel, the reader will find therein some apology for the frequent recurrence of any terms or phrases which may grate harshly on the unaccustomed ear. It will not be in my power, if I would express my meaning, entirely to avoid them. And in regard to style, generally, my sole object shall be to make myself intelligible, in as few words as possible.

If these introductory remarks be such as to encourage the reader to a perusal of the chapters which are to follow, I still feel it a duty to warn him that he has no holiday work to do. They are, I flatter myself, intelligible, but if he means to understand them and to comprehend the system as a whole, he must gird up his loins like a man that has a task before him. He must labor in thought, as well as the author. If he does, his labor, in any event, may not be entirely lost to him. An intellectual exercise upon a doctrine of entireties, in an age so much accustomed to deal in fragments, may do him a service, even though his anticipations may not be realized.

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## CHAPTER II.

### THE ALL RESOLVED INTO ITS SUBJECTIVE UNITY IN THE LOGOS, OR ABSOLUTE REASON.

*'Εν ἀρχῆ ην ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ην πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν, καὶ Θεὸς ην ὁ λόγος.*
*Πάντα δί αὐτου ἐγένετο· καὶ χωρὶς αυτου ἐγένετο ουδε ἓν ὁ γέγονεν.*
*'Εν αυτῶ ζωη ην, καὶ η ζωη ην τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρωπων.*
John I. 1, 3, 4.

We know nothing of matter, but by the agency of the senses. We have, and can have, no knowledge, except by intuition and inference, of any substance separate and distinct from its qualities. Locke has distinguished qualities as primary and secondary. Solidity, extension, figure, and mobility, he considers inseparable from matter in whatever form it may be, and therefore he classes them as primary qualities. His secondary qualities are those that spring from the primary; that is, qualities which are nothing in the objects themselves, but which are certain sensations in us, produced by the various powers of the primary qualities; as by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts. Hence colors, sounds, tastes, &c. are by him denominated secondary qualities.

In the above enumeration of primary qualities, it does seem to me that three names are bestowed on what is essentially but one quality. Figure is but a mode of extension ; and solidity results from extension and figure. If my hands embrace a cannon ball, and I endeavor to bring them together, what is it that prevents their contact, but a modified extension in the ball, resisting a modified extension in the hands. Extension acts against extension, and the only new element, which this action reveals, is resistance. This I shall hereafter consider ; and it will, I think, be made to appear, that if extension be resolvable into an absolute Reason, resistance, as its correlative, is equally resolvable into an absolute Will. I may, therefore, now dispose of all these primary qualities, simply by considering two of them ; viz. Extension and Mobility.

But since we cannot have an idea of either of these qualities without the idea of space, I deem it well, first to consider our idea of space. Space is not a quality, either secondary or primary. It is not an object of sensation. Of all our primary ideas, this, without which none other could exist, comes not to us through the medium of any one of the senses. No one ever saw, heard, or felt space. Nor is its idea a product of the reflective reason. The brute creation have as truly a perception of space as we, though they may not make it an object of reflection. Yet, notwithstanding it is neither an object of sensation, nor a result of reflection, we have such entire faith in its existence, that it is easier to conceive of the non-existence of bodies, than of space. But if it come neither from sensation, nor reflection, there is but one other source from which it can be derived, and that is from intuition, or (to confine myself to the language of this treatise,) from that absolute Reason, which I conceive to be God's presence within us. I will endeavor to make this position good, by satisfactory proof. According to the common notion, space is a somewhat which extended bodies fill, or by which they are separated ; and which would remain as a vast,—as an immeasurable vacuity, if they were all annihilated. Now, as preliminary to the consideration of extension and mobility, I will endeavor to show what space really is, in the *absolute*, whence it comes to *us*, and how a conception of it is forced upon the mind.

There is truly nothing in external creation but ultimate forms called material. Wherever these forms are, we perceive spontaneously, intuitively, all possible geometrical relations between them ; and space is nothing but this objective geometry, minus the material forms or coexistent plurality which suggests it, or gives it, as it subsists in the geometrical reason, to become objective. Take away then material extension—the coexistent plurality, and space is nothing but this geometry, which a *pure mathematical Reason*, of its own spontaneity, has created out of itself; or rather which exists in itself, and of which the external is only its objective form.

This position, it is believed, can be established as an incontrovertible scientific truth. It can be proved, by an experimental process, that the space of a body is nothing but the body itself and its geometrical relations, by showing, that if you annihilate a portion of the field of vision, you also annihilate a portion of its space. I can best illustrate this idea by the experiment itself ; and as it is one to which frequent reference may hereafter be made, I must beg the reader here to make it a subject of particular consideration and to criticise it closely. I value it for the means which it affords of illustrating ideas in relation to spirit and matter, concerning which we have hitherto had an obscure notion, rather than a definite conception.

An impression upon the organs of sight is not itself vision, but only the condition necessary to seeing. Now the faculty of sight is one and indivisible ; but it has two distinct organs, with each of which, independently of the other, it can see, and with both which it does see, when both are in the appropriate condition. But since the same field of vision paints two distinct pictures,—one on the right retina and one on the left—why is it that two objects are not perceived, instead of one ? It is not owing to the unity of the faculty of sight only, for distorted eyes see double. The question has been answered in various ways ; but the only answer which appears to me satisfactory, is that the objects are not seen double, because the space between the picture on the right retina and that on the left excites no visual perception. I will give the answer in another form. You see the object through both the impressions, but through the space between them you can see nothing—nothing visual or visible separates them to the internal faculty—and it is for this reason, though we see distinctly with each eye, independently of the other, that both together produce but a single perception of the object. The two impressions are as independent of each other as if each eye belonged to a distinct person ; but by reason of a common faculty of sight, the object seen by both appears somewhat larger and more distinct.

But let the reader satisfy himself on this point. If he be under the necessity of using glasses to aid his sight, he can at once realize the truth of our problem. The two glasses will represent the two images produced on the organs of sight by an object, and the bow between them will represent the space which separates the two images. Now apply them in the usual manner to the eyes, and the space between the two glasses will utterly disappear, and the two glasses will be seen as one.

Here then are actually two objects—the two glasses—they are actually separated by the space of an inch, they produce on the retina two distinct images, and why do we not see the two distinct images, instead of seeing both as one ? I answer that, because the glasses are applied to the eyes in the usual manner, the visible space between them is made to disappear—is annihilated as to the percipient mind ; and hence, as there is no visible extension to separate them, and as they are in all respects similar, they necessarily appear as one object or glass ; considerably enlarged, but still as a single object. So if on corresponding portions of the glasses, nearest each to each, circles be drawn, say of the size of half-dimes, or the coins themselves be so placed, they will appear as one. Now here are actually two objects producing their images, yet both seen as one, because the extension between them is annihilated as to the sight of the beholder. But when we look at a single object, it produces two images, one on each retina, and the space between them may be called the *non-visual*, and these images and this non-visual space precisely correspond, the former to the glasses, or the coins placed, or the circles drawn, and the latter to the separating space or arch between the glasses. And then since the result is the same, it must be explained on the same principle ; that is, the non-visual space produces no effect on the mind, therefore the two images are to it as one. The geometrical relations of the two images to each other disappear, without leaving even a blank behind them ; and, because they are not separated by other visual images, the mind resolves them into a unit. And the result would be the same however great the tangible extension between them. Though separated by a *non-visual* equal to the distance between the stars, the two images would appear as one.

But if the perceived distance between any two objects of sight depend wholly on the intervention of other visible objects, then it must be true that visual space arises wholly from visible objects, and that if you annihilate any portion of the objects, you do not, as may be the common prejudice, leave a gap or *hiatus* between the remaining portions, but, along with the obliterated images, disappear all the geometrical relations, and consequent space, leaving an utter nothingness, or absolute blank of all relations, and distinct objects to become one.*

But though there be in this case no gap or *hiatus* left—no apparent space, without visible objects, yet there is a real—an absolute somewhat for these visible objects to take form in—something independent of them—self-subsistent, yet becoming extant, and giving the geometrical relations to them, which we call their space, the moment that they themselves become extant. For we must not forget that we are not now inquiring merely what space is to us as relative and finite beings, but what it is in itself—what it is in the absolute, or what it would be were there no material forms. Now I think it may be shown that this absolute somewhat, in which objects take form, can be no other than the absolute Reason. Thus ; Space, as already shown, is but the sum of the geometrical relations of visible forms, yet visible form, in and of itself, has no geometrical relations but those which arise within itself, as from the relations of part to part, or of parts to the whole. Considered abstractedly, and alone, it has relations to nothing —out of or beyond itself it has no attribute, and if it be made to have, it must be done by something other than itself. Yet other than the object or form, we may suppose nothing present but the percipient mind ; but in the presence of this mind these geometrical relations at once manifest themselves. Whence come they then ? They are not an object of sight or of feeling ; and whence do they come but from the mind itself, or rather but from that pure Reason which at once creates, and perceives all mathematical relations ? If this be so, then those relations, the sum of which constitutes, what we call the space of bodies, are but an ascription of that Not-Me which I call the absolute Reason or Logos, made through the conscious individual to the objects perceived. Hence space is infinite—it can never be filled ; for wherever an object is created, the Logos, through the percipient mind, ascribes to it those geometrical relations which are themselves its space. Withhold this ascription, and all material forms are resolved into unity—they cease to be extended—bestow it and the universe is created.

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* Distorted eyes see double, because each takes in a portion of the field of vision, not common to both.

Indeed, if this subject be considered scientifically, we come to a like result. For if it be true that the particles of matter are inextended, (and it is said to be all but demonstrable that they are,) then, if you take from them those separating spaces, which are the ascription of the geometric reason, that abstraction, alone, resolves them into unity ; and all matter becomes a mathematical, or inextended point ; in other words, a mere conception, or one of the forms of the intellect. But if all matter be resolved into a mathematical point, which is but a conception or form of thought, space goes with it, and can exist only as a mere conception or abstract idea of the absolute Reason.

I now proceed to the consideration of extension. By extension I mean that idea which necessarily arises, on the mere perception of the outlines or superficies of bodies.

Now, if it be true, that space is nothing but that which I have called the geometrical Reason, (meaning thereby one of the forms in which the absolute Reason develops itself) rendering itself objective, then it would seem, that this Reason, as objective, embraces within itself those very forms by occasion of which it becomes objective. We have an idea of the immensity of space by contemplating the innumerable stars which occupy this objective geometry—Take it from them—resolve the spaces between them into the non-visual of the foregoing experiment, and they are reduced to unity ; that immensity of space disappears ; the innumerable stars which occupied an illimitable expanse become a point ; and a mere point, in and of itself, can suggest no idea of space to the percipient power. If we would acquire an idea of space from the point, we must, as it were, repeat it *conceptively ;* we must imagine a coexistent point, and, by repeating points conceptively, we may come to an idea of space ; but the single point, in and of itself, suggests no such idea. Now what is that which we call extension in those forms, by occasion of which this Reason manifests itself as the space which they occupy ?

Unquestionably if pure space may be resolved into mere geometrical relations, the extension of bodies may be resolved into the same relations. There is no necessity of going into a process of abstract reasoning on this point ; the foregoing experiment proves what space is, and the same experiment will show that extension is but one of the forms of the same geometric Reason which constitutes space. What is true of space, is true of visible extension. Interpose the *non-visual* between the extremes of a body, and the extremes of the same body appear together as a one continuous extension ; and this continuity it owes not to itself, but to an overruling law of the percipient mind, which makes a continuity where there is actually a gap or hiatus in vision. There is an extension between the retinæ; also between the glasses in the preceding experiment; yet the extension, in each case, disappears; the two eyes are as one; the two glasses appear as one. A blank of geometrical relations, in an extended body and in pure space, is therefore followed by the same results. In both cases unity or continuity is preserved, notwithstanding the actual breach made in the field of vision, and this continuity or unity can be preserved only by the involuntary ascription of new geometrical relations, in the absence of those supposed to be annihilated. Yet if extension exists from geometrical relations, there must still be something from which those relations subsist—something to support them—and what is that something from which they do subsist, and by which they are supported?

I answer, that there can be no geometrical relations, without a coexistent plurality of some sort—as of points or of objects. It may be of little consequence what this plurality consists of, provided it be a coexistent plurality; but a coexistent or simultaneous plurality it must be. But whence can such a plurality derive its existence?

I apprehend it can derive its existence only from the absolute unit; the Esse, or as it is felt or apperceived in the depths of consciousness, the Logos or Divine Reason. Let us see if this unit, subsisting as the soul of the soul, may not repeat itself objectively in a coexistent plurality, and thus give, by a necessary consequence, our ideas of extension and space; if out of this unity within us, there subsisting as the basis of our idea of number, may not come a coexistent plurality, or cotemporaneous order, that shall manifest itself in the consciousness, as an idea of extension.

The absolute Reason, considered in itself, is the absolute unit, and as such, it must be the basis of all that is called matter or spirit. Subjectively considered, it is an entirety without parts. It attains to plurality and the finite, by repeating itself objectively. It repeats itself in the soul of man, and thereby makes him a finite intelligence. And because he is a finite intelligence, man cannot see the infinite, nor fully apperceive it. The infinite is a unit to his intellect, and a blank to his sense; and he can contemplate it and realize its presence only in the *termini*, or limits, which it reveals to him as a finite being. I say it is a unit—a blank—for without variety or change, who could be conscious of any thing? But break this unit, this blank, into variety—into parts. Let this be done by consequence of the structure of the organs of sensation, and you have in this variety a world of the senses; let it be done by the action of the will within you, and you have that world of conceptions, which manifests itself in the consciousness; yet both the internal and external worlds will be but the same unit, seen or contemplated in different aspects. Now this variety, these *termini*, are that coexistent plurality, without which we can have no geometrical relations, space, or extension. Yet this plurality and these relations cannot be separated—they are correlatives. Without the plurality you cannot have the relations, and without the relations you cannot have the plurality. Either subsists from either; and all spring from and still subsist in the absolute unit or divine Reason; and are no other than the conceptions of that Reason as revealed to a finite intelligence. This is not mere theory; let us examine ourselves, for proof.

Unity, as felt in the individual soul, resolved into coexistent plurality to the senses, will necessarily make the idea of that visible and tangible somewhat, which we call extension. To explain: a mathematical point has no dimensions. It is a mere conception. The conception of a single mathematical point, taken abstractly and independently, gives us no idea of extension. If one of these conceptions after another be repeated to any number, they will still give no conception of extension. But let us have a conception of several of these points at once, say two or three as coexistent, and their relation to each other becomes immediately and necessarily a geometrical relation. They present to the mind, irresistibly, the idea of a line or triangle. Now the single mathematical point may be considered as representing the felt unity of which I speak, and which, if it do but repeat itself in a coexistent plurality, becomes, necessarily, an idea of extension.

This felt unity exists, subjectively, in what may be called the absolute mathematical Reason. That is, in one of the forms of that Reason which we feel within ourselves as a law of our being, and which we know to be essentially an active and creative power. Do but change our normal relation to it, as it is in the individual soul; and it acts —acts from its own nature, and according to laws its own. It projects and repeats, objectively in finite modes, its own subjective unity, and thus creates that simultaneous, objective multiplicity which we call extension.

Without this unity, (felt, though not an object of thought,) the conception of extension would have no basis—no premise. For we cannot attain to a knowledge of extension by comparing one extended body with another, without taking for granted the existence of that very extension of which we are in search. Thus, I may place my hand on this table, and say that it is extended ; but what authorizes me so to say ? Why, merely because my hand is extended. But I may very properly ask myself, how it is that I know my hand to be extended ? Where is the test that will enable me to answer such a question ?—Where is it, but in the felt absolute unity—this incipient mathesis—this perfect mathematical Reason within me ? It is this Reason which spontaneously, and by a law and energy its own, forces upon me an instinctive feeling of the original unity within, and thence of its own multiple or projected plurality in the nether sphere of the senses.

I am here speaking of a mere tangible extension. —I am inquiring how from mere feeling, without any previous experience, comes this idea, and, bearing this in mind, I submit an additional proof that it is out of that Reason, felt as a unit in the individual mind, that this idea proceeds. When I hold my hand to the fire, and it is equally warmed all over, thereby producing a single undivided sensation, the feeling is a unit ; and, as such, is a form of the absolute unit ; yet, from the perception of this unity, I acquire no idea of a palpable extension, such as arises from a resisting solid body. The feeling is nothing beyond itself, and it perceives not its own limits. So place the hand on a surface, which shall affect all parts of it with one undivided sensation, and the result must be the same. But stud the surface with a variety of points, resolve that unity into a coexistent plurality, and that single idea which is the absolute of extension, as it exists in the perfect mathematical Reason within, becomes spontaneously, instinctively, and instantly, conusant of the geometrical relations that are thus made to start out of its own bosom. It ceases now to be a mere single sensation of the hand ; it becomes a thought—a geometrical, a mathematical thought—a thought forced upon the percipient Me, irresistibly, by an overruling law of the soul. Spread your fingers—place them on distinct points, and you have a triangle—walk over the earth, and each act is determining, intuitively, by a spontaneous geometrical reason, that there is an extension. You geometrize practically, actually—you make an extension for yourself; or rather the will, the Me within, brings into action in its own consciousness, that perfect Reason, Logos or Not-Me within—with which it subsists in the most perfect union—and it is *that* which geometrizes, and makes an extension for you. It gives itself to exist without, as it exists within you, *mutatis mutandis*, and thus creates for you, the world of matter, as well as the world of mind.

The assimilative Logos, by its intimate relation to the will, imparts something of its own consciousness, and thus creates the individuality of the *Me*, and gives it to be conusant of all the operations that are going on within, and around it, and to put in requisition energies divine. In this relation there is no confusion. I will to move my limbs, my body—in so far, my organization is the Me; but of the energies which this act of my will puts in requisition, I know little or nothing—they are of the vital organic Not-Me. I sit down, I rise, I walk, I run, but in every act, I put in requisition the earth's attraction, without which I could not move. And so it is as to the Me and Not-Me, internal. I open my eyes upon the universe, and a thousand ideas exist at once in my mind. The opening of my eyes was an act of the will, but the creation of these thousand ideas was an act of the Logos within. It paused not for my bidding. It is thus that the conscious Me, the individual man or spirit, puts in requisition, by his voluntary act, that spontaneous Reason which geometrizes to his senses, extension and space.

Now with this view of that which constitutes the relations and the individuality of the percipient mind, we may illustrate the position, that coexistent plurality is of itself extension, by the following supposition. Suppose the mind to be a mathematical point, endowed with sensation and reason—suppose all the objects of the material universe to be at one and the same time acting upon it—no matter how, but as so many magnets if you please—in an infinite variety of degrees, according to size and distance; and then I ask, whether this sentient, rational, mathematical point, could do otherwise than perceive the coexistent multiplicity and all its simultaneous relations, and in them, all the elements of geometry. Throw into a mathematical point, all the variety of the universe, and it is of no consequence how it is produced, or what it is, provided it be simultaneous, and you will have an extension of necessity, and with it, all the relations of space. Magnitude is nothing but by comparison, and the universe, thus wrought out of a mathematical point, would have its own immensity.

Sounds are heard in succession. Could we *rehear* the notes of a tune, as we *review* visible objects, music would have its geometry, its extension and form, and pure mathematical reason would take shape in sound, and stand out in a world of harmony. The hand, the eye, and the ear, have had, in all time and in all language, certain terms denoting an idea of extension common to the three senses. The terms long, short, continuous, broken, round or rolling, sharp, rough, smooth, and a multitude of others, are by no means purely metaphorical when applied to sounds. Their application and their meaning are as naturally understood in reference to sounds, as to visible and tangible objects.

I come, then, to the conclusion that the coexistent plurality, with which we are made acquainted by the agency of the senses, and the geometrical relations which it reveals, are what constitute that visible and tangible somewhat, which we call extension; and that our idea of extension, as well as of space, and the coexistent plurality, is derived to us, from the absolute idea embosomed in the pure mathematical reason within us; in other words, is itself that reason geometrically actualized.

I will here add, that, although we have educed the coexistent plurality from the absolute unit, as represented in a single sensation of the hand, yet our remarks are no less applicable to the sense of sight. This sense or faculty, considered as yet unaffected by aught of change, is a unit, and one of the forms of the absolute unit; it wants objectivity; it sees nothing. Now, if by occasion of the action of the Me, or finite will, this unit break into a variety—be that variety a mere conception of the Logos, or whatever else it may—we, at once, have the coexistent plurality; we have the termini, the points, the lines, the objective geometry—all starting out of the unity of this sense, and all ultimately resolvable into that absolute unit, in which they have their basis, and whose creative energy the action of the will has put in requisition. Thus pure space and the extension of bodies, through whatever sense they may be contemplated, are both resolvable into the unity of the Absolute Reason, as mere geometrical relations which that Reason has evolved from itself, and ascribed to a coexistent plurality; whilst the plurality to which they are ascribed, is formed by a resolution of the same absolute unit into finite modes, by the conceptive repetition of itself in *termini* or points: so that space, and extension in all its variety of forms, are but conceptions of that divine Reason or Logos, which is at once within us and everywhere without us. And, then, because they are the conceptions of that Reason, they are also the conceptions of the divine mind, and thus subsist, as to us, as a creation absolute and independent of our finite wills. They are the Not-Me, and come of the Supreme or Absolute Will; and, therefore, stand out, in the presence of the Me, or finite will, as the independent forms of the sensuous universe.

## MOBILITY.

This term, in its most comprehensive sense, may be considered as embracing every susceptibility of change to which matter is subject; for it is difficult to conceive of a change, in material bodies, without some change either in their masses or their insensible parts. The term however is generally used to denote that susceptibility to motion which becomes manifest to the senses by a change in the geometrical relations of masses, or their parts. And it is in this sense that I shall here use it, but perhaps not exclusively confining its use to *manifest* changes. It may be made to comprehend gravity for instance, which is generally a tendency to move, rather than a manifest motion; it may be made to comprehend the tendencies of vital bodies to growth and decay; and also the chemical tendencies in bodies, and so on. Considered in this light, Mobility, unquestionably, may be called a primary quality of matter, so long as we look not beyond matter for its origin or cause; for matter is not only constantly susceptible of motion, but is ever in motion.

But since space, or the sum of all geometrical relations, has been shown to be a mere ascription of that divinity within, (which I call the perfect Reason or Logos,) to bodies, or, in other words, to be that Reason itself extant, present to, or involving all things; and since the absolute extension, or coexistent plurality, has likewise been found to be that very Reason in one of its forms, it does seem necessarily to follow, that though the susceptibility to motion be in matter, yet that the motive power and source of the susceptibility are in the perfect Reason ; and that it must be the willed action, or tendency of this Reason that is the source of all motion in matter ; and perhaps of action in mind.

Now this same willed action, must manifest its expansive energy, in all growth, progress, and development—in the action of chemical affinities, in the flow of waters—the rush of air—in all physical changes on earth—in the action of mass on mass of matter through all space, and in those centripetal and centrifugal forces which give order and movement to the universe, for it is an action, at the centre and the source of all things.

But further to illustrate, if further illustration be necessary : suppose all space (as it is to us) to be extended matter, or what in effect would be the same ; suppose all material forms were reduced to a *unit*—that is, seen as the absolute Reason sees them—*ab extra*—thus having no space or relative points in space, what motion could there be in the entirety ? Part might change in reference to part and to the whole, but the *entirety* could depart from no point, and proceed to none. It could but change state. And this great aggregate is after all neither more nor less than the same unit—that absolute idea, into which extension resolves itself, and which we found to be embosomed in the pure mathematical Reason, and a mere form thereof. Any change or tendency to change in this idea, which is the essential form of all matter, is the absolute of motion, and necessarily produces its correspondent relative motions, or tendencies, everywhere.

I have named this state or tendency, which is the absolute of motion, a *willed* state of the Logos, or divine Reason, ever acting in the soul. For we know of but one self-originating cause of motion, and that is *voluntary* power or *will.* To believe that motion is in every instance caused by a will, is a dictate of spontaneity. It is true that we lose sight of this dictate, by discovering repeatedly that one body communicates its impulse to another, but could we stand *ab extra*, and at one glance behold all the infinitude of movement in the universe, would it not again return ? Should we not see that it was an immense machine operating alone, and should we not, rather than acknowledge an effect without a cause—(the greatest of miracles) recognize in its operation, a life, a mind, a will presiding over it, and infusing its energies through the mighty whole ? To conclude it to be an effect without a cause, would be a violence done to an irresistible impulse of the Reason, whilst to ascribe it to the influence of a presiding will, would be conformable to the whole constitution of our nature.

The Logos itself, in a certain aspect, is but the supreme will—the divine energy subjected to the laws of divine wisdom, and so subsisting and acting within a divinely perfect order. Indeed, I shall have occasion, in this treatise, to speak of the Logos in this sense ; and when so considering it, I shall call it the supreme or Divine Will. I have here shown that the absolute of motion, or Mobility, comes from the Logos, or this Divine Will, and I now proceed to show that the same Logos gives to us our idea of

## TIME.

Time, like extension, space, and motion, has its relative and absolute—its manifest and essential modes or aspects. Time was created when relative extension, space, and motion were created. In other words, God created time, when He created a succession of events, or changes.

Before this, (if I may so speak,) relative or manifest time was not—all was Eternity. He, who asks therefore, with the child, who made God, absurdly supposes a creation, a time, and a succession of events or changes, anterior to their Creator. There is a difficulty, arising from the forms of language, in expressing to the understanding, the relation between time and eternity. The relation is logical, not chronological. Eternity is an everlasting *Now*, ever resolving itself, without changing, into what is called time. It is *as* the absolute of motion—one of whose *phases* it is—to the relative motions which it generates. And just as the relative, is resolvable into the absolute of motion, so time is resolvable into eternity; and eternity is God, in the unity of His own order—or the Logos in *synthetic* unity.

Eternity is to those changes which make what we call time, what the soul is to those thoughts or internal changes which it generates within itself, and which constitute its own little world of mind. Obliterate the mind, if you choose, and the soul still remains to create a new one, as it often has done in cases of insanity. Let the old and new minds alternate with each other, and each will have its distinct memory, and distinct time; and the same identity will thus put on two distinct exterior individualities, both deriving their times from the same phase of the Logos which constitutes their common soul.

Every change which takes place in the human mind is itself a portion of the time of that mind. A rapid succession of thoughts will, on retrospect, seem to have made the sun and moon to stand still. A slow succession—a lingering on a solitary thought—will, on review, seem to have wonderfully accelerated their progress; though during the state, we seem to suffer a short eternity. Stop all change in the mind, and you stop time; as in the case of swoons and profound sleep. The soul then rests in one continued state, and when it rouses from it, it finishes the sentence which it had, perhaps, begun, just as the state commenced. Not an instant is lost to it—no gap or hiatus is apparent in time during this suspension of change, any more than in space, when a portion of the field of vision is abstracted. The analogy between space and time is here perfect, evincing a common origin.

All minds have the same common eternity, since all have the same common Logos. But that eternity is to them, what the action of gravitation is to so many clocks. Each mind transmutes the common eternity into a time its own. Each individual mind has, in this manner, a time distinct from that of all others; and in this sense a man of thirty may have lived longer than one of three score and ten. Hence the necessity of a common measure for all minds; and we find that common measure in the motions of the heavenly bodies, in the revolution of the earth upon its axis, and its progress round the sun. To these motions, that mathematical reason, which is above, though within us, ascribes time; just as to extension, it ascribes space, or to vibrations, sounds; and forces upon us a faith in it, in the same manner.

The changes which give occasion to our idea of time are like sounds observed in successive order, and time thereby is made to differ from space, as mere arithmetical numeration differs from geometrical lines and angles; or as a successive repetition of mathematical points, ever disappearing, differs from a coexistent plurality.

But I need not dwell on this point. It must be sufficiently evident, that if all extension, all space, all action, and consequently, all change, be of states or ideas in the Logos or absolute Reason, then time itself, which is but a succession, or an ascription to a succession of changes, must likewise have its origin or absolute idea, in the same divine Reason.

Here then, are four absolute ideas—the absolute of extension, the absolute of space, the absolute of motion, and the absolute of time—out of which this external universe, together with all that it inherits, has proceeded as a mere relative or phenominal existence. I take this relative or phenominal existence as I find it, and trace it up to its pure abstract form, which I find to be in that perfect Reason which I feel in myself, (however I may pervert it,) and which every individual feels in himself, and which is itself the presence of that Deity who made all things.

So much for those qualities called the primary qualities. They are primary as to us, but they have their substance, substratum, or ground in absolute and unchanging ideas of the all-present Logos. Beyond them, I cannot look for the substance in which they inhere.

As to those qualities called secondary, I doubt not that some of them, such as color, considered with reference to the views here presented, are as truly primary, as extension, and have their absolute idea out of which they proceed, and without which they would forever remain unknown to us; but it is sufficient for the present, to say that if they are primary, they have their absolute idea in the perfect Reason; if secondary, they are dependent on, and derived from, the primary, and so are, indirectly, the phenomena of absolute ideas of the same Reason.

If this be true, all qualities that appear in matter, be they primary or secondary, subsist from their absolute ideas; and it hence follows, that Deity—the Logos, is that in which they are, and in which they become to us, in their own mode of development, objective forms; and in those forms they become what we call matter, and are to us what we call them. For let me not be misunderstood—the material universe is no deception—no mere dream or illusion of the individual soul—but is to us, precisely what our senses teach us it is. We are in the midst of the great all of material things, of which our material selves are coordinate parts; and we realize extension, space, motion, and time, when we take note of them reflectively through the senses, by comparing one material object with another, or one part of the same continuous element with another. It has pleased God to make our organism material, and comparing that organism with the forms by which it is surrounded, we find ourselves in a material universe, of necessity.

Had it pleased Him to have conferred upon us a spiritual organization merely, our universe would have as necessarily been spiritual; for worlds change, as qualities change, though the substratum remain the same. To us every thing is as it is, by relation—long and short, great and small, swift and slow, rough and smooth, hard and soft, and all other qualities, made known to us by the senses, as belonging to bodies, have an existence by comparison, or relation only; which is, however, as to our material selves, a great and inflexible reality.

Such is the external world, as to the soul's instrumental organic structure; but what it is in itself, or what extension, space, motion, and time are, as to the perfect and absolute Reason, is quite another question. And accordingly we have found that they, subjectively considered, are mere ideas in the divine mind; and objectively, the mere multiples—phenomena—of those ideas. In their most interior form, they are mere thoughts of the perfect reason—in their most exterior form, they are those very thoughts carried out into their own infinitude of imagery. In the midst of this imagery is man, himself an image of the perfect Reason, as it may be shadowed forth in the multiple and finite. And here he takes note of this imagery, because it is objective, and he himself a coordinate part thereof.

The general position, that the material universe, including the material man himself, is the imagery or last result of thought generated in the Logos or Supreme Mind, may I think be illustrated and confirmed by observing the operations of that law, or energy, which presides over and governs the development of thought *in* the individual mind. That it is the same Logos, or power, which creates and governs in the microcosmic order of the individual mind, that creates and governs in the grand scale of the universe, if not already sufficiently apparent, will, I flatter myself be made very manifest in succeeding chapters. But if this be so, then, I think, that I may confidently appeal to the self-observation of the reader for a confirmation of the truth of the position just stated. For myself, I think that I am justified by experience in saying, that there is not a thought, however abstract and general, which does not spontaneously seek a development or expression of itself in form.

Let one, accustomed to abstract speculations, lie down to sleep with their necessary general ideas bearing upon his mind, and he will see how readily, when left to their own mode of development and expression, those abstractions take form in the imagery of reverie or dream. It is the proper language of the soul in converse with herself. In this imagery, he will well understand his abstractions. Their likeness will sometimes be so perfect, that he may often forget whether it be the naked thought, or its image, that stands before the inward eye. The thought oftener takes form in the ideal world of the eye, than of the ear ; but in truth the principle is the same whether it find its ultimate in the one or the other. Ideas logically precede words, and when during these states they seek their ultimates in the conceptions of sounds, they are as truly symbolic, or metaphorical, as when they find them in the imagery of sight. There is, indeed, such a constant tendency in all minds to metaphor—and I here mean visual imagery—that the metaphor is felt to be necessary to every complete and perfect thought. No man ever had a vivid thought, that did not clothe itself in imagery. Not that he always, or even generally, expresses himself by describing the images in his mind; but I mean merely to say, that the process of thought is carried on by the aid of them, as in the natural language of the soul, whilst she addresses herself to those without, in such conventional speech as is best understood by all.

But if symbolic representation be the last result of the Logos, as it is in man, or the conscious *Me*, must it not be also the last result, as it is in God or conscious Not-Me? In man, thoughts—pure abstractions—stop short in the ideal, or a mere movement of the brain; but in God, acting through universal existence, they pass forth unobstructed, and find their own termini in what to us are real material forms, as their last expression.* The mind of God thus to us materializes itself—takes form in a language suited to its own infinity—projects from the absolute idea of extension, the relative and phenominal in all its infinite variety, and in that infinite variety, still subsists as one; just as the human soul preserves its own entirety, in the midst of all the variety of mind, which it generates within itself.

It may be somewhat difficult to reconcile the seeming contradiction that this universe, as it appears to us, should subsist in the perfect Reason, subjectively as a unit, and objectively as an infinite multiplicity ; but I do not despair of making it intelligible. Are we not at this moment realizing a corresponding truth ? Consider our own organic structure ; it consists of an infinite variety, and every organ is performing its distinct function, and every nerve has its distinct capacity to feel, whilst the soul lives through and sustains the whole. Yet amid all this variety, the whole organism is by her felt as a unit. If perchance some obstruction interrupt, or break the entire harmony, this idea is disturbed, the perfection of the unity is marred ; but as long as this harmony continues, the soul feels this vast variety as a unit—as a one whole. This is her connate relation to the body—her feeling or idea of the organism in its subjectivity, or its synthetic state. Could the soul now project this organism so as to make it, with all its distinct organs, objects of perception, of feeling or of vision—as indeed to some extent it does—this same organic structure would then subsist objectively, whilst the subjective relation would still be maintained. Its idea or felt existence, subjectively, would be a unit—objectively, a manifold formation. It is thus that the universe may subsist in the bosom of the divine Reason, subjectively as a unit, and, objectively in all its infinite multiplicity.

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* It is this tendency of the soul to symbolize ideas in sounds, as well as in visual imagery, that has created language.

Nor can there be much difficulty in conceiving how this universe, gross and coarse as it seems to us, becomes in the Divine Reason, itself a mere idea. If we take from it that space and those geometrical relations, which this Reason creates, and with which it invests it, it does in fact become a mere thought, or rather a mere substratum of thought—a mere something to be invested with qualities which may be just as well spiritual, as material. Suppose that the space between the infinitude of worlds formed from the immense of matter, was converted at once into the blank of the *non-visual* of the foregoing experiment ; it is manifest that they would become to the sense of vision, just as the two pictures of the retina, a unit—great or small who can determine, since there would be nothing to which it could be compared. And as to its extension, would not any pure mental image or conception of form be just as truly extended, as such a unit ? To a being thus *ab extra*—who thus subsists out of, and distinct from space and extension—such a unit in its subjective form would be this universe of material things—intangible—inextended—imponderable—without motion or tendency, resisted by nothing, and resisting nothing. If to such a being, such a unit bore any relation—no matter what—his thought could move it.

How surely omnipotent, then, would he be, if that unit were itself the present product of his thought ! If the universe be regarded in this light, there can be no difficulty in conceiving it to exist as an idea in the Divine Reason.

This material universe is thus a mere thought in the bosom of the Logos, through which as its medium, that Logos sought to realize an image of its own perfect self in the human organic structure. It did thus realize itself in man's material form, and perfected its image therein for transmission through every succession of change. Excuse me reader, whilst in illustration of a matter so grave, I resort to the suggestion of an imaginative friend, without, however, meaning to adopt the suggestion further than it may serve the purpose for which it is quoted. "During the age of the primitive humanity," says he, "the Logos was at once God and man ; but when its image had attained a degree of perfection in human clay which qualified it for the reception of something of God's own personal freedom—something of his own free and absolute will—it received the divine gift thereof—it received the free conscious individual will—it became a free activity, and thus ceased to be one and identical with its Creator. The image thereupon acquired a quasi identity, as it acquired a quasi freedom, and became distinctly a living soul. It was in this incomplete, or conditional separation from his Divine Parent, that to man, the universe itself *seemed* to separate from its generator—seemed to lose, and, as to him, lost its former relation, as an ultimate form of the mind of God. Like himself it seemed to become something independent of Deity; for he made his own organism the test whereby he determined the nature of its qualities, and as they were to him matter, he too hastily determined that they could not be mind to God."*

## CHAPTER III.

### THE SUBJECTIVE UNITY IN THE LOGOS OR ABSOLUTE REASON, RESOLVED INTO ITS OBJECTIVE ALL; SPIRITUAL AND MATERIAL.

> "What if earth
> Be but the shadow of Heaven, and things therein
> Each to other like, more than on Earth is thought?"

THAT God is present to every human soul, is a truth which all admit. That He is present within, and as the Logos, or that overruling Reason, which each and all feel within them, is a postulate of this chapter; which, if it do not at once approve itself to the mind of the reader, I hope to make very intelligible before I close this Treatise. At present this position rests on the ground that the Logos, or perfect Reason comprehends all things, and that all things are therefore present to it, and it present to all things.

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* Hence, it may be, comes the tradition of the fall of man from a paradisiacal state, or golden age.

But I here go further, and, anticipating the proof that will be offered in the proper place, assume, that it is present in its *entire unity ;* nay, something more than present to the conscious Me, ever making to it, on known conditions, (which must always be fulfilled,) revelations from its own infinitude. Do you desire to know the absolute cause of all effects, or of any effect ?—Consult this Reason, the Logos within you—it is the grand Causality—the great Mover and Orderer of all spirit and matter. Go not forth into the material universe in search of absolute causation—inquire not of the stars—dig not into the bowels of the earth—nay, are you a physiologist ?—pry not inquisitively into the heart and brain—you shall not find the grand Causality there. Life, mind, gravity, magnetism, electricity, light, caloric and so forth, are but effects subsisting here on earth, and here constantly made to subsist, from those ideas in the Logos, whose ultimate results they are. All these effects will ever be manifest—in some form or mode, wherever the percipient Me may be made to exist : be it in the world of spirit, or the world of matter. It will, however, be but effects, that are perceived. The supreme Causality—the absolute life and mind—the essential gravity, magnetism, electricity, light, caloric, and so forth, lie still deep in the eternal soul of all things—in existence necessarily inaccessible. Go, chase the rainbow—aim to pluck its gorgeous arch from the cloud—pursue it, and it will mock your quest ; analyze its resplendent hues, and they may suggest to your reason, but shall never in themselves, reveal to your eye, the parent source of all their light and beauty.

Therefore, pause ye, and look upward to the grand fountain of all light, and you may then learn that the radiant arch is nought but the dimmed image of its glory. Go, search for causes in matter, for life or mind, for instance; and you shall see nothing but effects; each series of which has its causes, which, when discovered, shall turn out to be but effects, of causes still higher—thus ever alluring the soul upward—ever evading the knife of the dissector, and the analysis of the chemist, they at length force inquiry to leave the material, and enter the world of spirit; there to find, in the Logos, or perfect Reason, the life of lives, the soul of souls, the cause of causes. If matter be an ultimate expression of the perfect Reason, then there is that which is not ultimate—which is a substance, but not a substance whose qualities stand out to the senses. In other words, there is a degree of substance above the material or sensible; and whether this degree be called spiritual or supersensual, it matters not, so long as the true import of the terms is rightly understood. I shall in the next chapter, give this degree of substance a more particular consideration; but, surely, without further discussion, no one, not disposed to contend for the absurdity that what we call effects, have in fact no absolute principle of causation, can ever think of questioning the existence of such a degree. But the admission of this degree of substance is all that is now required, in order to enable me to proceed with the further development of our theory.

I have in the preceding chapter, been considering the physical man as the Me, and the material universe as the Not-Me. But this is the external form of the Logos or perfect Reason. The universe is a genesis of the highest element of thought in

Deity; for no thought can arise at the grand centre, that does not spontaneously propagate itself to the utmost verge of the orb of being, changing its aspect or form with every degree of substance through which it may pass.

Now I am desirous of showing that this external form, which each thought and the entire mind of Deity may have taken, has, in the degree next within or above, a correspondent world of form—This the preceding chapter does not show; since for all that appears therein, there may be nothing but the absolute ideas and their ultimates—And I wish to establish this position logically from the world of the senses. I wish to reason from the forms of matter to those of spirit—from the universe as an effect or ultimate form, to its immediate cause within or above that form; I would, (if it may be done without blame,) trace the connection between the internal and external of this grand theatre of our existence, and show that in the world of spirit the Not-Me exists, with precisely the same relations to the Me, as in the world of matter.

For example, I here find my material self resting on this outstretched earth, canopied by the blue vault of heaven—I find it surrounded by an infinitude of coordinate forms of matter, all moved and actuated, or governed by certain laws, immutable and eternal. Now it ought to appear, if this position be correct, that in the degree or sphere of substance next above the material, I have a supersensual or spiritual form, in a correspondent supersensual or spiritual world, and in like manner related to, and surrounded by, forms spiritual—all too, in like manner, subject to laws analogous to, though not one and identical in all respects with, those that govern in the material universe.

But to establish this position, it is necessary that

I first show that I have the legitimate means for accomplishing it. To this end I propose now to show, that the principle of causation, considered as the perfect Reason, furnishes legitimate means whereby the correspondence may be well established. I propose first to show, how this perfect Reason or Logos creates human language—how by an all-formative energy, it expresses itself in all the various modes of living and dead matter; and then I propose to show the perfect analogy between its operations in the individual mind, or soul, and through that, on the brain; and its necessary operations in all spiritual substance, and through that in all matter; and thence draw an inference which will at once show the legitimacy of the means, and support the above position.

But in order to the successful accomplishment of this object, we must be careful not to confound things that are in themselves distinct. We must be careful to distinguish between a cause, and the necessary conditions under which a cause acts. The vital principle of the seed is the cause of the germination and growth of the plant; but earth, moisture, heat and light, are the conditions necessary to its germination and growth. The various conditions, under which cause develops itself, give distinct individuality to each development. Could the conditions, under which the vital principle of the acorn develops itself, be always mathematically the same, the development would be the same, the form the same, the oak the same; but this may not be, until every condition be the same, even to the quality of the seminal matter, and consequently to that form or modification of the universal life, which corresponds thereto. Again—if further illustration be necessary—look at the green fields, the glassy waters, the brown forests, the gray cliffs of the hills, and the blue o'erarching sky;

there is but one cause operating here, to produce all this variety of hues. It is the light of the sun, which in itself is one, and perfectly homogeneous; but the various surfaces which receive and reflect it, impose those conditions upon it, which give to it, as the same uniform cause, all this variety of effect. In each separate surface, the light, as cause, takes a distinct modification—acquires a separate individuation, (if the term may be so used,) and yet is dependent, for its distinct mode, on the same homogeneous element. So it is with the one all-pervading life. There is, it may be fairly inferred from the preceding chapter, but one life; yet that one life—(by reason of the diversity of the seminal qualities which it, acting, as the divine will, creates for itself, and through which it passes into effect)—is wonderfully diversified. Each germ of animal or vegetable life, contains within itself a somewhat of the universal life, individualized and made something distinct from its original self—a somewhat that still continues to be of, and from, the universal life which produced, and still sustains it, and an integral part of which it still continues to be. And as such part, it becomes a distinct medium through which the universal life operates, with an assimilative energy, on its surrounding elements—transmuting them into a shape appropriate to the medium. Causality, thus passing into multiplicity, creates conditions for itself, (for each new medium becomes in turn a condition to one subsequently created,*) and so goes on multiplying forms and media without end.

Could we always distinguish between the conditions, and the cause, we should, I think, discover a logical arrangement of causes and effects—and should learn that every thing, created and made manifest in the sphere of the senses, had its correspondent cause above the sphere of the senses—and that the arrangement and order beneath, was but an image reflected into matter, of an analogous arrangement and order above.

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* Thus the vital principle of the acorn forms the germ and root; the germ and root the trunk; the trunk the branch; the branch the bud; and the bud the leaf.

Now I am desirous of showing that there is this logical arrangement in the sphere above, and beneath—in spirit and in matter. To do this, I will show that causality operates logically—that it is in fact but the resolution of a sort of mathesis, or logical principle, into its necessary consequences, and relations—that it is a universal premise which, of its own spontaneity, evolves all its included elements or particulars. That a *premise*, as it exists in the mind, has this spontaneous tendency, every one must feel to be true who has made such premise an object of contemplation. The Me cannot bestow its fixed attention upon any premise for any considerable time, without the manifestation of a spontaneous tendency of this sort.* The act of bestowing the attention may be an act of the will; but the resolution of the premise is a law of mind above the will, and therefore of the Not-Me, the Logos, or divine Will.

But independent of this fact, if the conclusions to which the preceding chapter has conducted us be correct, it is unquestionably true, that Causality can be no other than that perfect Reason, Will, or Logos itself, passing with more or less perfection, out into the actual—becoming itself an actuality, in ultimate time and space, or more properly in ultimate successive and simultaneous order. Permit me to illustrate this view of the subject, by an example of its operations taken from the sphere of sounds, or the world of the ear. The organs of speech being given, articulate sounds—inasmuch as they become extant in successive order—are less subject to the control of conditions than effects wrought in most other sensuous spheres within which this Reason may be supposed to display its creative energy. Music is similar in all countries; and the structure of speech essentially the same, however different may be the articulate sounds which compose it.

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* Thus the idea of Man suggests the idea of the varieties of the race, of nations, and of individuals; so genus suggests the idea of species; cause that of effect; a part (as the segment of a circle,) that of the whole.

That law, which is common to all men in their intellectual operations, and which governs from generation to generation in the achievement of some necessary good, is the Reason common to all—that is, it is the overruling Logos itself. I will draw an illustration from an achievement of this Reason as it operates through man, and which thus makes an undoubted manifestation of itself as reason, and then proceed to its analogous works in Nature.

Take human language then—the language of some unmixed people—a language that has become fixed, such as the Hebrew, or Arabic, Greek, or Latin. That language is not the work of one individual, or of any number of individuals concerting and designing a language. The language has been forming through a succession of generations, by the tongue of man, woman, and child, entirely ignorant of what they were doing. Yet analyze that language, and its structure is perfect; design and logic appear in every part. Considered with relation to that part of the human family which used it, and through which it was formed, nothing can be more perfect—not even the structure of the organs of speech. A logical design of the perfect Reason has embodied itself in sound, and become in the world of the ear, an object of thought as perfect, as any one that may be found in the world of the eye.

There have been those who have said that God formed the first human language ; and it is the perfection that appears in some of those ancient and unadulterated languages which suggested the saying. Those, who so believe, are, it appears to me, unquestionably right. God did form the first human language, but not perhaps, in precisely the way they may suppose ; and yet in a manner perfectly analogous to that in which he has fashioned the visible creation. The ear is but the medium through which the perfect Reason ascribes sound to vibrations ; just as through the eye, it ascribes space to a coexistent plurality. That Reason, therefore, the Divine as it is in man, spontaneously acting through a limited and special form of humanity, passed through human vocal organs, and the auditory nerve, and thus reflecting its own action into a sphere of sensation, gave it there to take logical form in a perfect language.

Unless it be supposed that the first human language was dictated *verbatim* to man, by his Creator, (and no philosophical mind can I think at this day assert such an hypothesis,) or unless it be supposed that millions of distinct wills could accidentally concur in the same creative work, it must be conceded that language was formed by that overruling Reason which operates through all ages, as a law or an inspiration to man. And if so, it is the Logos which has thus actualized itself in sound.

Yet has it not thereby parted with any thing that belongs to its spiritual sphere. The idea, logically precedes the sound which expresses it, and still exists in mind, though it may have uttered itself in language—it still exists in the supersensual in logical order, though it may have actualized itself in the sensible sphere of humanity in a corresponding logical order. Let the reader bear this in mind ; and let us now see if we cannot follow the perfect Reason, or Logos, into those manifestations which it makes of itself, *independent* of the human organization—into manifestations however, which shall be perfectly analogous to those just described, and attended with corresponding results.

Why it seems to me that all Nature is but a language subsisting from ideas in the Logos, which ideas continue still self-subsistent, whatever exterior forms they may take. Look at the animal creation, and, from the half-reflecting elephant to the ant that perambulates the subterranean streets of its little city, every form is but expressive of ideas in this all-actuating Reason. What is an instinct but an idea?—an individuation of the Logos—going forth to actualize itself in a world of material forms—an idea, which when actualized in form, fully and perfectly expresses itself to the senses—aye, does more—goes forth into action, and so passes to all its necessary and logical results. Take the bee for instance; is it not perfectly manifest that it is a mathematical reason, which constructs with such accuracy the cells of the hive?—that it is a reason of the most perfect order, which actualizes itself in the polity of its little communities. The rational individual man himself, resolved into the multiplicity of a sectional existence, and still retaining his identity, could not more decisively manifest the law of an overruling reason, than a community of the bee or ant. It therefore can be no other than the same spontaneous and everywhere present Reason, which thus becomes extant. In the organism of the bee, or ant, it of necessity, and without choice, precept, or experience, proceeds straight forward to accommodate every thing to itself. The organism gives it limitation, or rather it makes for itself a limitation by realizing itself in an organism, just as a thought, or affection of the soul may realize itself in a single articulate sound.

It indeed seems to be that very Reason which actualizes itself in human language—with this difference, that in living bodies, it goes far beyond its achievements in sound. For look throughout animated nature, and whatever form this Reason adopts, that form becomes a limited premise, from which it passes—not in speech, but by a series of acts—to every possible logical conclusion of which the premise admits.

We have heard of vegetable instincts, and there is no doubt of their existence; for there is but one life, and the vegetable is one of its manifestations. And who can doubt that its law of action is just as rational in the vegetable, as in the man? Could we see those particles which make their journeys from the root of the growing stalk of maize, out into the ear, and there behold them marshal themselves in kernels and rows of kernels, we could hardly doubt the present action of the overruling Reason. Nay, this spontaneous Reason may be traced into what is called inorganic matter. Do not the mountains rise, and rivers roll, just where a perfect Reason would command? Not perhaps where the individual man would desire; for that were to leave the same Reason in him, idle, and undeveloped; but where the order of the great whole requires. Are not the wanderings of the stars regulated by a perfect mathematical reason? And when we ascertain the laws which govern them, do we discover in those laws, any thing more than exists in that power within us which makes the discovery? The discovery is a mathematical discovery; and the power which makes it is a mathematical power, which, in the act of demonstration, evolves something of its own infinitude, and recognizes its own identity, on the grand scale of the laws of the Universe.

Causality, then, is that everywhere present and ever active Reason, or Logos, which gives logical expression to itself in nature without, and which we feel as a spontaneity no less logical within us, and so near to us, that we habitually confound it with ourselves.

It is to the logical form in which it manifests itself in the multiplicity of the Universe, and to the additional fact that this expression is derived from the unity of the Logos, that I would here particularly call the attention of the reader.

For if Causality be a unit in itself, and if it express itself to the senses in logical form, in all particulars and in the grand entirety of the Universe, then have I a right to infer that its expression is no less logical and orderly, in the sphere of causes next above the senses—that is, in the sphere of the supersensual and spiritual. Indeed I have a right to go something further, and insist that it is there, not only logical, but analogous; and correspondent to its form and expression in the world of the senses. I have a right to infer, as will more clearly appear in the sequel, that the Logos, as the grand causality, actualizes itself in a special form in the spirit of man—organizes itself in a spiritual body, and through that in the material man; and that the human form, in this world of the senses, is what the spiritual body is in the world above the senses; in other words, that there are a Me and Not-Me, supersensual or internal, precisely as there are a Me and Not-Me, sensible and external.

But we may bring the truth of this conclusion close home to us, and, by examining the laws and tendencies of the perfect Reason, as they manifest themselves within us, prove not only this entire correspondence, but realize, and even feel within ourselves, something of the manner in which the effect is produced. Our external organization is itself a part and portion of the material universe;

and the laws and tendencies of this Reason (considered as causality in its unity,) must be within this organization, *mutatis mutandis*, what they are in the mighty whole. Analyze a single ray of light, and you may discover the properties of all that mass of light which illumines the Universe—ascertain the law which causes the apple to fall from the bough toward the centre of the earth, and you may calculate the density of Uranus, or measure the speed of the comet, in its journey through space—a law, an energy, which governs and actuates a single drop in the great ocean of life, must be a law, an energy, pervading that mighty whole, of which the drop is but an insignificant part. Let us then examine the operations of the Logos as they manifest themselves within us in the creation of mental imagery; for such as they are there, they must be on the grand scale of the Universe. In doing this, I presume not to analyze Deity, or to grasp the Infinite; but I may realize something of the nature of His creative power, by observing the operations of that creative energy within, which generates all thought—an energy, which by a law its own—sometimes acting unaccompanied by my volitions—sometimes modified by them—spontaneously fills my mind with its own ideal imagery, and creates a supersensual world within me. I may will the necessary conditions—but the conditions *realized*—the imagery comes of a law *above* my will.

> "We do not make our thoughts—they grow in us
> Like grain in wood."

The causative energy, which produces this imagery, may ever be the same Divine Reason acting in its unity toward a perfect development; but its realization, in the consciousness, may partake of the voluntary, moral and physical states of the individual—may be perfect if they be perfect—or incongruous and heterogeneous, as in dreams, if they are not in harmony with the divinity which they call into action. The defective or incongruous development of ideal imagery is ever chargeable on the state or condition of the individual Me, and not on the creative cause.

I state this position in this general manner, that I may not divert the mind of the reader from the course of thought, by which we are now passing to the main object of the present argument; and, reserving it for a more particular consideration in the next chapter, I proceed to show how it is that the Logos or Perfect Reason operates as a creative energy within us, and transmits its *ideal* forms into matter. If it can be shown that it is a creative energy which produces this effect, then, since that energy is a unit, in which all things are, it will follow, that it must operate as a like cause in all its like relations, and that consequently it must produce, on the grand scale of the Universe, effects differing from those, which it is shown to operate in ourselves, only as the recipients of its action differ. In one word, if it can be shown that it materializes its ideal imagery in the brain, it will follow that it must, by a corresponding process, materialize its imagery in all substance susceptible of its influence; and that the forms of the material Universe, are but the ultimates of an ideal world of forms, subsisting in the bosom of the Logos.

Now what is the Logos within us, considered as the source and fountain of our ideal imagery; in other words, considered as an internal, creative energy?

Why, undoubtedly, if the views of the preceding chapter be correct, the Logos, considered as a formative energy, is itself necessarily the all-involving form—the abstract and absolute of forms; or the unity of forms in their original synthesis. But what do I mean by this original synthesis in which all forms are in their unity ? Let me assure the reader that this phrase carries with it more of the appearance, than of the reality of mysticism. I will endeavor to illustrate its meaning.

The form of the future oak subsists in synthetic unity in the qualities of the acorn—that is, in those tendencies of the matter which constitutes the acorn, to produce the roots, stem, branches, leaves, blossoms, and fruits of the oak, and nothing but these. Again, all colors, all hues subsist in like manner, in synthetic unity, in the pure light of the sun, ever ready for development by a law or energy their own, on the appropriate conditions being given. Light, when it thus reveals itself, passes from its synthetic state, to an analytic development of its involved elements, and shows objectively what it is in its own subjective unity. Thus, the Logos considered as the absolute of form, or all form in the unity of original synthesis, only awaits the existence of the appropriate recipient, or medium, to become analytically extant, not only in mind, but in time and space. It creates from itself its own recipients, and when it finds an appropriate recipient in that ultimate called matter—dead matter—it passes into the forms of planetary orbs and central suns—worlds and systems of worlds. When it finds recipients in the various modifications of the vital element, it stands out in all the variety of animal and vegetable forms. When it finds its recipients in the states of the conscious Me, it passes into the forms of ideal imagery, and thence out into the creations of art—a world superinduced on the world of nature ; just as the world of life is superinduced on the world of dead matter.

Again—to carry out the premises afforded by the preceding chapter—The Logos or perfect Reason, is not only the original synthesis of all form, but it also contains all form within itself, by reason of its omnipresence, or rather by reason of the presence of all forms to it. Take away space—the ascription of the perfect mathematical Reason to a coexistent plurality—and all forms are resolved into a synthetic unit, and subsist in the bosom of the Logos as a mere idea. The same Logos that contains the absolute of space and extension, contains this all-involving idea of form. This idea in the Logos must be ever present to the conscious Me, and there subsist with a tendency to make analytic revelations upon every change of condition in the percipient self.

I trust that what I mean by the phrase, the unity of all forms in their original synthesis, may be now understood. But if it be understood, it will at once be perceived, that the Logos, considered with reference to form, is Omniform, or all-formful.

Form arises from relations ; and the absolute Logos considered without relations—as it must be when regarded as absolute unity—is without form ; but considered with reference to its own involved multiplicity in all the degrees of substance, it is in its central and divine sphere, the perfection of all form. With reference to Nature, it is Nature in her principles, or the mind of God in the creative sphere of the divine ideal. With reference to the form of man, it is human beauty carried up to divine perfection ; or rather it is itself that perfect form, of which man is but a poor, imperfect image. But it is enough for my present purpose to say, that the Logos, is the all-formful, as well as all-formative principle ; that it is ever present with those attributes to, or in the conscious Me, the individual soul or self ; and that, in as far as the Me or self becomes recipient of its special or particular influences, it makes revelations of its all-containing ideas—presents something of them, sometimes in the sphere of the Me internal alone—as in dreams, or in the memory of the past, or in the forms of the fancy or imagination—sometimes in this sphere, and in that of the sensitive Me, at the same instant. This I suppose to be necessary to every complete perception of external objects. But with this we at present have nothing to do. We are now confining our attention exclusively to that imagery which manifests itself within, to the Me internal.

I may have been in the habit of regarding this internal imagery as a creation of my own, and as a part of my voluntary self, and subject to my will; yet nothing can be more certain than that it has an existence independent of and foreign to it. On a close examination we shall find, that it is ever subject to the laws of the Logos whence it proceeds, or in which it continues to be, and is just as truly a something distinct from my essential self, as the fields and forests, which now fall within my view, are distinct from the corporeal organ which is the instrument by which I behold them.

That the soul has no choice but to see the form, or image, in case of sensation, will at once be admitted; but this is equally true in the case of pure internal imagery, whether we be dreaming, or in a state of wakefulness. Do but give the feeling or mental state, which is ever a necessary antecedent to the perception—and the appropriate image comes—we willing or not willing. In dreams, the mental image most certainly comes spontaneously, as a consequence of a particular state of recipiency. So in reverie; and in every case of waking memory, the appropriate feeling precedes the remembered form. The image comes just as independently of our wills, as the light of the sun upon opening the eye toward him, and it continues within us just as independently of our volition, as the sensation, or perception of the same light to the eye whilst open ; so long as the appropriate condition, or relation of the conscious Me to the internal Logos continues. It comes and subsists independently of our wills ; and so is not of us, but of that from which it proceeds, or in which it becomes manifest.

The moment then that these forms, or conceptions, arise to the Me within, they become as to it, realities—supersensual or spiritual realities. They exist in the mind, and are a part of it ; and therefore are as truly real, as the individual mind itself. But because they there exist, they do not cease to be of the Logos, any more than the color of an object ceases to be of and from light, because it falls within the scope of my vision. They still are of the Logos, and, for that reason, are still endowed with something of its spontaneous energy. But, if this be so, any such image must subsist in the mind, with its force (if I may so speak,) undiminished, and so have a tendency, beyond its spiritual region in the individual mind, outward into that portion of the nervous substance to which it has the most appropriate relation. If for instance, there be in my mind a distinct image of my friend, that image, of a law its own, should tend to bring the organ of vision into a state similar to that in which it is, when he is actually seen. (I do but speak of a *tendency*.) And now let us see if this inference cannot be verified by experience and observation.

If there be any truth in physiognomy, or craniology, the whole soul stands out imaged in the physical organization. Now what is thus true of the whole spiritual being of man, every one has observed to be equally true of its particular changes. Whence is the smile of joy, the tear of sorrow, the tremor of fear, and the muscular constriction of rage, but from the mind ?—the spirit transmitting its influence into the bodily organization, and taking form therein. So powerful is this action on the physical organization, that a single thought has been known to produce death.

But, it is in that portion of the physical system with which the mind is more immediately connected, that we must look for the more immediate and slighter manifestations of thought. Now that part of the physical system is undoubtedly the brain, and its nervous appendages; and when we inquire into the effect of an idea or conception upon the nerves, we shall find that the class of nerves, whose action gives occasion to a corresponding sensation, or perception, is that class which is most powerfully affected by the conception in the absence of the sensation. Thus, if the conception be that of a tangible body, the nerves of feeling will be most sensibly affected—if of visible form, the visual nerves—if of sounds the auditory nerve. If any one can form the distinct conception of a piece of coarse felt drawn upon the edge of his teeth,—or of walking up a slippery plain of boards or shingles, at an angle of forty-five degrees, his foot occasionally sliding,—without feeling the nerves affected in precisely the same manner that they are upon the actual sensations arising from these acts, all that I can say is, that his nervous system is constituted very differently from mine.

But as to the effect of this class of conceptions on the nervous system, I need proceed no further—every one is familiar with them. But how is it with ideal images, or the conceptions of visible forms? Do they imprint themselves, or produce corresponding effects, on the visual nerve?

For myself, I cannot doubt that the visual nerve is just as susceptible to impressions from the conception of the form of an object of vision, as the nerves of touch are to the conception of a tangible body. I have known the visual imagery of dreams to retain, after waking, possession of the visual nerve, and to have an apparent *outness*, (excuse the word,) until external objects produced their full effect and obliterated the impression from within. But here the visual nerve must have been affected by a mere conception, or ideal image. I have heard one, in whose word I think I may place implicit confidence, observe, that he could, at any time, by fixing his eyes on a darkened portion of the room, give a faint apparent *outness* to the visual imagery of his mind. Now this can be done, only by the conceptions imparting their own images to the retinæ, and so overcoming external impressions made on the same point, as to give the mental imagery to take their place.*

This, indeed, is the true theory of apparitions and spectral illusions. Whenever the nerve becomes exceedingly susceptible to this sort of mental influence—as in many cases of physical and mental derangement, it certainly does—or the image so vivid that it transmits itself through the visual nerve to the retinæ, and there takes form, supplanting those from external objects, the mental image, then, does of necessity appear as a part of the field of vision, and seems to have form, place and reality therein, as an external body. But in such case, there is a real form, (not a picture,) produced by it in the retinæ, such as that produced by the rays of light. The latter must be a change in the visual nerve answering to the external object; the former must be precisely the same change answering to the ideal image; and, in case of spectral illusion, a change of a character, so decisive, so powerful, as to overcome the action of some portion of the field of vision. In other words, the force of the visual image within, on the nerve, must be greater than that of the supplanted image of the visible object. Disordered nerves could never of themselves accidentally take this form; but doubtless they may be so disordered, as to become more susceptible of taking form from mental imagery, and perhaps, at the same time may bring the conscious Me into unwonted relations to the all-formful Logos.

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* William Blake, whose biography is given in Cunningham's Lives of the most eminent British Painters and Sculptors, must, I think, be regarded as affording an extraordinary instance of this power of the mind.

Phrenology professes to account for spectral illusions and mental imagery, by ascribing them to the action of certain organs, which she has, or believes she has, demonstrated to exist in the brain; but unless these organs be endowed with a self-active, independent, isolated energy—be in fact themselves that energy—she accounts for no psychological fact whatever. To say for instance, that the organ of form gives us the idea of form, and that a diseased state of that organ produces monstrous mental imagery, is as if one, professing to account for the existence of vegetable and animal forms, should say, that they were the products of a seminal substance, and that if that substance were diseased, the vegetable or animal would be diseased and misshapen.

The man who shows me a musical instrument, and says nothing about the musician, or of sound from which he draws forth all the variety of harmony, accounts very imperfectly for the music which I hear, when the performer's fingers are moving upon the keys; or for the discord which would result from the same movements, should any of the strings become accidentally deranged. The instrument is as the brain; sound and its laws are of the Logos; and the movements on the keys, represent the various states or conditions of the Will or conscious Me. You may show me a kaleidoscope; but if you would account for the phenomena which it reveals, you must go beyond the instrument itself—you must make me acquainted with the existence of light, and teach me something of its laws; and you must then add something concerning the movements which the hand must give to the instrument, in order to produce a succession of images. Phrenology, when she points out the organ of form, does nothing, unless she reveal to us something of the all-formful energy, which is ever acting upon it to produce its phenomena, and something concerning the human will, whose various changes, states, or conditions, give to that energy its ever-changing manifestations. In this case, however, it should be recollected that the performer dwells within the instrument, and that by his mere volitions he puts in action, this or that energy, which independently of those volitions, spontaneously, of a law its own, acts *ab-intra ad extra*, responsively to the changes which are calling forth its action.

The mental image, then, does not originate from the brain, or any particular organ thereof, but only finds therein its echo, or responsive action. This, perhaps in every case, is necessary to a full and complete development of the mental image, as long as the soul continues its connection with the body. For there can be little doubt, that as every key has its relation to the sound which a musical instrument yields, so every point of the brain has its corresponding organic relation to the soul—which, whilst unchanged, tends to keep the soul unchanged in its primary state or condition in reference to the Logos. But if this be so, then it will follow, that some change must be produced in the brain, or in some organ thereof, in order to overcome the primary tendency and effect of this organic relation; and hence, for this purpose, if for this alone, there must be this sort of responsive action in the nervous system, at every change in the mind. If it, at any time, happen, that this responsive action is interrupted or deranged, by disease or other cause, there will be great danger of insanity; and if the interruption or derangement be continued, insanity will be the infallible consequence. For in such case, changes of the Will, or conditions of the conscious Me, are not followed by the results which it intuitively anticipates. Images, as unexpected as the sounds of a deranged musical instrument on the performer's touch, obtrusively start up, and manifestly have an existence as independent of our volitions, as the forms of the material Universe, when forced upon our reluctant attention by the will of another—bars, chains, dungeons, and gibbets, cannot have a sterner reality. In such case, we necessarily mistake this anarchy of mental images, for an external reality, and insanity becomes the inevitable consequence. The all-formful Logos retains a relation to the disordered system through all its mutations; and so does the conscious Me; but then the Me's primary feeling, resulting from its organic relations, is no longer the same—it has changed; and when, after it has thus changed, it undergoes a modification from volition or other cause, the modification is no longer followed by the accustomed results, but by something quite different. Some development of the Will or conscious Me, therefore, seems to be a necessary prerequisite to every case of insanity. And this inference appears to be supported by the whole history of the insane; for though many are born idiots, yet never have I heard of one who came into the world a lunatic. But to return from this digression, into which I have been led by an objection which imperfect phrenological views might suggest.

This fact, then, it seems to me, has been established; namely, that the formative Logos does, on certain conditions, present to the conscious Me an ideal image; which is a substantive spiritual reality still in the Logos—that whilst thus subsistent, it so acts on the brain and visual nerve, as to repeat its image therein, take material form, and become a material reality, without ceasing to exist as a mental or spiritual image—not that it should be understood that the ideal image acts from an isolated, independent energy of its own, but that, whatever energy it has, is derived from the Logos, which presents the image, and in which it still continues to subsist.

But the same all-formative energy is present in its unity to every portion of matter, just as it is to that which constitutes the brain, and visual nerve. It, therefore, surely must in like manner everywhere reflect its images into whatever of matter may be receptive of them. Appropriate recipients are everywhere present to it in all seminal qualities, in all vital substance, vegetable or animal; and the spiritual image must tend (as I find it tends in myself,) to take form in whatever may be most receptive of its assimilative action. The Logos being a unit, its energy must everywhere be the same as it is in the conscious self—varying its effects, however, as a causative energy, with the conditions and media in which it acts. The appropriate recipients being given, its spiritual imagery must take form therein, for the same reason that it takes form in the brain.

Yet is there a wide difference between the effect which it produces in the brain, and that which it produces on the grand scale of the Universe. But this again is owing, not to any difference of kind in the action, but to a difference in the conditions and media in which the action takes effect. When the spiritual image arises in my mind, it does but appear in a microcosm—in the limited sphere of an individual soul or self, and so tends to repeat its form only in the brain and visual nerve; but when it passes from the Logos direct to the common world of matter, it is subject to no such limitations, but repeats its form in that which is most receptive of it, and is thus made to stand forth as an image actualized in matter, amid a universe of coordinate forms.

But whether the image in the Logos pass in action from my mind to the brain, or, from spirit beyond my consciousness, to matter, the forms are still dual—still spiritual and material. The spiritual image must logically precede the material; and must still continue to subsist distinct from it; just as, in forming a language, the idea must precede the formation of the word which expresses it, and must continue to exist, though the word be forgotten and lost forever. But if it be true that each form is dual—has its spiritual and material subsistence—then all natural forms are, in like manner, dual, and we have a world of spiritual forms and a world of material forms; the latter subsisting from the former, as effect from cause, as shadow from substance; and the one differing from the other, only as a material differs from a spiritual mode of substance—their correspondence being in all other respects complete and perfect.

And this is something more than mere analogy; for if it be the Logos which of its own spontaneity creates the image which exists in the mind, and repeats that image in the brain and visual nerve, because they are receptive of its influence, then, in all cases, where matter becomes thus receptive of its influence, like effects will follow. It is but to conceive the same cause, which operates on the brain, to be operative, in like manner, on the stupendous scale of the Universe, in order to account for the creation of all form, whether animate or inanimate—all subsist from, and continue to be ideas in, the Divine Mind ; and the world of form in matter, is but an image—an assimilated image—of a world of form in spirit.

If we take this conclusion in connection with that law of mind to which I have already adverted, namely, that there is a spontaneous tendency of all thought, however abstract, to form, then creation will follow as the necessary consequence of the self-established order of the Logos—the mind of God exists ; therefore the Universe.

What then—are material forms mere phenomena of spirit? Are my corporeal organization, and these rough and tangible elements of earth and water—this starry sky—yon worlds that roll, and suns that burn in the depths of space, the mere imagery of a dream? Be it so ; but recollect, these are not the phenomena of my spirit's creating—it is not a dream, of my dreaming. If dream it be, I am, spirit and body, an insignificant part of it—if dream it be, it is a dream of the all-creating Logos, and no less real, than God Himself. It is the absolute unit projected into the all-possible variety of its ultimate degree, and yet not losing thereby its unity, any more than that principle, which constitutes the life of man, loses its unity, by taking form in the multiple of the human body. To the mind of God—to the absolute and perfect Reason—all creation, spiritual and material, and the forms thereof, are but phenomena of thoughts Divine ; but to man—made somewhat distinct from Deity by the freedom of his will—they are, at the limits of that freedom, the inflexible, absolute, and stern realities which they seem to be.

Were it mine, in the season of exalted vision, at will, to cause apparent suns to blaze forth—systems of worlds to circle round them—their hills and vales to be clothed with verdure and forests—torrents to descend to oceans, and oceans to heave and roar—animated forms to move and act appropriate parts—all these to subsist, continuously and simultaneously, to the internal eye, dependent on my will; I having at the same time a conscious feeling of my own presence pervading all—pray what would this splendid vision be, but the mere imagery of the mind? Yet if, in the midst of this imagery, I willed into existence as part of it, and as a representative of my own personality, an image of myself, actuated by thought, endowed with something of liberty distinct from mine, having by consequence, a Will its own, fitted to be influenced by partial relations, and partial views, of that whole, of which it was but a microscopic part—and if, when this were done, our visionary man went forth into my ideal world, it would be no mere shadow to him. Let him will my ideal hills and vallies to cast off their verdure—my ideal torrents to stop their downward course—and my ideal ocean no longer to heave its billows to the shore, and he may be supposed at once to discover, that the verdure, the torrent, and the ocean, subsisted from a Will independent of his own, and that they were as real as himself. Let him place his hand against the mountain with a willed effort to move it, and ideal form shall resist ideal form, and my mountains shall remain unmoved. An all-powerful Will, presiding over the each and all, shall impose appropriate limits to every effort of its own puny creature.

And yet, if it be granted that man is in any respect a free and independent force, and as such, bears in the grand order of things an ordained and established relation, the Universe, viewed in this aspect, must likewise have its fixed order, and so long as the relation continues, must lose something of its absolute and unqualified subjection to the Divine Will. Whatever changes it may undergo, must be changes made consistently with the order required by the relation, and the power of the Deity must therein find limits growing out of a self-imposed condition. Hence the Universe, even as to Deity, may have a certain degree of fixity, not to be disturbed whilst this relation continues.

## CHAPTER IV.

### SPHERES, SENSUOUS AND SUPERSENSUOUS—THEIR CORRESPONDENCE AND DIFFERENCE.

> "The truths we think,
> Subsist the same in God, as stars in heaven;
> And, as those specks of light, will prove great worlds
> When we approach them."

It is a remark of the preceding chapter, that the supersensuous or spiritual can differ from the material form, only as a spiritual differs from a material mode of substance; or, considering spirit and matter as two distinct substances, then, only as the one differs from the other. Adopting this as the basis of my argument, I will endeavor more particularly to point out, in what respects I conceive the world of spiritual forms to correspond with, and in what respects to differ from, the world of material forms.

Of spiritual substance we know nothing, except as it manifests itself to the conscious Me; and indeed, the same remark applies to matter. One might therefore rationally conclude, that we had equal assurance of the existence of both; and that there could be little or no dispute as to the most obvious qualities of either. Yet some there are, who deny the existence of spirit altogether, and recognize nothing but matter. Others there are, who deny the existence of matter, and recognize nothing but spirit; whilst there are others still, who confidently affirm the existence of both; but who, in order to distinguish spirit from matter, insist that spirit has, in no sense, any of the qualities or properties of matter, save that of real substantive existence. They deny, for instance, that it has any dimensions, or, in any sense whatever, an extension, or relations of space. The materialist finds it hard to conceive what and where such an entity can be, that has neither length, breadth, nor thickness—that is neither hard nor soft, light nor heavy. And taking this doctrine as it is commonly presented, one cannot be greatly surprised at his difficulty in believing it. Yet have I a most undoubting faith in the existence of a supersensuous form or mode of substance, call it spiritual—call it material—call it what you may. I mean by the phrase spirit, simply such a substratum, or modification of a common substratum, or support of qualities, as renders those qualities absolutely distinct from all those which are made known to us by the aid of the senses. Let us see if there be not some test by which we can establish this distinction clearly, and prove the existence of such a supersensuous or spiritual order of qualities, as shall render the existence of spirit conceivable.

It appears to me, that there can be no such thing as power, cause, effect, law, quality, property, or any other thing, distinct from substance. Every manifestation, whether made through the senses, or directly to the mind, must have its appropriate substratum, or support, in something. This the materialist must admit, or deny the existence of matter. True this may go to prove an infinitude of substances, or causes ; or what is much the most probable, a common central substance or cause ; but whether the one or the other, for the present purpose it matters not ; all that I now affirm is, that substances, or substance in its various modes, is all that there is, whether subject to the senses or above them. And when I speak of spirit and matter, I do but use terms which classify the various modes of the same common substance, by a reference to distinct classes of phenomena.

Now, in making this classification, I proceed precisely as I do in making any other classification. I use a test ; and the soul itself is that test, and there can be none other ; and in making this affirmation, I do not mean to assert either that the soul is, or is not spiritual—I mean simply to insist, that, be it what it may—acting and suffering accordantly with its own laws and constitution—it is the ultimate test of identity, and difference, of all substances, sensuous and supersensuous.

And it is a test to which it is not possible to conceive an objection. The constitution and laws of the soul are as eternal, as those of the Universe ; and in perfect accordance with them ; since nothing can come to the conscious Me, save that which those very laws, of their own *spontaneous* energy, present to it.

Now, in this constitution of soul, thus true to all things, there is a trinity of degrees or spheres—variously named, it is true ; and about their names there may be some disagreement ; but every body knows what I mean when, in logical order, I call the most external sphere, the sphere of sensation ; the sphere next within, the sphere of the understanding, or reflective reason, wherein the conscious Me exerts, internally, its free activity ; and the third and central sphere, the sphere of the spontaneous Reason, or all-pervading Logos—by others called intuition, instinct, law, &c. In the sensitive sphere, the conscious Me perceives the forms or objects of the material universe, merely as objects or forms. In the sphere of the understanding, it apperceives their images—ideal images, which subsist even in the absence of the sensuous object. These images, and those things which they represent, are, in this sphere, understood to be effects or sequences of something which logically precedes them as their cause. Whilst from the third or central sphere, the spontaneous Reason, pervading all, is ever tending to reveal, and subject to the forms of the understanding, the cause or antecedent. I am not ambitious to have the reader adopt this as a perfect statement of the operations appropriate to each sphere; all that I at present affirm to be a necessary consequence of this trinity of degrees, or these laws of action, is, that each sphere has its distinct development of qualities, properties, and modes of substance; just as each organ of sensation reveals distinct properties in matter. I open my corporeal eye, on the material universe; its forms act thereon; and they become manifest, as the causes or occasions of their perception; and I feel, no matter for what reason, that they subsist exterior to, and independent of me. I close the eye, and by an internal faculty, see the image of the same object within.

Now, however analagous this internal image may be to the external form, which it represents, yet it cannot be entirely one and identical with it; for so far as it is now an object of my consciousness, it has properties, laws, subsistence, and form, which cannot be altogether one and identical with those of its material type. But let us decide the question by the aid of that infallible test, the conscious soul, which must ever be appealed to in the last resort;

and does it not spontaneously distinguish between the interior and exterior form?—and is it not conscious, whilst in a sound state, that the former is perceived by a faculty or power, which is in some respect distinct from that by which the latter is perceived? It is established beyond the possibility of doubt, that there are certain qualities, properties, forms, and so forth, of which it can become conusant only by the aid of the organs of sense, and designates them as sensuous, or material; and that there are certain other qualities, properties, forms, and so forth, of which it becomes, immediately and internally, conusant, and of which it cannot have cognition by the aid of the organs of sense—these it designates as supersensuous and ultra-material.

Now both these classes of qualities may have their basis in the same common substance, and the differences between them be but *indicia* of certain radical modifications of that common substance, or substratum. It is the spontaneous reason that forces upon us a belief in the existence of this substance or substratum of qualities; for the percipient mind cannot see, either directly or indirectly, any thing but the qualities or phenomena of substance. Substance, then, is strictly the one universal term designating all that underlies spirit and matter; whilst the word matter, as determined by perception, is a generic term, which designates a certain class of qualities, of which the soul becomes conusant by the aid of the organs of sensation; and spirit is another generic term, which designates another class of qualities of the same universal substance, of which the soul becomes internally, and perhaps directly, conusant, and without the aid of the organs of sensation.

The dispute between the spiritualist and the materialist, when divested of the theories and hypotheses into which it runs, is therefore a question merely, whether there be, yea or nay, any ground for this classification—a question which these very philosophers, before their understandings had been mystified by dogma and creed—aye, before they left the precincts of the nursery—had decided for themselves ; and correctly decided.

It will be perceived that the term substance, as I have here used it, can be no other than the essential Deity, considered as the basis or source of all qualities, properties, or laws, of which the soul can take cognizance. It is his Will which creates them, as the changes of the conscious Me creates the blush, or the frown. They are of the order which that Will has established and eternized, in its own perfections. Matter and spirit, therefore, are only two different modes of the same entity—two distinct orders of qualities, properties, and laws, which the same common substance puts on, or presents to the percipient soul.

In every instance, therefore, I might speak of the modes of substance, as the basis of these two classes of qualities ; but this may sometimes be an inconvenience to the writer, and obscure his statements. To avoid these results, I shall use the term substance or modes of substance, as may best subserve clearness and brevity of expression. Indeed a mode of substance is, relatively to the qualities which it puts forth, to the percipient soul, a distinct substance ; since it is the medium through which, the divine idea that appropriates it, goes forth into its multiples of the sensuous and supersensuous. These distinct classes of qualities, then, having their basis in the ideas of the eternal Reason as their cause, may, without leading to the slightest error, be regarded as having their substance, support, or substratum, in the same ideas ; and hence we may speak of substances without confusion—meaning always to be understood to have reference to the divine idea from which the quality, property, or law subsists.

Regarded in this light, the test which we use, reveals not only distinct qualities, but distinct primary causes; and in those causes, distinct substances; for every pervasive power, cause, effect, law, property, or quality,* truly distinct and independent of all, other than its legitimate or necessary conditions, indicates the existence of a distinct substance, or radical mode of substance.

If we have established the competency of our test to prove the identity or difference of qualities, let us apply it to ascertain in what respect the objects of the Me internal, differ from those of the Me external. This will be done by briefly presenting a few instances of difference.

Does not every one perceive in the soul, qualities, laws, energies, totally different from, though in some respects wonderfully analogous to, those of the masses of matter by which he is surrounded? The soul alone thinks. Its tendency to think, is the necessary gravitation of the soul to the great centre of all thought. External objects affect it through the organs of sensation; and on receiving the effect, it acts with an energy its own, and according to laws its own—just as magnetism, light, caloric, act, each from its independent laws. All the natural instincts and tendencies of the soul, are laws derived from an overruling principle within. Its tendency to trace effects to their causes, is a supreme and primary law of the rational soul—a spontaneity from the Logos, and a constitutional recognition of God, the Supreme Cause.

That, which is erroneously called the association of ideas, is the effect of a law, purely of the soul. It is a law which subjects the primary feeling or general intellectual state, to certain generic changes, or conditions, which are called abstract or general ideas, and which spontaneously evolve the multiple and particular. It is the transition of one of these generic feelings, or states, into another, that evolves in its operations, a succession of mental images. Sleep is of the vital soul—disease of the vital soul; and death itself, is but a departure of the vital soul from its organic structure. Mere matter sleeps not, dies not, and is never diseased. Sleep is the quiescence of the soul in its primary state. Pain and disease come of a partial breach in the organic relation of soul and body.

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* Such as life, soul, magnetism, gravity, caloric, electricity, and the like. Though many of these are evanescent, yet no one can legitimately infer that they cease to be, upon their disappearance from the bodies in which they become manifest. Nothing was ever annihilated.

Mind then, or that which falls within the exclusive cognition of the Me internal, has its distinct properties, energies, and laws, without a metaphor; and these must inhere in, and be developed by, a mode of substance, distinct from that, whose qualities are revealed to the corporeal eye. The admission of this, is all I ask for. The materialist may call these supersensuous manifestations and their substances, matter; if the term suits him better; but it is certain that they do not fall within the scope of the external senses; and I choose to call all those qualities material, which fall exclusively under the cognizance of the corporeal senses; and those supersensuous or spiritual, which are revealed by the light of reason, or by an internal energy, to the senses of the inner man.

The Me internal, then, has its distinct class of qualities, and by consequence, its distinct general mode of substance; differing certainly as much from the external, as the Me internal, differs from the Me external. When we see, and hear, and feel within, as we do in every dream, in every act of memory, and in every case of distinct conception,

—we see not by the aid of external light, we hear not by the aid of external vibrations, and we feel not from the action of external tangible bodies, and hence, the Me internal must differ in these essential laws, widely from the Me external. But if it be thus true that the soul has a distinct mode of substance, and class of qualities, of which it takes cognizance within, then, it has its own world of substance, with its qualities and forms, distinct from the material; and yet upon examination, we shall find that there is a most striking analogy between the internal and external worlds. Let us consider this analogy. In the external world, we have two distinct elements of action, or sources of power; Nature, and Man, a Me, and a Not-Me. How universal and absolute is the action of gravitation! Its dominion is impartial and equal, over every particle of the tangible and visible. It affects rock and mountain, torrent and ocean, living and dead matter, alike. Every particle of my corporeal frame is, at every moment, under its dominion. It becomes the basis of all motion. It rushes in the storm, it waves in the forest, and rolls in the billow. It combines with animal life, and is the everywhere-present agent of instinct. Not a movement could be made without it. The earth's attraction is the immediate source of all motion; Will and instinct only guide it.

Considered in another aspect, the Not-Me, also puts forth its spontaneous energies. It peoples earth and flood with every kind of vital forms; and the Me finds its physical organization one of them, and on all sides pressed upon by a living, as well as a relatively quiescent, Not-Me, stimulating it to put forth its powers. In obedience to the impulse, its internal energies come out into its external organs, and the physical man goes forth into great Nature, to bring her into subjection to himself. If he rashly oppose his puny will to hers—to the laws of her eternal order—he does but cast himself beneath the rolling wheels of her collossal chariot to be crushed to atoms. Yet if he do but ask to guide the action of her divine energies—to direct the force of her torrent—to avail himself of the strength of her storm, or the giant mights of her animal kingdom, she beneficently answers his prayer. The divine energy permits him to tip the horn with brass, and the hoof with iron, and then quietly bends its neck to the yoke, and meekly bears his burthen. The power of a Deity becomes his, and clothed in divine energies, he stands, in the midst of Nature, the true image of her God—she, the ideal imagery,—he, its in-forming soul.

But the divine energy, under another form, no less truly exists *within* us. Spontaneity, that all-pervading influence—that presence from above—that basis of all action of the soul—is just as universal within, as the law of gravitation without. Passion in its rudest form, and thought the most sublimated, are alike subject to its dominion. Even the Me, the free will in its quiescent state, is resolved into it, and becomes a coxeistent and coincident activity; loses for the moment its relative, in the absolute identity, speaks the voice of prophecy, and reveals secrets from the awful depths of the Logos. The deep feelings of the conscious Me are but its relations to the divine energy—conditions on which the Logos reveals the appropriate idea, and gives to it a language its own. The savage, who made an offering of his ornaments at the falls of St. Anthony,* and the bard, who poured forth his devotion in the vale of Chamouni at the foot of Mont Blanc, however different the forms of expression, did but give utterance to the same sublime idea, revealed on like conditions.

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* See Carver's Travels.

> O dread and silent Mount! I gazed upon thee
> Till thou, still present to the bodily sense,
> Didst vanish from my thought: entranced in prayer
> I worshiped the Invisible alone.*

When the Me internal thus passes from state to state, whether impelled by sensation, or moved by its own volitions, it ever finds itself still under the government of laws, and in the presence of intellectual forms, that come to it from an overruling power. If it seek but to guide and direct the spontaneous energy, it becomes invested with something of the attributes of the Divinity, and creates a paradise within; but if it seek not to guide, but to oppose its puny will to the divine influence, its little world of mind becomes a chaos—a pandemonium of wild and tempestuous passions. How certainly then, do its images start up spontaneously, with all the sternness of external realities that will not be layed. They take possession of the man, and bind the conscious Me in its own tabernacle. They never fail to inflict meet punishment on him who violates the laws of his physical constitution; but to him who has consciously violated, or meditates the violation of the moral law of his being—like the furies that pursued Orestes,—they are ever present. Waking he sees the phantom dagger, "its handle toward his hand."

> Thou marshal'st me the way that I was going;
> And such an instrument I was to use.
> I see thee still;
> And on thy blade, and dudgeon, gouts of blood,
> Which was not so before.

And in the deep sleep of night, the eye of the conscious soul still beholds the bloody hand, which not "all the perfumes of Arabia will sweeten."

Such is a general view of the analogy between the laws which govern the internal and those which govern the external world. Both orders of laws are equally real; both coextensive with their respective spheres; both uniform and analogous in their effects. But when we pass from this general view of the laws of mind and matter, to a particular consideration of the mental imagery which the Logos within, presents to the conscious Me, when a distinct memory of the past comes upon us, or when in dream, or reverie, an inborn creation spreads itself to the intellectual eye with all the beauty, variety, strength of color, and firmness of outline, which mark the external reality, the analogy between the worlds of matter and mind is so complete, that the resemblance, during the continuance of the vision, is lost in the full belief of their identity.

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* Coleridge.

The forms of both worlds alike are visited upon us by laws over which we have no control, but by a change of the relation or state, which forms the condition on which they appear. To certain temperaments, to certain physical conditions, certain classes of mental imagery arise; just as to certain places, the material universe has its particular aspects; and as by a volition, we may pass from state to state within the same range of temperament, (though not of physical condition,) and change the imagery, so we may pass from place to place, and give variety to the external world; but in whatever state or condition the conscious Me may be, the imagery comes by a necessary law.

When a particular state is the result of physical infirmity, as in the crisis of a fever, or as in the physical disorder produced by an excessive use of intoxicating stimulants, how utterly beyond the control of the patient is the imagery by which the soul is visited! With what inflexible tyranny does it rule over the will! But if the state be induced by our own volitions, as by the voluntary recollection of some former scene—we may change it by passing, of our own accord, to a state of feeling, which shall bring with it imagery of a different cast; yet whilst any one state continues, the visions are not less real and necessary within the mind, than the scenes which present themselves to the external eye in obedience to the laws of the external universe.

What then, are these internal forms and images really what they appear to be? Are the shadows and pictures of the imagination no unreal things? Have they then, within themselves, truly relations of time, space, and extension? I answer these questions affirmatively, and shall endeavor so to explain and illustrate the answer, that it shall appear to be no less philosophical on account of its novelty. The great hindrance to the correct understanding of this subject lies in the erroneous idea so generally entertained of the nature of space and extension. I hope therefore, to derive to the proofs and illustrations which I am about to offer, some aid from the first chapter of this treatise, which makes extension and space two of its prominent topics.

From what has already been shown, it may be fairly inferred that if the material be of one mode or degree of substance, and the spiritual of another mode or degree of the same common substance, they can have no continuous or common properties or qualities. For if substance be the substratum or support of properties or qualities, and, if it be resolved into two distinct modes or degrees, it must give rise to two distinct orders of qualities, properties, and so forth. The qualities of one order, however, may mathematically correspond to those of the other, and yet have nothing in common; just as the ideal image may correspond to its assimilated form in the visual nerve, and yet the image in the one, have nothing in common with the form in the other—not even a common space or extension. Thus, if both orders have extension, it cannot be a common extension; but the extension of one will differ as much from the extension of the other, as the modes or degrees of substance differ. A common mathesis they may have, by which relations, in each apart from the other, may be determined. Yet the material can never take the place of the spiritual, nor the spiritual the place of the material. So that whatever the two extensions, each in itself, part compared with part in its coexistent plurality, may be, yet will they, considered as entireties, be each to each, reciprocally inextended. Thus will all this material universe be without extension as to spirit, and all spirit without extension as to matter. Spirit subsists in relation to matter, as soul to body, connected simply by a law. Spirit magnetically assimilates matter in form to itself, just as the ideal image assimilates the visual nerve. Yet this is done, as the moon governs the tides, without any thing like a blending or contact of the two substances. There is indeed no presence in the common acceptation of the term; yet something more than presence, since it acts in its entirety, at once in every part and atom of the whole mass, and on the whole as a whole. It everywhere tends to produce every thing, and hence makes a particular manifestation, or development of itself, only where special conditions favor it.

But though all spirit be thus as a unit to all matter, it by no means follows, that it is in itself a unit. It may, like material extension, when considered in itself, have its coexistent plurality, and consequent extension and space. To prove that such is the fact, will be to complete the parallel between the sensible and supersensible spheres of existence, and will also establish the fact, that mind has as truly its own permanence of order and form, as the material universe.

In order to establish this truth, (for truth it seems to me,) I shall chiefly consider that class of mental objects, with which the mind is almost constantly occupied. I allude of course, to those which come by the sense of seeing. The quality essential to the production of an internal visual image, and without which it cannot exist, is color; and I use the term as one including light and shade. To determine where and what the color of these visual images is, is to determine where and what the images themselves are; at least in so far as color can reveal any thing of their nature or qualities.

Now it seems to me a matter of demonstration, that color has no existence out of the mind, or out of the internal Not-Me. In this I assert nothing new—it is a proposition to which all philosophy gives its assent, and it would be a waste of time to argue at length in its support. It is agreed by all, that color no more exists in external bodies, than the odor of the rose exists in the rose itself; or than the sound of the bell exists in the bell, or in the vibrations which it excites. True, there is an arrangement of the superficies of bodies, that produces an effect on the organ of sight; but neither that arrangement, nor its effect, through the agency of light on the visual nerve, is color. A sound is something more than a mere vibration; and a color is something more than a mere arrangement of superficies, whether of the object, or of the retina itself. It must be a mental, supersensuous, or spiritual effect, and nothing less. This becomes perfectly evident, when we consider that the present action of light is not necessary to color; as is proved by the phenomena of spectral or incidental colors, and spectral illusions. And that color is independent of the mechanical action of the visual nerve, or brain, is sufficiently manifest from all the imagery of our dreams.

Is there any difference between the colors seen in our dreams, and those seen in our waking moments? I propound the question gravely; and if there be a difference, I ask for a serious and philosophical reply. I ask for the difference to be pointed out between the perceptions themselves—between the perception which I have of the color of a rose, when my waking eye is open and directed to it, and that perception or conception of the same color, when it afterwards arises in the distinct and vivid dreams of my sleep. It is a question which must be determined by self-observation. As to my own experience, I confidently aver that between the two perceptions of the same color, I know not, and cannot feel, the slightest difference. Who is there, that, when wandering in a distant land, has called up a distinct conception of the blue sky and green fields of his native home, and has not seen color with eyes other than the corporeal?

In the absence of all visible bodies—nay in the absence of light on the retina—these colors are thus objects of the most distinct perception. Never are they more vivid than in the dreams of profound sleep; and where can they then be but in the mind—the soul—that substance which we call spiritual? In such case, it must be a revelation of that substance acting under its own peculiar and distinct laws. But if this be so, the action of light on the visual nerve is not the direct physical cause of this mental phenomenon, but the condition on which the soul acts to produce it. So in sleep,—cold, hunger, thirst, and the like may be the mere occasions on which spirit acts from laws its own, and the conscious Me becomes percipient of the qualities of related spirit, feels the paralizing nightmare, or sees the luxurious banquet.

Color, then, is in the spiritual, and not in the material substance—at least all that we denominate color is there. And it is there, consequently, as a spiritual quality or property of that substance, as truly as extent and solidity are to ourselves, qualities of matter. What then does it further reveal to us of its nature, and of the spiritual world to which it belongs ? Has it any thing analogous to those universal attributes which belong to matter ? Does it reveal any thing analogous to extension, form and so forth ? I think it does ; and I will now endeavor to verify the inference.

True it is, that one unvaried color would give us no idea of extension ; it would be blindness. The film, which obstructs the light, makes the sight one unbroken unit—makes it to see one unvaried hue, and by reason of its unity of effect, it can give no idea of a visible extension. But divide it, for one color may be divided by another, and the moment you introduce divisions of this kind, you create all possible geometrical relations. That is, this spiritual substance, as it manifests itself in this objective quality of color, may be wrought into all variety of shapes, or given to take any conceivable geometrical figure. But when all the figures of geometry become predicable of this spiritual quality, I ask whether it be not an extension in itself, and has not, by consequence, a space its own, as truly as matter, which *is* extended, and which *has* its space for no other reason, than because it has all possible geometrical susceptibilities and relations? Both are the same geometric Reason, in distinct objective forms. As to matter, we compare one material thing with another, and come to an idea of material extension, from the geometrical relations which the comparison reveals; and when, on a like comparison, spiritual qualities reveal the same geometrical relations, shall we not come to the same conclusion ?

But though the extension of spirit, and the extension of matter, cannot be one and the same, yet do the two extensions correspond each to each mathematically. Both develope the same geometrical principles, and both express the same great idea. The two different forms, arising from two different degrees or modes of substance, are two different languages, like signs and sounds, in which the same divine Reason expresses the same ideas. In matter, those ideas are in ultimates—fixed as in rock, mountain, sun, moon and stars; in spirit—in the Logos within—the ideals from which they proceed, subsist in an order equally permanent, but perhaps far more perfect. Yet by reason of the relations of the conscious Me to it, and of the facility with which it changes states of recipiency, and compounds them, this order has all the appearance of individual mutability; and seems to belong to the individual self, till by close internal scrutiny, we discover its independence of the will, in the uniform analytic revelation of its contents.

There is nothing in the existence of two distinct extensions, mathematically corresponding with each other, that goes beyond our common observation. A man born blind, makes himself acquainted with all material forms by touch. He knows none but tangible forms—these to him are the whole world of forms. But give him to *see*—that is, introduce him to a new extension, an extension consisting of all the forms of varied color—and he will at once perceive, that a new world is opened to his mind; yet will it require little time for him to discover the mathematical correspondence between the world of the eye and the world of the hand. I will add one or two further considerations confirmatory of the foregoing deductions in reference to a duality of extensions, and then pass to another point.

The reader can form in his mind, a distinct conception of a triangle, or a circle ; or the conception thereof may arise in his dreams, and thus have a purely mental existence ; and I ask whether this object, the form of the intellectual eye, has not as necessarily its own extension as its own geometrical relations ? How can a plurality of images, at one and the same moment, as in the distinct visions of sleep, exist in the mind, if that mind has in no sense of the term an extension or space ? We have all experienced a coexistence of conceptions, as of a prospect, or of a multitude of persons, and can there be a coexistent plurality of such conceptions, without what must be termed an extension and consequent space, of an order distinct from the material ?

The conclusion then, to which I come on this point, is, that the world of mind or Not-Me within, has its own extension and forms, as well as the world or Not-Me without ; and that there is a mathematical analogy, or correspondence between them, although as to extension, they have nothing in common, but a common geometry.

This seems to me to be the necessary teaching of the spontaneous reason, to the unsophisticated observation and experience of the inner man.

But I am free to admit that the moment he attempts to go beyond the teaching of his unerring preceptor, he will discover objections that will apparently be wholly irreconcilable with this doctrine. He will soon learn to object that this mental imagery is of an evanescent nature—often incongruous and inconsistent with itself ; that the senses of the dreaming, vanish from the waking mind—that the images of the memory often pass out of cognition, and even fall into utter oblivion—that, finally, these intellectual visions belong wholly and entirely to the individual man—are of his own independent creation—fleeting and futile, and have nothing in them of permanence or order.

To all these objections, the reader may have already anticipated the answer which will be given. The disorder is not in the all-formative and all-formful Logos from which the imagery proceeds; but in the individual self, or conscious Me—the recipient. The objections are suggested by a notion which is on a level with those astronomical hypotheses, that seem to have been common to the savages of America and some of the sages of ancient Greece and Rome. The most common idea was, that the earth was the fixed, immovable centre of the Universe; from which all the host of heaven proceeded, as from a parent Deity; by whose breath all were sustained, and around which all obsequiously revolved. Seneca, who was of the school of the Stoics, says, that it was their faith, "that all the heavens, which the fiery ether, the highest part of the Universe, includes; all those stars whose number cannot be told; all this host of heavenly bodies, their sun running his course so near us, draw their nourishment from the earth, and share it among them; nor are they sustained by any thing else than the breath of the earth." In this hypothesis, that doctrine, which makes the self the immovable centre of all mind, and generator of all thought, of all ideas, and of all intellectual imagery, finds a perfect parallel. It puts the conscious Me in the place of the divine Logos, and makes Deity the sattelite of man.

True it is, the mental imagery may be evanescent, incongruous, fleeting, and exhibit neither permanence nor order, to the ever mutable percipient Me; and because the imagery changes with every change of state, and because the voluntary self may not be able to realize a particular state at a given moment, and thereby revive particular recollections, it does by no means follow that the imagery does not exist potentially ; that is, ready, from its nature and constitution, to reappear whenever the conscious self by its own volitions, or by force of physical causes, shall have past to that state of feeling, which is ever the necessary condition of its appearance.

It is not otherwise, even with the material universe. The world of the senses (whatever may be the true theory,) does not exist in Nature. Hers is but a world of potentialities. In the absence of the sentient being, her rose may indeed still yield its exhalations, but they have no odor ; her fields still reflect the modified rays, but they are without color—her breaking billows may still produce the appropriate vibrations, but they emit no sound. Yet give her but the presence of the conscious sentient being—that is, realize the appropriate condidions, and it shall be a creative fiat ; the rose shall breathe its odors, the fields shall spread out their green expanse, and the billows murmur their sublime music.

To a supersensuous being, divested of a material organization, this entire universe of matter is as a unit, and all its forms subsist in synthetic unity. Could we suppose such a being to assume, sometimes at will, sometimes by force of causes over which he had no control, transient and imperfect organizations in matter, whilst he was passing from the more to the less, and from the less to the more perfect organic states, how fleeting, evanescent, incongruous, and dependent on his individual self, would this universe of permanence, order, and law appear ! He might very naturally fall into the error which I am combating—make himself the centre of the fleeting forms which were presenting themselves to his ever mutable senses, and his glimpses of this universe of matter, a creation from, and dependent on, his transitory states and conditions. So might it seem to him; whilst to us, in the perfection of our material organization, that grand synthetic unity of all material forms, would stand out revealed in the perfection of its analytic order, the permanent and immutable system of the sensible universe.

The conscious Me, may, indeed, on particular occasions, be unable to realize the necessary conditions on which particular ideas or images return; but we ought not hence to infer that there is a loss of capacity—and that these conditions are no longer possible to it. The individual soul has acquired a power by having once realized these conditions; and that modification of feeling, which constituted the conditions, still potentially exists in the depths of the individual consciousness, just as the imagery exists as to it in the synthesis of the Logos. In the dreams of the aged, reappear the long-forgotten scenes and companions of youth. In the delirium of fever, the patient converses freely in the language of his childhood, of which in health, he is entirely oblivious. The conscious self, having once existed in a given condition, the susceptibility of resuming it is formed, and when it is resumed, no matter for what cause, the appropriate ideal forms and sounds return with all their original distinctness.

There is then, that same sort of independence and necessary existence, in the forms of the internal, as in those of the external, Not-Me. Yet there is this difference in the two modes of realizing them: to realize the visual perception of a given external form, we must pass through space, step by step, and comply with every geometrical and optical relation or law necessary to the complete fulfillment of the requisite conditions; but the conscious self ever subsists with all its internal susceptibilities, and, by them, subsists as it were at once, in the whole, and in every part of its own sphere of mind ; and takes cognizance by a simple change of state, of ideal forms, whatever may be their relations to it, in the simultaneous or successive order of the supersensual. That portion of the supersensual world which is present to the intellectual eye, is the only portion of it that is analytically revealed to the conscious self in the order of simultaneous and successive relations ; whilst all that is unrevealed, at the particular moment, still continues, as to the same conscious self, in its synthetic unity. Perfectly analogous to this is the world of the senses. All that is the present object of sensation stands out to the sentient being in its simultaneous and successive order ; all that is not, subsists, as to the same sentient being, as a synthetic unity, and it is only by a change of relation in space, that he can give it to reveal itself to his senses in its own analytic order.

It often happens that the conscious self, by reason of its physical affections entering into combinations with its own voluntary action, passes into a complex or compound state of feeling, and thus realizes to the internal eye, visions incongruous and inconsistent. But suppose it to pass, uninfluenced by physical relations, from state to state, by a transition as necessary and regular as our progress through space, and the imagery of dream or reverie shall then be to it no less real, than the scenery of the material universe. Whenever the conscious self shall, in all its states and in all its changes of state, harmonize with the laws of the Eternal Reason, the ideal world shall reveal itself in the perfection of its own order, and in the light of its own divine beauty. All its forms shall have their logical and necessary relation, each to each, and each to all ; and earth, and ocean, sun, moon, and stars, shall be seen to be even less real than these. This relation to the Logos may perhaps, never be realized on earth ; yet, in respect to the external world, it is realized in every instance of sensation. In every instance, in which a perfect impression is produced on the organs of sense, the conscious self or free activity is brought, by force, into a state which in some degree is one of absolute union with the Logos, both internal and external. And this statement leads me to present, with more particularity, what must, according to the principles already advanced, be the true theory of sensation.

But as a necessary preliminary to a brief exposition of this theory, I will repeat, with some further particulars, what I understand to be a state of feeling forming a necessary condition to the perception, whether of mental imagery, or external objects.

That original state of feeling, which forms the basis of all subsequent states, is that in which the individual soul subsists by relation to the corporeal organization. This is a felt relation, whether the self be reflectively conscious of it or not. That such a state of feeling may subsist in the consciousness, and yet not be an object of thought, may be demonstrated from the fact, that one born blind may have his mind impressed by one uniform color, occasioned by the visual obstruction, and yet by reason of its uniformity and its unity of effect, have no knowledge or idea of any color whatever. Now this is the felt relation in which the individual soul subsists as to its corporeal organization, and constitutes the law by which the two are connected ; but it subsists with relations precisely analogous to the all-formful Logos within, considered as the soul of the soul, and consequently, as the source and cause of all perceptions. In reference to the Logos, the primary state is a pure, supersensuous state of feeling, and all the modifications through which it passes are likewise pure, supersensuous states of feeling. Thus any impression on the organs of sense produces a change in the primary felt relation of soul to body, and this change is sensation, not perception; but this change is necessarily accompanied by a change precisely analogous, in the supersensually felt relation of the soul to the Logos, and the result is a perception which, instanter, identifies itself with sensation, and resolves the internal, into the external of form.

If any one should request me to state, more particularly, what I mean by this supersensuous state of feeling, and to give him some plain illustration, I should answer, that every tone of sound, and every hue of color, produces not merely its sensitive, but its supersensuous effect or feeling. A combination of sounds makes a tune; a combination of colors, a picture. Will any one say that the tune and the picture do but excite sensation, and that they produce no supersensuous state or feeling whatever, and that independently of association, the jig and the anthem are one and the same thing? Now it is the supersensuous states or feelings which these tones and these colors produce, either separately or in their combinations, that are the conditions of perception, and which remain in the individual soul or self, after the sensations which they have excited have passed away forever. These may be renewed at will, and on their renewal, they bring with them the appropriate conceptions, and repeat to the soul's eye and ear the forms and the sounds that may never more be renewed externally. Just so it is of all forms and of all things, whether of art or Nature—each of them, and all their combinations have their supersensuous, as well as merely sensitive effects.

I have said that the Logos is the Soul of the soul. Now if our doctrine in relation to extension and form be true, the Logos is, in this relation, all extension and all-form, in synthetic unity. If this be so, then every form in the Universe is ever subjectively present in this all-comprehending entity—to the soul of every human being—present even as that all-containing entity is present. What then is there that should prevent its becoming objective, or rather at all times, being an object of perception? If the form of the star, that burns unseen by me in the depths of space, be at this moment in the Logos present to my soul, why have I not a full and complete perception of it? Simply, I apprehend, because of the felt relation of soul to body. This felt relation fills the entire perceptive power of the soul, just as in blindness, the film, or other obstruction to vision, occupies the whole faculty of sight. The blind person sees the obstruction, and can see nothing else. The whole faculty of vision is absorbed and swallowed up by the relation in which it subsists to the obstruction. In like mannner, this felt relation of soul to body takes possession of its whole perceptive capacity, and the forms, which the Logos embosoms within the soul, cannot for that reason become objective, or even a subject of distinct consciousness. But let the ray of the supposed star fall on the visual nerve, and instantly the whole visual nerve is brought into a new state—the primary felt relation of the soul, as to it, changes in perfect accordance with the nervous change, and becomes merged as it were, in the Not-Me or Logos external—There is as yet, however, no perception of the object. But at the instant of sensation, the soul has, on its internal side or aspect, undergone a change precisely analogous as to the Not-Me or Logos within, and has to the same extent, become merged in the all-containing soul.

From this supersensuous felt relation, the soul becomes, *instanter*, receptive of perception, throughout in all respects, to the extent of the change in the nerve and the consequent sensation; and there being now no obstruction to the free development of the all-formative Logos within, (in consequence of the entire homogeneousness of all states and relations through all degrees of substance, as to this particular effect on the visual nerve,) the ideal form of the star, always subjectively present within, becomes objective through sensation, and the visual nerve. The ideal form within, identifies itself with the form without; the extension, the geometry, and the space within, are at once *externized* through all substance, and become fixed in the cause, or necessary occasion of the sensation. It is thus by a force acting on the Me, that we see the form itself—not an image of it—from its ideal in the bosom of the Logos, to its ultimate in matter. We erroneously ascribe the perception to the Logos external only, because in that is the predominance of effect, the terminus or last result of the process of which we are conscious.*

The form, which is an object of perception externally, and its ideal in the Divine mind are correspondently one, though substantively dual. No one ever had the present sensation of a material form—saw it with the corporeal eye—and at the same time had an ideal image thereof manifest in his mind; and that probably, by reason of the mathematical correspondence between the ideal and the sensible form. During the sensation, the ideal seems to be merged in the sensible ; but this can be only an appearance, arising from the cause just mentioned ; for remove the object of sense, and you shall call up an image thereof in the mind, as distinct as the counteracting influence of present impressions on the senses will admit ; and in the absence of such influence, as in sleep, it shall appear as distinct as any object of sensation. The sensible form appears in one degree of substance, the ideal in another ; and they mathematically correspond ; therefore they exist as substantively distinct, yet correspondently as one.*

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* A short way of stating our theory of sensation and perception is this: The *object* of sensation and the *idea* of it are correspondently one and identical in the Logos—The individual soul would perceive the object—the idea—nay all things, but for the obstruction of the organization. Now this obstruction is removed, (so to speak,) whenever the organs of sense are brought into harmony with any particular idea of the Logos, by the action of the object upon them; and the individual soul thereupon, to precisely the extent that the obstruction is removed, becomes necessarily identified with the idea in the Logos, whose ultimate form has produced the impression, and perception is the consequence—or rather, this is itself sensation and perception. Or it may be stated thus, still more briefly: All things ever subsist subjectively in the inmost soul; and the impression on the organ of sensation, made by an external body, does but render the subjective idea of that body, objective—that is, render the body itself an object of perception.

There is this further difference between the sensible and ideal form. That which we see externally, passes away to give place to new forms and relations ; it is in time ; but that which we see internally, is in eternity—is of the infinite. For when we call up an object which we saw twenty years ago at Rome, or Jerusalem, the individual soul may be supposed to assume the state in which it was at that time, and in that place, and the object thereupon is evolved from the synthetic unity of the Logos, and appears precisely as it then was. The assumed state may have no relation whatever to time ; for it will not be even an act of memory, unless it, at the same time, be a state that has relation to a past succession of events ; and then it will not be precisely the state that I have been supposing.

All things now are in the bosom of the Logos what they ever were. Do but assume the appropriate state, (an achievement not very possible,) and though the affirmation may excite the smile of the reader, or possibly something worse—yet it does seem to follow from the premises, that you might see Noah and his family just landing from the ark, on the peak of Ararat ; or Moses at the Red Sea, accomplishing the Exodus of the Hebrews ; or the kings of Egypt, laying the foundation of the Pyramids ; or the temples of Babylon and Nineveh, in all their original glory. The supersensual state being given, all things appropriate to it, are instantly given. It gives rise to its own internal time, and space; but of external time and space, it has nothing, and can, during its continuance, know nothing.

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* Such, too, I apprehend to be the relation of soul and body. They are substantively distinct, yet correspondently one.

These states, however, are not at our command. We can resume those into which we have been forced by external, or other causes ; we can even compound them, or, in other words, assume a complex state—a state consisting of many, resolved into one—as in our dreams ; when the past, the present, and the future, present us with a jumble of their imagery ; but in no instance, does the soul, of its own will, assume a state entirely original.

The Logos is the central unity of every kind of natural form, animate and inanimate ; and is the ideal beauty and perfection of each and all, everywhere present in its entirety, making partial revelations of itself, in matter and in mind. I mean not to say that it thus subsists by radiation, or diffusion ; but that its presence is absolute and entire everywhere. To make the manner of this presence understood, and to show by what law the Logos controls and governs all things, will be the attempt of the next chapter.

# CHAPTER V.

## THE LOGOS—ALL-PRESENT AND ALL-ASSIMILATIVE.

> "The Divine fills all things without space."
> SWEDENBORG.

> "O, Adam! one Almighty is, from whom
> All things proceed, and up to Him return,
> If not depraved from good, * * * *
> More spiritous and pure,
> As nearer to Him plac'd or nearer tending;
> * * * * So from the root
> Springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves
> More airy, last the bright consummate flower
> Spirits odorous breathes." PARADISE LOST.

"THEN you really believe," said a missionary, to a Hindoo philosopher, "that your god Krishna passed over nine distinct bridges, in nine distinct individual forms, at one and the same time?" "I do really so believe," said the Hindoo, "and further, that he was, at one and the same time, with his twenty thousand wives, of whom not one doubted she was his sole partner." "Say nothing about them," observed the missionary, "the nine bridges are marvel enough for me. And now will you be so good as to teach me, how one being can become nine distinct individual forms, and yet, in each individual form, be neither more nor less than the whole being?" "Do you see," inquired the Hindoo, "yonder banyan grove, that throws its shadow upon the sacred waters of the Ganges?" "I do," answered the missionary, "and have often admired the luxuriant growth of the trees that compose it." "Will you count them?" asked the Hindoo. "That were no easy task," replied the missionary, after a pause; "but their number cannot be less than a hundred." "Not less than a hundred!" reiterated the Hindoo; "how greatly you err! I can convince you, by occular proof, that the whole grove is but one vast tree, subsisting from one common root, and having but one common life." "Indeed!" exclaimed the missionary, somewhat astonished; "but what then?" "Why," continued the Hindoo, "the god, of whom we are speaking, did, in times past, give each of those supposed hundred trees of yours,—but which are truly a growth from the same common root,—to see, hear, and feel; and the consequence was, that each tree saw something, heard something, and felt something, which none of the other members of the brotherhood saw, heard, or felt; and thus each tree had its distinct set of sensations, and, thereupon, became a distinct, individual, percipient being. In this manner did the life or being of one tree assume a hundred distinct individual forms of being, and subsist in each as in all; for it heard, saw, and felt, in each, and through all, in its own entirety. Do you now understand, how one being can become nine distinct individual forms of being, without losing his identity in all or either?"

The Hindoo may have confounded the missionary by the above illustration; indeed, he may have approximated a great truth; yet, except as a sort of approximation, I have little to say in favor of it. It does but very imperfectly express what is believed to be the true nature of ubiquity.. The Hindoo supposes his god to be in space; but any illustration, which we may use, should suppose a being which creates space as a thought, and who, therefore, rather comprehends, than is comprehended by it. In a word, it seems to me, that our views can be best illustrated, by again having reference to our optical experiment.

According to the facts which that experiment reveals, if the soul saw through, or with, nine distinct eyes, separated by the appropriate *non-visual* spaces, all the nine organs would be but as one organ. In other words, the soul would see through, and be present—so to speak—in its entirety in each eye, but no less present in them all, as one. For let it be recollected, that the spaces, which separate the pictures on the retinæ of these organs, excite no visual perception, and the nine pictures are, therefore, as to it, one picture, so long as they are the representations of the same field of vision. And so, if the impressions be multiplied, by multiplying the organs and the correspondent spaces, ad infinitum, will the impressions and the organs, to the percipient soul, still be but as one impression, and as one organ. This indefinite number of organs, though diffused like the stars through space to the sight of a distinct beholder, would be, to the percipient soul of which they were organs, as a unit, occupying no portion of the space of visible extension. The soul would be present, in its entirety, to each as to all, and to all as to each. Indeed, it would be its entire presence to every one, that would make up its entire presence to all as one. Space, it has been shown, is but the ascription of the pure geometric reason to a coexistent plurality, and, by consequence, where it does not, and cannot, make the ascription, because of the subjective relation of the coexistent plurality, it resolves the plurality into its synthetic unity, as to its own apperception, and subsists in all, and in each of the all, in the entirety of its whole being. The each and all thus felt by us as one, constitute, in that reason, what is called a universal idea; and the order in which this idea is felt or conceived by the perfect Reason, considered as the visual faculty, is the order in which the each and all of being is present in God or the Logos. It is present in the order of Reason; as unity, resolvable into degrees, classes, orders, genera, species and individuals. It is a presence that involves all things in an order its own. Just as the idea of the number twelve involves all its component numeral elements in an order its own.

Such I apprehend to be the nature of the presence of God, the absolute soul of all and singular of the Universe. Here is no division—no diffusion of Deity—no separation of the great central unit into parts ; the illustration does not even suppose magnitude, or occupancy of material space ; but it takes the existence of absolute soul, from the analogy which that soul affords in ourselves, and regarding its relation to the material universe, as that of the individual soul to the body, or as the visual faculty to its organs or the impressions thereon, it at once makes it manifest that the necessary consequence of the relation is, an entire presence at each and every point, where form or being is. Not perhaps that the presence is one in form, or effect, or energy ; for as to all manifestations or effects it may have its degrees of more or less,—just as may the action of gravitation, or the principle of life,—but that, though it act through forms and degrees, as diverse as the ideas of the Logos, it is still the same unit and the presence of the same great being, subsisting in the perfection of its own willed order.

That the Logos has a common and special relation of presence to the all and each of humanity, may, if our premises be correct, be shown by a further consideration of its relations of presence, in the visual faculty, to the impressions on the retinæ.

In the above illustration, I have supposed a unity of presence in the percipient soul or visual faculty, to each and all the organs, only in the instances where the field of vision is common to all the organs. But this presence would be the same, both as to the percipient power, and as to the organs, even were the common field of vision resolved into as many apparently distinct fields, as there are supposed organs. For let both eyes be directed to the same field of vision, and the impressions produced by that field, on the visual nerves of both eyes, are the same, or precisely similar; and then the common field and all its objects will appear single. But now, let one eye be so directed, by pressure or other cause, that it shall take into this common field a portion of visible extension, with its objects, not included in the field of the other, and so, also, leave out a portion, that is included in the field of the other; and instantly the field of vision, that was before common, ceases to be common. Each eye has its distinct field, because it is different from the other, by its different visible extension and objects. The geometrical relations thereupon arising from the objects common to one eye, cease to be one with the geometrical relations arising from objects common to the other, and hence every object, that is common to both eyes, appears double. But this duality of vision could not arise, were it not that the same soul or faculty of vision saw it by means of both organs at once, and because of a common relation to both, as well as a particular relation to each. But this common and particular relation is what is called the presence of the percipient faculty, or soul. The presence then of the percipient faculty, or soul, continues the same, even when the eye is moved from its natural place, and when the field of vision and its objects are apparently double, and the perceptions arising therefrom are actually double. But the same rule will apply to any supposable number of organs, under like circumstances, and, by a like process of reasoning, the same presence to them all may be inferred; namely, a common presence and a particular presence.

But though this presence continue the same, yet, by reason of the distinctness and difference of one visual impression from another, do each distinct organ and the visual power of each acquire something of a distinct individual percipient character. It is as if the same percipient being had two distinct forms, occupying two distinct positions, from which they were viewing two distinct, though not entirely dissimilar portions of extension ; for the vision of one eye is entirely independent of the other, though the percipient power be common to both.

But we may suppose these distinct forms to be very numerous, and their positions to be very much diversified ; but however numerous his forms, and however diversified their positions, yet will they, each and all, be essentially the same being, in a multiform aspect, susceptible of a great variety of relations, and receiving a great variety of visual perceptions. This being would, as the distinct soul of each form, see through each its distinct and particular field, and, as the common soul of all, through all the forms, at once, the whole number of distinct fields in their aggregate. Here is still the same sort of presence that we have heretofore observed ; an individual presence, and a common presence, the sum of the individual presence ; just as we have the gravity of the atom, and the gravity of the total mass of atoms ; or the rainbow of the single drop of mist, and the rainbow of the whole cloud.

Now if we suppose each one of these individual forms to acquire, from the excitement of its distinct set of sensations or perceptions, a will its own, and a consciousness of its own individuality, as distinct as its perceptions, we do not at all alter the relations, or the presence, of the percipient being. It is still as truly everywhere present to each and all, with their now acquired personal attributes, as it was when these forms were without them. And such I apprehend to be the nature of the omnipresence of Deity or the Logos, to man—present to each, present to all, as one. A will, or conscious individuality, arising from distinct relations and perceptions, takes form from the all-pervading will or consciousness, and gives individuality to the soul. It is this relation which brings us at once into the presence of God, and His Universe—the Logos within, and its ultimate form in matter.*

Nor is this a mere illustration, but rather a *demonstration*, of the nature of the Divine presence. For, if the views presented in the third chapter be correct, the action of the Logos, as brought home to our consciousness within, is one and identical with its universal action ; just as the hydrostatic laws of a drop of the ocean, are the laws which govern its total mass ; or as the law which governs in the descent of a pebble, is that which governs all worlds through infinite space. The order of the presence of the Logos in the organs of sight, is the order of its presence in all the forms of sensation. The human organism, in all its variety, is to it as a unit ; and for that reason, the Logos, as the Soul of the soul, is present, at once, in the whole organization, and in every part of it, in its entirety. And the Universe is likewise a unit to the Logos ; the Logos, therefore, must be, *mutatis mutandis*, in like manner, present to the each and all in its entirety.

I will here incidentally remark, that, without at all relying on the doubtful phenomena of Mesmerism, this theory will, if the clairvoyance of somnambulism be not all a fraud, render its wonders a little more credible, by furnishing a plausible explanation. We have but to suppose an acquiescence of the Will, and its partial or complete abstraction from its material relations, in order to the ascent of the soul to a higher degree of the Logos or Universal Soul, and the remote in time and space may thus be laid open to view. Whilst an oscillation between different states, or the blending of mere dream with the visions of reality, may plausibly account for its frequent errors.

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* I will here add, in further illustration of the theory of sensation and perception put forth in the preceding chapter, that if it has already been shown to the satisfaction of the reader, that the external universe is but a *permanent* conception of the Logos or Divine Mind, he can now easily apprehend how that conception is made to stand out, to the perception of each individual being, as the universe of the senses. It exists in the Logos ; therefore it exists for each percipient being thus conditionally individuated from the Logos, and organized in the finite.

But though the universal, be the inmost soul of the individual soul, yet the particular sensations and perceptions of the individual, may not be *its* sensations and perceptions. It is itself the fountain of sensation and perception; it receives nothing *ab extra*, save the reaction of the free will—a will distinguished from the supreme Will, by its finite relations, whether arising from the *Not-Me*, or created by itself. Without changing itself, the universal soul (or Logos) is constantly acting to change those individualities which it has formed from itself. It is itself ever the absolutely active element; the individual ever, relatively the passive. The going forth of its energies may constitute its perceptions, and at the same time give individuality or modification to the individual soul, whilst the reception of them by the individual soul may constitute its perceptions and sensations.

But if the Logos be thus present to the each and all in its entirety, the question presents itself, what is the necessary consequence of this intimate presence? We have seen that it subsists, as to matter, with a constant tendency to a realization of itself—a tendency ruled by its own willed order, and proceeding from the most interior and divine ideas, to the most exterior forms, or to ultimates in matter.

But if this be so, and if there be no counter influences, there can be no reason why every thing should not continue to advance until it attain perfection. Is there such a progress in the Universe? Let us see.

The laws of Nature are eternal and immutable; yet they are the source of all mutability. Does change then proceed in an eternal round, so that every thing is still on the primitive level? or has there been a fall beneath, or rise above it? The evidence on these points does not seem perfectly harmonious. But let us consider the questions—perhaps we may find, that if we cast aside the absurd hypothesis that Nature is in any respect on the wane, we may come to the conclusion, that in some things, she has attained perfection, and hence as to them become stationary; and that in other things, she is still advancing toward perfection according to the laws of universal order; and this may relieve us from the embarrassment of any apparently conflicting evidence.

I think that we may, at once, come to the conclusion, that whatever there may be in the material universe, which is in itself immutable, has attained its perfection; and that, as to it, there can be no such thing as improvement, or deterioration. Thus dead elementary matter is unchangeable, and it can, as dead elementary matter, never become either better or worse. It has attained its perfection, and its condition is fixed. True you may add life to it, but it will still be dead matter under new laws; and the moment that those laws cease to predominate, the laws of dead matter will prevail, and carry the mass back to its primitive condition; showing, that though for a season, their force be counteracted, they are not annihilated. Matter then, considered merely as matter, is, under the laws of Nature, immutable, and therefore in its perfection.

But then the *forms* of matter are constantly changing, and, in the world of forms, we find that there has been a progress—a progress from a state of imperfection—of deformity—to one of great perfection and beauty. This is a truth which the geological history of the globe most clearly reveals. Life first manifested itself in the lowest forms of vegetation ; then, in the lowest forms of animal life. It seems to have proceeded from one degree to another, until it attained its perfection in the form of man, an image of the all-perfect form in the sphere of the material. I must here be understood to speak generally of the kind of form, and not of forms individually.

But change, in this world of forms, has been going on ever since the creation of man, and is still going on—one generation is succeeding another—and is this change an evidence of progressive improvement ? Is the vegetable, the animal, or human form, more perfect now, than it was six thousand years ago ? Doubtless vegetable and animal forms, under like circumstances, are now, what they were six thousand years since ; save where the art of man has wrought an improvement in them. With this exception, their instincts must have continued the same, and their forms the same. We have no evidence that the Logos manifests itself with more perfection in them, whilst in their natural state, now, than at their first creation ; though considering them in their connections and relations with man, it may manifest a higher degree of perfection in them now, than primitively. Both plants and animals, that have fallen under the dominion of man, have been made to undergo great change, and, in some instances, have been wonderfully improved. And this argues an improvement in the human race ; for, had man continued stationary, nothing, with which he is connected, or to which he is related, could have been improved. All things, then, whether mutable or immutable, considered distinctly from any necessary relation to, or connection with man, continue stationary, and, so considered, are in their perfect state. That all are in their perfect state, and therefore stationary, would be an absolute truth, but that we are under the necessity of excepting man and those things in which he has property and over which he has dominion. Neither he, nor his, are stationary, or in their perfect state; but are improvable and progressive. Not but that portions of the race may retrograde; but that the race as a whole, notwithstanding occasional appearances, is progressive, and constantly so, is a position which all history verifies.

Man being the only free force on earth, and he continuing here from generation to generation, under the dominion of the perfect Reason, is necessarily the only progressive being or thing in Nature. But if so, what is the peculiar mode by which his progress is secured? What is the nature of that law which operates his progress consistently with his freedom, and by what name shall we designate it?

We have seen that that action or law, which produced the world of forms, began with the most imperfect organizations of vegetable and an animal life, and proceeded through every intermediate degree to man, the image of God on earth—doubtless a very imperfect image. But I have now shown that this action has not ceased in man; but that it is still operative—that is, tending to perfect his image spiritually—to make it still more like Deity, and, by consequence, to improve him as a material being—to render him and all his, a more perfect image of the perfect form. Every form thus has tended, and is tending, toward a likeness of the divine, or supreme central form of the Logos. Now what name can we give to this action or law, which tends to liken all forms to the most perfect form? I know not how better to designate it, than by calling it the *Action* of *Assimilation*, or the *Law* of *Assimilation:* an action or law that proceeds from God or the Logos, as the Supreme of being or form, and whose tendency is to liken all forms to the Divine form from which it proceeds. It is this action, or law, that has produced the world of forms; not perhaps excepting those of suns and planets; and which is still sustaining the world of living forms against the laws or forces of dead matter, and is going on, with a progressive creation, in the world of humanity.

The action of assimilation, thus understood, is universal—it is all-creative—and, though in Nature, it has its limits beyond which it does not perfect its forms, and though in man, it has no limits, but proceeds toward an indefinite perfection, yet it is necessarily continuous through both Nature and man; to the end that it may preserve, as well as create. All natural forms, that are not the forms of dead matter, subsist by succession; so that among them, the work of creation must be constantly going on.

To prove that it is the action of assimilation, that is producing this effect, I resort to the facts and deductions of the third chapter. In that chapter it appeared, that the ideal image was of the Logos, and subsisted in the mind with an energy, whereby it repeated itself in the visual nerve; that is, drew into a likeness of itself a certain portion of that nerve—assimilated to itself an image therein; and it was hence inferred, inasmuch as this was the operation of a universal law or principle, that wherever matter was brought into a state receptive of its influence, like effects must follow; and it was thence shown, that all natural forms were the creations of this principle acting through ideal spiritual forms, extant in the universal mind. If this be so, and if that action, which repeats the ideal image in the visual nerve, be the action of assimilation, then is that action the all-formative energy, and the law of assimilation is the law which produces the vegetable and animal creations, and the whole world of humanity.

This is an action by which the spiritual divine assimilates matter to its own exemplars or ideal forms ; but its action is not arrested in the mere germ or embryo of the form which it thus creates. It takes possession of it as its instrument, as a medium of action. The form itself becomes an assimilative organism. The vegetable and animal assimilate the substances on which they feed, convert them into their own forms, and identify them with themselves. Wherever plant, animal, or man is, there is the assimilative energy, active, from its source in the Divine form, down to matter, and, through the forms of matter, on all substances that constitute their growth.

That the same supreme assimilative form should shadow itself forth in the common humanity, as it best may, and so stand out in the civil and social relations, would seem to follow as a necessary consequence of its universality. In the social many, it must indeed present itself in a different aspect to the senses, and yet may it be to the reason, the same essential form. It takes corporate form in communities. Every well-formed community may be said to have its head, its heart, its body, and members, that minister to its wants. And in that saying, there may be reality, as well as metaphor. Whereever the social relations exist, even in the brute creation—as birds that flock, and beasts that herd together—especially in the natural state, we see the shadow of this image ; and even down the scale of existence, to the insect creation—as in the bee and ant—it bears with it much of its human aspect—too much for any serious and philosophical mind to doubt its presence, as an actuating energy, or controlling law.

What is that sympathy which performs so great a share in the social relations of life, that, if man were altogether without it, he would cease to be a social being? What is it, but one of the modes in which the assimilative energy manifests itself through media of its own creation? Man sympathizes with his fellow man from necessity, and, if he also does it from choice, it is because the necessity has made it agreeable.

Whence is the resemblance of offspring to parent, of kindred to kindred; nay, of all members of the same community, even where relationship cannot be traced, but from a law of assimilation, proceeding from the Supreme form as their grand analagon, and acting through their forms spiritual and material, as media, according to the nature of each? Nay, if one dwell among strangers, how soon will he catch their gestures, their gait, and their general deportment? And from the active workings of the spirit within, how long will it be before his countenance, and his features, will begin to assume a resemblance to theirs? The child catches, if he does not inherit, the manner of his parent; the pupil that of his instructor; the inferior that of his superior, especially if he be an object of love or respect. If Alexander have a wry neck, all his officers may be expected to pride themselves in a like blemish or deformity; and, if it do not actually exist, they may be expected, by a sort of involuntary or spotaneous affectation, to put on the appearance of it.

Is not the fashionable world a creation of this energy? The cut of the garment is not often chosen for its beauty or neatness, but may be assumed simply from a desire of avoiding the appearance of singularity, or of conforming to the prevailing fashion.

The action of assimilation, then, is not only direct on the spirit of man, and through that on its material organization, and the substances on which that organization directly acts, but through the organic form on other coordinate forms ; and again through spirit on spirit—begetting social relations, and thereby, blending the common brotherhood, as among themselves, into one mass, and still sustaining the relation of each, individually, to the grand central form, whose action is producing the whole effect. Perfectly analogous to the action of gravitation, as well as to the order of the pervading presence, it acts on the each and all, as one.

Is it asked how this is accomplished ? I answer by an all-pervading will, acting through its own perfect order. Does the human will move the body—give motion and direction to the limbs, or rather put in requisition energies which move them—nay, shall the magnetizer, by the mere energy of his will, (as supposed,) contract the muscles of his subject, and cause him to move, and apparently to think and act as he pleases,—and shall not the will of God, present in an order its own to every atom, move all things ? What is matter, that it should present any obstruction to the will of its Creator ? Do but reduce the total mass, to the size of a cannon ball, and then view it *ab extra*. It has no weight—no tendency—it can resist nothing. It is, to such a being—subsisting in, or rather comprehending it—a mere thought ; and a thought can move it. It is itself that will, actualized in a subordinate sphere ; and shall not that will, ever present, continually give to it its laws of development ? This it certainly does, by acting, first directly upon it through its connected spirit, and secondly, by indirect action, through media spiritual and material. This is of necessity, for the preservation of order. It is the manner in which the absolute Will harmonizes the action of the each, with the order of the mighty whole.

But to prove the universality of the action of assimilation, it should be shown to affect matter without life, as well as matter with life. I know not that it is necessary to our theory to prove this ; and yet it seems to me to be susceptible of proof.

But, as preliminary to this inquiry, I revert to the doctrines of the second chapter. In that chapter it was shown, that the idea of a coexistent plurality, no matter of what, necessarily involved the idea of space and extension—that unity, as felt in the individual soul, resolved into a coexistent plurality to the senses, made that visible and tangible somewhat, called matter. I showed that this felt unity was the basis of our idea of number—that since it existed subjectively in one of the forms of that reason within, which we felt to be essentially a causative and creative energy, it tended spontaneously to repeat itself objectively *ad infinitum*—to take form, of a law its own, in successive and simultaneous order. Now this unit, which thus exists subjectively within myself, taken absolutely, is no other than the divine esse, or absolute unit ; and, as I find, that in myself it tends to an objective self-repetition *ad infinitum*, so it must tend, in its self-subsistent entity, to an objective self-repetition *ad infinitum*—that is, to pass into infinitude in every possible mode. We must, however, conceive the repetition, only as the repetition of unity, and, therefore, as without form. But if conceived as without form, (and so it must be conceived, as the mere repetition of the esse,) it can be conceived only as the point—the mathematical point. Now take any number, or a group of these mathematical points, simultaneously subsistent, and if each tends to assimilate the whole group to itself—that is to give its own unity to the whole group—that is, again, to reduce all the points to a single point at their common centre—then their movement will be precisely that which manifests itself in the attraction of gravitation, and will prove that the action of gravitation may be but one of the forms of the action of assimilation.

But if these points all tended to one point without deviation, they would, in the end, all merge in one ; and if they all merged in one, they would merge in the absolute unit. But this, the very energy or law, which gave them objectivity and multiety, forbids. Thus, though they may seek the central point, yet they must all be repelled and deflected from it. And this deflecting force must give to each point an orbital, and to the whole group, perhaps, a rotary motion. This theory enables us to account for the resistance and solidity of bodies, and for the motions of suns, and planets, and systems, through all space.

By this deduction, I do not deny the existence of the law of gravitation. All that I would be understood to say, is, that the law of assimilation, acting through masses of matter, as media, manifests itself as the attraction of gravitation ; and that the law of gravitation, is included in the more universal law of assimilation.

The action of assimilation appears to operate through two degrees or modes of substance ; viz. : that which we call matter, and that which we call spirit—the sensuous, and the supersensual. Acting through its sensuous sphere, it tends to assimilate all matter to the globular form ; acting through its supersensual sphere, it tends to assimilate all things to the human form, or to the divine as it is imperfectly imaged in matter ; and so to the Supreme or perfect form. Through the two spheres, it acts antagonistically, and brings the principle of life in contact, as it were, with death. It tends from above, to convert all things into living forms—to approximate them to the perfect form of the Logos, or to an examplar of vital form in the Divine mind. It tends from beneath, to reduce all things to the globular form, or to that form, whatever it may be, to which dead matter tends, of its own law. So that life, as it manifests itself to the senses, is but the struggle between these two antagonistical, and, apparently, conflicting modes of one and the same action. And when dissolution comes, as come it must, in this never-ceasing struggle, each sphere takes its own ; the body passes to the nether, and the spirit to the superior sphere.

The one supreme form, acting directly from itself through the ideals of the Divine mind, in these counter assimilative tendencies, must be ever forming new centres of action, and making new manifestations of itself. Of those inconceivably vast masses, that are accumulated in the depths of space, portions may acquire, from the very accumulation, distinct centres, and so separate into orbs, and systems of orbs. So the whole human race, though acted upon by the same assimilative energy, separates into distinct nations and communities. In humanity, however, there is not that homogeneousness, which we have supposed in the mere mass of matter ; but each nation has its distinct character, or ideal forms to which it aspires—so has each tribe, and each family. And these ideals or examplars, constitute distinct centres of action, from which nations derive their ruling ideas and laws of action. When we add to these, that somewhat distinct element, the free activity, we have every thing that is necessary to an infinite diversity of action, and from which we may derive all that is imperfect, as well as all that is perfect, in the relations of human life.

In and over all these apparently conflicting and jarring elements, the perfect Reason presides—omnipresent and omnipotent—in an order its own, with a never-ceasing tendency to bring all things into subjection to itself. Its tendency to assimilate the each and all of humanity to itself, is slowly, but ever certainly, gaining on every aberration from its own perfection, and approximating the race to a universal civilization. The tendency of man is to a divine destiny—a point toward which he has been, and ever will be advancing, but which, from his very nature, he never can completely attain.

And why not? Every form of dead matter—every form of vegetable and animal life, has attained perfection in its kind; and why should not man attain *his* perfection? Nay, why is he not already perfect? Why has not the Supreme Will the same dominion over him, that it has over all other existences? I answer, because man is not simply a mere animal machine; because his mind or soul is not the mere instinct of an organism, nor a partial image of Deity, acting through a correspondent limited form, to a manifestation of itself; in a word, because he is a progressive being, by his constitution and nature; has his distinct identity; (conditional though it be,) his quasi freedom; and because when he ceases to be progressive in his nature, he ceases to be man.

A grand distinction between man and all other portions of animated nature, lies in his conscious individuality—his conscious identity and freedom of will. I will endeavor to trace out this distinction, and show, as far as may be, what man is, in his relation to the perfect Reason; in other words, what the Me is in its relation to the Not-Me, and in what manner the assimilative energy is bringing the universal humanity to act in harmony with the pure Reason, without any infringement on that share of freedom which the Creator has vouchsafed to the individual man.

# CHAPTER VI.

## THE ME, OR HOMO-INDIVIDUALIS. OF ITS UNITY, IDENTITY, AND FREEDOM.

> "Fond fool! that deem'st the streaming glory nigh,
> How vain the chase thine ardor has begun!"

To God alone belongs absolute unity, absolute identity, and absolute freedom. From these attributes in God, man derives a quasi unity, a quasi identity, and a quasi freedom.

Unity is an element essential to the personal identity. Give unity alone, however, and you do not give personal identity; for each plant, and each animal, has its unity. But give to this unity a consciousness of its own existence, distinct from that of the external world, or of a mere sensitive existence, and you infallibly give the personal identity, or conscious individuality. It is this unity, made conscious of its own independent or distinct existence, that constitutes the personal identity. The question first in order, then, is, what constitutes the unity of the human soul, or individual man?

In answering this question, I certainly feel no unwillingness to ascribe to it, a unity perfectly analogous to that which belongs to any entirety of the natural world, to the whole of the Universe, or to any of its systems. Let this proposition be clearly explained, and if it now has an objectionable aspect, I am persuaded it may be made to disappear.

We have seen, that between the world of spirit, and the world of matter, there can be no interference, for each has its distinct substance, or mode of substance, and, by consequence, its distinct extension, and distinct space. Now the soul is a part of the world of spirit. It therein exists, subject to laws which rule over it. It has its own distinct activity, or successive volitions, and its own ideal forms or images, which appear and disappear, seemingly at will. Now here is an aggregate plurality; yet who is there, that is not conscious that this plurality has nevertheless its unity—some principle, some bond, which makes it one? So true is this, that in all common discourse, we speak of it as our own internal being or self-hood, and thus necessarily treat it as a unit. And a unit it is; but in what does its unity consist? To answer this question in the easiest and most familiar manner, we will begin with the soul in its most exterior form; to wit, with its image in matter, the material organic structure; and through that, follow, so to speak, this unity, inward or upward, into the supersensual, or sphere of the soul; and we may, perhaps, thereby more clearly discern, in what the unity of this spiritual aggregate consists.

The body, considered as an organism of this internal self, or virtual unit, is itself a unit, an entirety—an instrument of the aggregate, which we consider the mind or conscious being. It is an entire instrument, through which the mind operates on matter. It is an entire instrument, through which the material universe operates by the senses on the mind. As to each, it is a whole. It is the soul materialized, and the infinitude of the world of sensation is its sensitive mind; of which it is itself, considered as a whole, the presiding unit; and as such, gives to the world of sensation, whatever of unity it has. Let us then examine this unit, and see whether it be really a unit, or only the appearance of one. Now the moment we commence our analysis, this apparent unit resolves itself into a plurality of senses—or organs of sensation—each independent of the other—neither of which, independently, can give unity to the sensitive mind. But then, (it may be said,) *all* may, when acting in combination. Very true ; but what is it that gives them combination ? Whence is it that they derive their unity? Why, from the mind, it may be said ; that aggregate plurality, I suppose, of which I have been speaking. Very well ; let us analyze *that*, and see if we can find the principle of unity therein. We speak of it as the mind, and, in common parlance, treat it as if it had all the unity of the real conscious self ; but the moment we examine it, we find that its unity is altogether derivative, and that in itself, it consists of conceptions, or objects of apperception, which have no more real dependence on, or connection with, one another, than the objects of sensation ; as sounds, and colors ; odors and tangible bodies. Whence then this apparent or derivative unity? Perhaps it is in a superior self or soul, which makes this aggregate of conceptions its object of apperception, just as the external organization makes the material world its object of sensation. Be it so ; but the moment you examine this interior self, you will find that it consists of a combination of internal senses, faculties—no matter what they are called—no one of which can perform the functions of any other, and which, as in the case of the external senses, require a combining principle to give them unity, and which combining principle can be found only in an existence still more interior. It must be an existence, which, like the faculty of sight to the organs of sight, can, as to itself, resolve a multiple into a unit. You may thus proceed, for aught I can conceive, *in infinitum ;* in every step of the process resolving an apparent or derivative unity into a plurality, which has its combining principle still beyond or within it. Yet, in every step of the progress, shall be revealed the two great elements of all mind, the Me and the Not-Me—the Will and the overruling Reason. But still, does not the number of objects upon which the will may act diminish, as we ascend in the scale of mind ; and does not the will, in every degree of ascent, lose something of its energy ; and must it not fall more and more within the dominion of this absolute, overruling reason—until it is lost in it—swallowed up in it ; as in the source and fountain of all being ?

It is most certainly true, *cæteris paribus*, that the activity of the will depends entirely upon the number of objects, or the variety, upon which it may act. Take from it this variety—take from it all objects to call forth its action—and it falls back into its infantile state of quiescence ; into the bosom of the spontaneous reason—the Logos from which it proceeds. Now most unquestionably, the number of objects or ideas which call forth the action of the Will or Me, diminishes as we ascend in the scale of mind, and that point, therefore, must be ultimately attained, in which the Will or Me becomes merged in, or identified with the Logos, or absolute will of God. I therefore say, that whatever of unity we find in ourselves, is wholly derivative, conditional, and dependent ; that it is a quasi unity, subsisting in all its degrees, entirely from the one absolute unit ; which is God, considered as the Soul of the soul. It is His perfect will, under the appearance of spontaneity, which, like gravity in matter, pervades the mind through all its heights and depths ; gives to it law ; and to every degree of it a conditional unity. We may, by a self-analysis, pursue this unity as far as our capacities will enable us ; and when we pause, as ultimately we must, we shall find that our quest has been like that of the child in chasing the rainbow, and that the great source of unity is still above us. Down from the Supreme, through every variation of soul, the divine unit takes form, till it terminates in the material organism, and in the mind of the senses.

And this view of the unity of the soul, as far as it can be an object of apperception, is supported as it should be, if correct, by a strong analogy to the unity which may be observed in the material universe. Thus every mass of matter—every particle of which this earth consists—has its unity ; but it is a unity derived immediately from the attraction of the globe, which acts upon it as a unit—the globe has its derived unity, for it is made one, by the action upon it of the whole solar system as a unit. All the distinct masses of the whole solar system, are resolved into a like unity, by the action upon them of the whole material universe as a unit ; and this in turn must acquire its unity from the all-present will of Omnipotence, imposing on the whole and every particle thereof, the universal law of gravitation ; which seems to be but one of the forms of the all-assimilative energy.

God, then, is truly the unit of all unities, both in the worlds of matter and mind. He is the grand centre of all forms of existence—the central substance or support of all qualities, spiritual and material—the only absolute unit ; every other, even when manifest in mineral substances, is derivative and dependent.*

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* Mr. Whewell considers the fundamental idea of that class of sciences, in which the powers of matter manifest themselves in visible movements and modifications of their material agents, to be *polarity*, or the conception of "opposite properties in opposite positions ;" and his definition of a mineralogical individual, is, "that portion of any mineral substance which is determined by crystaline forces acting to the same axis."

When, however, I speak of the unity of the soul, considered as the self, as being analogous to that which manifests itself among material bodies, I desire it to be understood, that I speak of it as analogous only, and not as in all respects similar. For the unities which we discover in soul, are the unities of a higher, in reference to a lower, sphere of existence, and not unities arising in one common degree of homogeneous substance, as in matter. For instance; the body is the soul's material organism. It is composed of an order of constantly fleeting particles. It is said, that the whole mass of particles is changed, once in seven years; yet the body has its unity as an organism. It is ever the same instrument. Its oneness, however, does not consist in the particles, as a mere aggregate, but in the unity of the vital self or soul which acts upon it, during all its changes, as one and the same energy, making the whole arrangement, a single instrument. This material organism is the lower sphere of the proximate spiritual form of substance which animates it; this spiritual form is the lower sphere of the first rational psychological self, or the individual soul, as it subsists in that degree or sphere, from which it looks down on its conceptions, forms of thought, and so forth; and makes them objects of reflection. This, again, becomes a lower sphere, to the soul in its primordial relation to Deity, considered as the Soul of the soul, or as the grand central unit, out of which proceed all the unities, of which we can become conusant, within us. God, then, gives unity to the primordial individual soul—that to the reflective soul—that to its spiritual form, proximate to the material—and that again, to its instrument, the body; and the body thus becomes the last result or image of all the preceding unities. This statement is fully sustained by any view that we may take of the operations of the soul.

The existence of two degrees of self is ever manifest in every act of cognition. In every such act, a subjective, and an objective—a higher and a lower self—must subsist together. Thus the sensuous self, or sphere of mere sensation, is the objective of the percipient self. The percipient self becomes objective—as a sphere of conceptions, forms of thought, ideal images, etc.,—to the reflective or intellectual self, which is a still more spiritual form of being. This again becomes objective to the Me, in that sphere in which it is wholly subject to the influence of the pure spontaneous Reason ; and this is the highest form in which it is possible for us to conceive of the existence of the individual soul ; for above this, the subordinate Me or self, seems to merge in absolute Deity. But when we consider unity as arising from the action of one body upon another, within the same degree of substance, as in matter, it puts on an aspect somewhat different, though the primary cause thereof may be the same. In matter, the proximate greater mass may be considered as giving unity to the less ; and we do not look for a source of all unity in a higher degree, until we come to regard all matter as constituting one vast unit. It is then, that we ascend to a higher degree, and find the source of its unity in Deity. The analogy, however, is perfect, between matter and the common humanity.

Thus we have individuals, families, communities, nations, communities of nations, the whole humanity —all deriving their social unities, the less through the greater, from the all-assimilative personal Logos ; which, at the same time, is imparting its own unity, to each and all, as one. Like gravity in its action on atoms, it acts directly on individuals, and gives to them their universal and distinctive relations ; and like the same principle in the formation of bodies from masses of atoms, it colligates individuals into families, communities, and nations.

But, it may be said, that if the foregoing representation of unity be correct, each individual man, and all men as one, are no other than the divine unit, standing out in organic material form ; and that the whole humanity is but one vast vital machine, moved solely by the will of God ; and that each human being is consequently without personality. This conclusion would certainly be correct, were the absolute will of God the only will, by which this vast aggregate is actuated and moved. It may have been the form or order in which humanity first appeared on earth. Man may have been in this state, whilst his material structure was in process of formation; whilst the Soul—the spiritual form—was yet creating for, and adapting to itself, an organization suited to the accomplishment of its destiny on earth. But whatever might have been his precedent state, the moment the individual was endowed with a consciousness of his own unity, that is to say, the moment he became conscious of his own acts and thoughts as his own, he acquired a conscious, a spiritual, a personal individuality, or identity, and could no longer be absolutely one and the same with Deity. For this *consciousness* of a self, or of a somewhat, distinct from the universe—distinct from the mere animal or sensuous life, and even from the forms or imagery of mind—cannot arise without its correlative will or free activity, and a consciousness thereof. For how can any one take note of aught that opposes or resists him, without the implied consciousness, if I may so speak, that he is to some extent free.

But the moment the consciousness of this freedom arises, be it real, or be it apparent, the individual or personal man, exists, and stands out, at least as to his own apperception, to the extent of such freedom, distinct from his Creator. He has an *Ego*, a Me, or what may be called a felt personal identity.

This identity, however, cannot be an absolute identity, any more than the unity upon which it is based is an absolute unity. Both are derivative, and dependent for their subsistence upon the great central unit, or self.

This leads me to enter more particularly into a consideration of the nature of the will, or free activity; which we shall find, I apprehend, like the unity and identity which I have been considering, to be wholly conditional and dependent.

"In Natural History," says Coleridge, "God's freedom is shown in the law of necessity. In moral history, God's necessity or providence is shown in man's freedom." This is a proposition as profound as it is true. The will of God, in the largest sense, is undoubtedly absolute. He wills man to be free, morally free; but the only condition upon which man can be endowed with any freedom proper to the individual, is, that he be brought into relation with the everlasting and unchangeable order of the Logos, or perfect Reason—in the supersensual world, into relation with that order as it manifests itself in the spontaneous action of mind—in the world of the senses, into that order as it manifests itself in the laws of Nature.

To satisfy ourselves that this order is a necessary condition to the freedom of man, we have only to suppose that it be disturbed or destroyed in the world of mind. Let thought follow thought, without order or connection, and is not the man at once insane? Has he any liberty of choice? Let the like disorder visit the material universe; let the heavens and the earth become a chaos, and the law of gravitation cease; let the ocean take the place of air, and the air that of ocean; let the mountains become valleys, and the valleys mountains; fluids become solids, and solids fluids ; and let them alternate their conditions or states without relation to time or circumstance, and would human liberty be possible? Could man think logically, or connectedly? And if he did, what would logical or connected thought avail him ?

When God willed the imagery (so to speak,) of his own mind to become fixed and subject to the eternal Reason, He then, and not until then, willed the existence of man as a free, voluntary, and somewhat independent force ; subject nevertheless to all the conditions of that order which is the prerequisite of his proper freedom and independence. The fiat which created man, was also the divine covenant, which assured to him the continuance of the established order of the Universe. In that order which bounds or limits man's freedom, God, as the Logos or perfect Reason, rules absolutely and unconditionally, and in as far as man is a part of it, not of choice, but of necessity, he is not free. In this order, God's absolute dominion trenches even on the moral world, not directly, but indirectly ; and ultimately controls it. Thus, man is not free to choose his own organization, nor to continue his life indefinitely. And thus, through the ultimates of organization and death, God absolutely guides and determines the destinies of the race ; but he acts not directly on the freedom of the individual will, but only tends to give it a direction and determination by the inspirations of the pure reason. By these, God rules conditionally, and man is free. Thus it is that God's freedom is man's necessity, and man's freedom is God's necessity—his self-assumed necessity.

He holds man in the embrace of His omnipotence, and presents him for his choice, a variety from the stores of His own infinitude. In the act of selecting, man is free ; whilst the still small voice of the pure

Reason, parentally chides every wrong, and approves every right selection, visiting, however, the consequences of repeated disobedience upon the physical constitution, until the line of life in which they continue to appear, becomes incapacitated to propagate itself, or is dissipated and lost in the midst of counteracting influences propagated by other organizations.

Thus human liberty has its limitations ; and limits, as well as liberty, are necessary, in order to enable the individual soul to acquire a knowledge of its own existence, as such. God himself exists in an order His own, which, as already hinted, can be no other than a voluntary limitation of His power. This order in the Divine esse, is eternity itself.

But it may be said, that the question whether the human will be at all free, is a very ancient question, and that it has not yet been logically demonstrated, to the satisfaction of every body, that it is so in any degree.

I do assure the reader that I am not about to revive this old controversy, in the form in which it has usually been carried on. It is enough for my purpose to say, that if the human will be not free in any respect, there is no such thing as freedom. If the will be not free, it is certainly wonderful that man ever came to the idea of liberty. The truth is, that the will itself is liberty itself, and the whole discussion, whether man be a free agent or not, is no other than the discussion of a question, whether liberty be free or not, or in other words, whether liberty be liberty ; yea, or nay. Such a question cannot be discussed, without yielding the very point in issue, and then contending for it.

Were man without liberty, he never could come to a knowledge of restraint or necessity ; were he without restraint or necessity, he never could be conscious of his liberty. It is from these that he becomes conscious of his own individuality, learns to distinguish himself from the external world, and, in the higher degrees of his being, the moral and spiritual, from the mere animal and sensitive self. In short, it is this encounter between liberty and necessity, that makes man *per se* a reflective being, or something above a mere brute force. Since then we cannot have liberty without necessity, nor necessity without liberty, I feel myself obliged to accept them both; and conclude that to question the existence of either, would involve the absurdity of questioning the existence of every thing.

But it may be said, that the brute has its voluntary power, no less than man; and that these premises will lead to the conclusion, that a beast, though of inferior capacity, is, nevertheless, to the extent of its capacities, as certainly a free agent, as a man. Some explanation I feel to be due to this suggestion; although it has been already, to some extent, forestalled. And by way of general reply, I will say, that the suggestion comes from not distinguishing between a being that is merely sensitive and perceptive, and so has but the lowest degree of self or soul, and a being who is not merely perceptive, but reflective, and so has not merely a lower, but a higher self, that looks down from the region of the moral and spiritual, upon the subordinate degree, and is capable of controlling whatever of the voluntary power it may have. It will be found, I apprehend, upon a little reflection, that the mere sensitive and perceptive self has a will, if it may be called a will, that is wholly under the government of sensation; and that, inasmuch as it cannot project itself, and make its action and passion objects of cognition, it is wholly unconscious of any freedom whatever, or of any distinction between its sensations and itself. It has no reflective knowledge of any thing. If the brute be a reflective being—one capable of internally resolving impressions and general instinctive tendencies into particular thoughts, or forms of thought, and so of making them objects of apperception, and means of promoting an end—all that I can say is, that no fact has ever fallen within the scope of my observation to prove it. The brute has, properly speaking, no ideas of time, or a continuity of events, or of causation. If my horse has taken fright, whilst I was driving him at a particular place, he will, if he continue in the same trim and condition, be very apt to take fright again at the same place; and this, not by reason of a memory of the past, as the past, but by reason of the same feeling arising, which identifies the past with the present, and makes them, as it were, one and continuous, and as without intervening events. And the same principle will explain any apparent manifestation of a knowledge of causation. We may learn that the brute is not a reflective being, by considering what man is, before the higher self has developed its powers.

No doubt every human being (as he is the image of God in the finite and multiple,) comes into the world with a capacity to develope this higher self along with a consciousness of it, and of the personal identity. Yet the babe, that came into existence last night, has not yet developed it. It knows nothing of liberty and restraint. It distinguishes not between itself, and the little world by which it is surrounded. Its sensations are as yet its all. Itself is all, and nothing more than what it sees, hears, and feels. Its voluntary movements are as yet not the results of thought, but of mere sensation. Its actions come of impulse or of mere instinct. It is a mere animal, saving that it has within itself the germ of its future personality or higher self; which the brute has not.

The condition of the brute and the child is in other respects the same. The brute has no *consciousness* of its distinct individuality, although, in itself, it be an individuality. Life and soul it indeed has, but it is of the life and soul of the universal parent, acting through, and in accordance with, a distinct and peculiar organization.

But, though I contend that the brute is not a reflective being, and that it has not a higher self, yet, let it not be hence inferred, that I deny that reason manifests itself in its actions; for I admit that reason manifests itself, even in insensate matter.

The laws of matter are reason, acting in and through it. The meandering of the stream, the heaving of the ocean, the growth of the plant, the climbing of the vine, the descent of the root in search of nourishment, the effort of the germ and leaf to pass, from darkness or shadow, into light—in short, the tendencies of all masses, and the progress and development of all vegetable life, are but the logical process of the same common reason; but the stream, the ocean, the plant, though thus under the dominion of reason, do not themselves reason. Neither does the brute; it feels, it *senses*, and sensation has its own law; and that law is reason itself, in the form of the sensitive organism.

The three geese which sat breast to breast under my window last evening, in a hail storm, drew nearer, each to each, as the storm increased in violence, till breast pressed against breast; then gradually rising on their feet, with necks and beaks brought together, and stretched and pointed upward, they sustained the fury of the tempest with as little of annoyance, as three Roman soldiers might have sustained, in a shower of darts from the beleagured fortress, whilst standing under cover of their contiguous shields. Yet this was not an act of deliberative, reflective reason; it was not choice, but a mere yielding of sensation to its own law.

As they approached that attitude, they felt less and less of pain; until their position became such, that it could not be made better for the purpose of shelter. They reasoned not, but reason acted in them. This seems to me to be always the mode in which reason, in the brute, manifests itself; it is not the reason of deliberation, but of spontaneity.

When sensation becomes highly excited, this reason of course becomes more active, and it seeks, by every possible avenue, for relief. It then puts on the semblance of deliberation and choice; but it is neither. It is a transition from one impulsive movement to another, governed at once by the organic structure, and by present sensitive influences. Man, in the act of reflection, does in his own internal world of mind, what the brute, under analogous circumstances, does in the external world. He passes from idea to idea, from thought to thought. His is the labor of the higher self; but the brute has but one form of self, and that the animal or sensitive form.

Divest man of the conscious individuality, the will conditionally free, and of all capacity to develope it, and you leave him a mere animal; a being without the power of reflection, without ability to distinguish, knowingly, between himself and the universe, and the mere machine of sensitive impulse. Yet would such a being bear within him an immortal principle. It is not otherwise even with the brute. For resolve the body of the brute into its original elements, and the vital soul still remains a somewhat of the Universal Life or Soul—elevated perhaps to a higher degree of substance by the process through which it has passed, but yet without the conscious individuality. It gained nothing, however, which it could itself appreciate by its organization, (since it gained not this consciousness,) and it has lost nothing, which it could appreciate by its dissolution.

The brute is as an oblique, and man as a focal image of the divine unit. Whatever of conscious individuality, freedom, and personal identity, belongs to the human image, belongs to it as a modification of this universal life; or rather as finite modes of the same attributes in the personal Logos. They are modes which identify themselves with the image itself, and give to it, in the completeness of the quasi unity, a homogeneousness with the absolute unit.

God, as the personal Logos, is thus the Self of selves; and when we cast off the animal organism, it is but to stand forth in the conscious individuality of a higher self. Hence it is that though the external world be changing in all its forms around us—though the body be undergoing a continual change between infancy and age—though the mind itself become obliterated by insanity or dotage—still the identity of being, the conscious life, soul or Me, continues as immutable as Deity Himself. Life is still life, as matter is still matter, however changed. This every man, whatever may be his speculations, feels in the depths of his consciousness to be true. It is the felt eternity of his own life, which gives the self of it to be conscious of all mutability.

But it may be asked, why should not this quasi identity resolve itself into its universal element? If the action of assimilation be a law of mind, as well as of matter, why should not the spirit be assimilated to, and absorbed in the Supreme Spirit, as well as the body assimilated to the dust, and absorbed in the earth from which it came, and man's conscious individuality be thus made to cease forever?

In answer to this question, I will say, that it may be admitted, that the quasi identity may pass into the divine element from which it proceeds. Yet it will by no means follow, that the Me or self, will cease to be. Annihilation seems to me an impossibility. Man's unity, identity, and freedom, subordinately conditional though they be, cannot be made to pass into nothing ; unless God can cease to be. But we may conceive the conditional to pass into the unconditional, the finite Me into the absolute Ego from which it proceeds ; but this would be a process exactly the reverse of that of annihilation, or of the destruction of the conscious self or individuality. It would be a more expansive and intense consciousness of existence—a transition into a more elevated sphere of being. The self-determining power, will, or capacity to act, would still continue and strengthen, through every advance toward identity with the perfect Reason ; which is but another name for the will of God acting through divine order. The doctrine of absorption therefore, is not the doctrine of annihilation ; but the very reverse of it.

But the resolution of the conditional Me into the absolute *I Am*, by the law of assimilation, seems to me to be impossible, without a subversion of the whole order of existence. For God, as the personal Logos, acts upon all, as upon each ; and the influence which would utterly annihilate the will, as a free principle, in one, would annihilate it in all. God, as the personal Logos, might, through this assimilative influence, create for Himself a perfect organism, through which to act on earth, without any breach of universal order. So He might bring the individual will, through order, to act on a line coincident with the perfect Reason ; but a coincidence, is not an identity of wills. Certainly the finite, by such coincidence, could not become the infinite.

But there is another view of this matter, that necessarily grows out of our system, which, I am apprehensive, will present an aspect very unfavorable to the idea even of a limited coincidence, much less to that of an absolute identity, with the Divine will.

It is this; the moral and intellectual habits which one forms on earth, are of the spirit. They are such manifestations as the spirit can here make of itself. They result from the acts of the will. These acts necessarily give form to the spiritual Me. It has been shown, that the mental imagery, and consequently the whole intellectual or physical character resulting therefrom, arise from certain general feelings or states of the soul, in relation to the perfect form of the Divine within us. Now, as these feelings, or states, are modifications of life and soul as they are within us, and are produced, generally, by our own free volitions, it seems very manifest, that the Me forms for itself, in the process of its growth and development, a distinct individuality, or form of soul, which, all other things the same, must continue in a future state, for the same reason that it exists in the present. The laws which produce it, or rather the laws in conformity to which it is produced, being spiritual, are as eternal, as the spirit itself.

We may not therefore, at any rate, expect a very sudden apotheosis. Humanity may, indeed, be ever approximating the Divine Infinite through order; but it can never finally attain it; any more than two converging lines, indefinitely produced, although constantly approximating in parts, can be made to coincide. The soul, the spirit, therefore, as a finite individuality, survives the dissolution of the body, and does not immediately, and probably never, enjoy the apotheosis which the question implies.

In this chapter, I have been considering the quasi unity, identity, and freedom, as they manifest themselves merely in the individual man, in his relation to the absolute unity, identity, and freedom in God, the personal Logos. But independently of this relation, the individual man is not alone—he has his coordinate relations in fellow beings, not only of this world, but, if the foregoing views be correct, of the world above or within. For there is as much truth, as poetry, in the idea that,

> "Man is one world, and hath
> Another to attend him."

Now I propose to make the each and all of this aggregate of free forces, in their coordinate relations, and in their relations to the absolute unit, the subject of the next chapter. In the discussion of these relations, it will, as I apprehend, distinctly appear, that these quasi free forces, constitute individually, and in their aggregates, a somewhat, that is foreign to the pure Reason or personal Logos, and that in the mind of God, it is a subordinate Not-Me, or distinct activity, ever requiring, like the animal passions within us, the active government of the perfect Reason ; that, in short, if God, or the Logos, be the absolute Not-Me to man, man is no less truly a conditional Not-Me to God. And in taking this view of the subject, I may repeat, and carry into further detail, some matters that have been considered in the present chapter.

# CHAPTER VII.

## THE THEANTHROPOID, OR HOMO UNIVERSALIS.

> "Others boldlier think,
> That as one body seems an aggregate
> Of atoms numberless, each organized ;
> So by a strange and dim similitude,
> Infinite myriads of self-conscious minds
> Are one all-conscious spirit ; which informs
> With absolute ubiquity of thought,
> (His one eternal self-affirming act)
> All his involved Monads, that yet seem
> With various province and apt agency,
> Each to pursue its own self-centred end."

If it be true, that the universe is an ultimate genesis of the all-present mind, and if it be true, that we have something of the universal order of that mind within, then have we something of all that is *by relation* evil, as well as something of all that is *absolutely* good. The self is a point in which all influences from above, around, and beneath, concentre. It freely acts, and reacts, yields to, or resists, whatever it may choose. In its own internal world, it has its space and correspondent relations. It has the Logos above, as the pure Reason, taking form in, or acting through, the superior sentiments ; and the same Logos beneath, taking form in the mere animal being, or that portion of being, common to the brute and the man. These distinct spheres, (if so they may be called,) are phrenologically represented by the organs of the superior and inferior portions of the brain. The Me, personal unit or free activity, is brought forth from the inferior sphere or form of soul, by the assimilative influence of the Logos, acting from above. Acting directly from the Supreme Absolute Self or Godhead, the personal Logos repeats itself, and begets its own likeness, in the finite.

The inferior and superior spheres are both of the Divine mind, and each in itself good ; but since it is the will of God, that the Me should be raised from the inferior or animal soul, up into the rational or human, and so through progressive order approach the Divine, the inferior is, as to this personal unit, the chaotic, or crude element from which the Me is formed. It thus becomes, by relation, its evil, or nether abyss, out of which the creative energy, by a constant effort, tends to elevate it ; whilst the superior sphere, the rational and Divine, is absolutely its good, its heaven of heavens. Of evil there is none ; save that which the free will of man creates, or which becomes extant as the correlative of his freedom.

The Me, considered as the free will, comes into being between these two spheres. Each acts upon it with its own assimilative energy. The Me stands balanced between the opposite energies, and is at perfect liberty to yield to the one, or the other. It thus passes upward, or downward, in accordance with its own inclinations.

But let us consider of what these counter elements (for such they relatively are,) consist, and how they effect the Me. We shall find, I apprehend, (if our premises be correct,) that the Me, considered as thus subsisting between these two spheres of action, has not a mere isolated being, but that, like a drop in the midst of a world of waters, it is pressed upon and moved by the whole ocean of existence, spiritual and material ; and so may be considered as subsisting by relation, throughout the grand order of the Logos.

In the first stage of infancy, when the child merely feels, and hears, and sees ; when it does but perceive the external world without recognizing it as external, the internal Me, or higher self, is apparently quiescent. It is the instinct of sensation, that then prompts every external act. Yet this apparent quiescence of the higher, or more interior self, is not inconsistent with a considerable degree of semi-instinctive activity. And active it indeed must be. For when the world of colors comes upon the senses in masses, (and as in masses it must first come,) the internal activity must make itself busy, in separating and resolving it into its constituent parts. When all visible objects are apparently at the same distance, this internal self must take cognition of their geometric relations, and learn to define their separating spaces. When the babel of sounds first visits the ear, it must busy itself in detecting all the variety, and particularly in distinguishing the precise intonations of the human voice. When the animal instinct finds relief in action, this ever-conscious self is surprised by the phenomena of motion, and, immediately and spontaneously, takes note of the connection between muscular contraction and its own volitions; and is thus early engaged in observing the mysterious relations between itself and its physical system—between cause and effect.

But who leads it to make these observations? Not the mother, or nurse; for all this occurs whilst the existence of the external world is yet a problem to be solved or questioned, at a more advanced period. It is its Divine parent, acting from the superior sphere as the assimilative Logos, that thus evolves the higher, from its germ in the lower self, or animal soul, by exciting to action, and prompting it to this course of observation, or instinctive cognition. Nor does the child make known that the internal self is born, or roused to action, until it does, itself, manifestly distinguish between the external and internal—the sensitive and reflective spheres. When it has apperceived or felt this distinction, the internal action passes out, as it were, into the external world. And this is a most interesting period of childhood; especially when the manifestation of this interior action is made through the medium of language. "I think—I believe—I hope—I fear." What an import these words have, when first lisped by the tongue of infancy! What volumes do they speak upon the precedent internal action and observation of the Me, made under the tuition of the great Teacher within? Yes, they announce that the self internal, in the tabernacle of the soul, beyond the contaminating approach of mortal, and under the exclusive influence of the plastic will of Omnipotence, has been formed and fashioned after the image of the Divine Parent.

It is not strange, therefore, that the child, when it first begins to lisp its thoughts, should seem like a being descended from an angelic sphere. Well and beautifully has it been said, that "infancy is the perpetual Messiah which comes into the arms of fallen men, and pleads with them to return to Paradise."

Thus formed and prepared by its great prototype, the Me comes forth, a distinct being, into the sensitive organism and surrounding world, to receive the instructions of its earthly guardians. It comes forth, all faith, all trust, in its preceptors; for they are, or should be, in the world of humanity, what the pure Reason is, in the world of the soul. And it understands, and confides in their precepts, because they are, or seem to be, but the echoes of the voice of the Divinity which speaks within. Conscious of its own exaltation, it looks down upon its subordinate self in the animal being, makes it an instrument of discipline, till its development is complete, and then goes forth to the full enjoyment of its freedom, and the accomplishment of its destiny.

By the time the Me has learned to distinguish between good and evil, in the moral world, and not until then, the nether sphere begins to put forth, with increasing and varied energy, its assimilative power. Then it is, that the soul called into action, through all its heights and depths, begins to feel, with additional intensity, its distinct identity. It is then, that the relations of the Me to both spheres become universal; the microcosm is complete, and becomes recipient of all influences, whether of the world of the senses, or of the world of spirit.

If our theory be true, death is but a name for a change that involves no extinction of the essential identity. It is not annihilation, or a cessation of existence. All ordinary language is but the language of appearances. We say that the sun rises, the sun sets; the stars run their courses—when, in fact, the earth only turns on her axis. Just so, in common parlance, we speak of death, and anticipate a rising of the dead; but this is speaking only according to those appearances, real or anticipated, which are, or are to be, the results of a change in the conscious self. Do but turn from the world of the senses, to the world of spirits, and the material Universe shall roll together as a scroll, and the dead shall rise around you.

In this idea, there is much of the sublime, but truly nothing of the horrible, save that which comes from a habit grounded in the fallacy of appearances. In what we call death, the self, or soul, does but withdraw the influence (mesmeric shall I call it,) which it imparts to the human organism, and straightway lives on in the world of spirits, as it has lived in this. A new space, a new extension, a new heaven, and a new earth, open on its untrammeled vision, and the discipline of this life, spiritually resolved, has made it already familiar with this new stage of its never-ending existence. Let but some slight change in the memory take place, and the future world will seem but a continuation of the present.

This is not fancy, unless the premises on which our theory is based be fallacious, but their demonstrably necessary result. We are brought, then, to this conclusion—that there is, embosomed in the Logos, a world filled with an infinite multitude of spiritual existences ; that it has its own order, so corresponding to that of the material world, that the one is the cause, of which the other is the effect ; that these worlds are, each to each, reciprocally inextended, and that, by consequence, the spiritual world is to the material, as a unit. Now, if this be so, this spiritual unit and all its spiritual existences, as one, must be considered as present by relation, to every human being. Not that this presence is necessarily attended with any consciousness of it, either in them or us, but that the presence subsists simply because, as to them, there is no such thing as the space of matter ; and because it is, through this relation of presence to the material organism, that they are as present to the soul.

But though all spiritual existences be considered a unit, thus present to the soul of every human being on earth, yet, inasmuch as this unit is, considered in itself, an infinite multiple, it must likewise be in *itself* susceptible of arrangement and order. This arrangement and order, the all-present assimilative Logos must necessarily produce. It must necessarily subject all things within it to its own order. It must, of its own law and energy, separate differences, and contrarieties, and bring like to like, and thus produce a superior and an inferior world of spirits. Both these are made to subsist by a relation, as of presence in each human being ; the superior acting as one with the Logos in the rational and moral sphere, and the inferior acting as one with the Logos in the animal form, or inferior sphere of the soul ; and each producing its appropriate effect on the Me, or free activity.

Man, indeed, is never alone. Deity is always with him : all above and all beneath are ever with him, and he can bring out the one, or the other, into his life and actions, as best suits his disposition.

And here I will remark, in reference to the subject discussed in the conclusion of the preceding chapter, that this superinduced power, (if thus divided and arranged by Omnipotence, into spheres superior and inferior, consisting of forces to some extent free, yet subject to an order imposed by the overruling Wisdom, and the former acting from above, and the latter from beneath,) must render the quasi unity and identity of the conscious self, little less than absolute. Nor are these antagonistical forces without their use, either to the individual or collective humanity. Both conspire to separate the good from the evil, and to purify the individual and the universal man. Each acts from its own assimilative power. The one elevates whatever is susceptible of elevation, the other swallows up in its abyss, all that is disqualified for the superior sphere ; and this is effected without at all impairing the freedom of the human will.

And it may be further observed, but with reference to another subject, that if all life, animal and vegetable, be assimilated through these media, it may be easily conceived how the whole universe of matter, considered as an ultimate conception of the Divine mind, derives, from its relation to man and spirit as forces quasi free, modification, fixity, and order, dependent upon the order of all spiritual existences. The material, must correspond, in some sense, to the grand spiritual, order ; and the universe of matter must continue as it is, until it shall be the will of God to resolve the free activity, and with it all, whether of spirit or matter, into the Divine *Esse*.

These are inferences which spontaneously flow from our premises. Yet, because the general mind shrinks, perhaps, from such speculations as unusual, or at least mystical, I would have avoided them, could I have so done, without leaving a deficiency in our system, not otherwise to be supplied. I now pass to a consideration of these influences through various orders of mind, on those social aggregates which constitute the entire humanity.

These various orders of mind through which Deity rules, ultimately, in human affairs, notwithstanding the temporary perversity of the human will, are formed, by the assimilative action of the supreme Reason, from the whole humanity, or universal man. And this necessarily leads me to inquire,—what is this whole humanity, or universal man, contemplated as present in its entirety to this Reason—a Reason from which it derives its existence, and from whose assimilative action it receives the laws that govern it ? How does it subsist in this Reason, and what is the manner or nature of its presence therein ? This is an important inquiry ; for such as is the order of presence in which the whole humanity subsists in this Reason, such, I apprehend, must be the order in which the assimilative energy acts through its entirety.

I have already treated of the omnipresence of this Reason, or Logos, in the fifth chapter. I have therein shown, by the aid of that formula, which our visual experiment furnishes, what must be the nature of the presence of the Logos, or Reason, considered as the absolute soul of all and singular of the Universe. But it is necessary here to understand what is the nature of its presence to man, and the entire humanity. This Reason is necessarily the Soul of the soul ; and considering it as such, it becomes expedient, here, to repeat some of the thoughts attempted to be communicated in that chapter. The reader will thereby have a clearer conception of that unity, which with the liberty of using a Greek compound, I shall call the *Theanthropoid*, or *Homo Universalis*.

I will, in the first instance, present the idea, which I would communicate, by supposing the individual soul itself to be the visual faculty. And I can conceive of no objection to this, since it is undoubtedly that which sees—the organs of sight are but its instruments, or its own exterior form. But if so regarded, then the visual faculty, or soul, may be considered as subsisting, in relation to the organs of sight, as the human ideal, exemplar, or image (which must logically precede the creation of man) subsists in the Divine Reason, to its material and spiritual multiple. But the unity of the visual soul, or faculty, is broken into a plurality, in the organs of sight—that is, the visual soul takes form, externally, in two or more visual organs. Just so may this ideal, exemplar, or image of man in the Logos, take form in that plurality of human beings, which constitute the race. Now, as the organs of the visual soul, however numerous, are, to it, as one organ ; so to the Logos, (which stands related to man through his exemplar or image,) the whole aggregate of human beings, contemplated in their most general relation, are as one human being. And as the visual soul is present in each and both, or in each and all of any conceivable number of organs, as one ; so God, considered as the exemplar or primordial image of man, is present in each and all of any conceivable number of human beings, as in one human being. The Divine Image (or Deity, as it is in relation to man,) repeats itself objectively, in a vast multiple ; whilst subjectively, it continues to subsist unaltered, in its original unity. And it is present (like the visual soul to its organs,) to the each and all, as one; and this relation of presence continues, whatever specific differences there may be in the individuals of the race.

For the purpose of illustrating this position, I must recall the attention of the reader to the first part of the fifth chapter, in which the subject of ubiquity is discussed. I find a repetition of the process, there given, necessary, in order to keep steadily in the mind a clear idea of the nature of ubiquity; for without some such almost sensible demonstration, the true idea is apt to elude the apprehension, and become confounded with our natural conceptions of space.

To this end, then, I repeat, that any supposable number of visual organs would, to the soul considered as the visual faculty, be but as one; since the spaces between them would not be objects of perception. And, for the same reason, the pictures, on the retinæ, of the same field of vision, would be but as one picture, exciting but one perception. And this would be the result, however widely the organs might be separated from each other. Therefore, the soul, (as the visual faculty,) would be present, so to speak, in its entirety, to each and all—whether organs or pictures—as if they were but one organ, or picture. It would be its entire presence to every one, that would make up its entire presence to all as one. Now if the supreme Reason, or Logos, be the inmost soul of every human being, then the above result becomes a formula, or true expression of the nature of its ubiquity to man. It is present, in its *entirety*, to each human being; present in its entirety, to all, as if that all were one being.

But in the above visual process, I have supposed a like picture produced by a common field of vision;

yet this hypothesis is not necessary to this common presence of the visual soul; for this presence would continue, even were the common field and its impressions resolved into as many fields as there are supposed organs. For if one eye be pressed from its appropriate place, so as to receive the picture of a portion of extension not common to the other, the field of vision becomes dual. We have in effect two fields of vision. It is, however, the same soul that sees each and both fields at once. It sees each, by reason of its particular presence to each organ; and both at once, by reason of its presence to both as one. The change in the position of the organs, and the change in the common field of vision, do not, therefore, in the least, effect the before-mentioned relation of presence. The particular presence and common presence still continue unchanged; and the result will be the same, however numerous the organs, or diversified the fields of vision and their consequent pictures or impressions.

But though the organs all have a common percipient power in the visual soul, yet, as each eye receives its distinct and independent impression, it also has its distinct vision; and, thereby, may be supposed to acquire something of a distinct percipient character, or individuality. And then, so considered, the whole number of organs together, however arranged, are as if they constituted one percipient being, having many distinct forms, occupying distinct positions, and each viewing distinct, though not entirely different, portions of extension. These forms may be very numerous, and their positions much diversified. But, however numerous the forms, and diverse their positions, they are still essentially the same multiform being, with a great variety of visual perceptions. It is a being, which sees in, or through, each form, the particular field thereof, and in, or through, all the forms, the whole number of fields at once. And here is still the same presence that we have heretofore observed—a common presence and a particular presence of the same entire percipient entity.

This seems to me to be, undoubtedly, a true expression of the visual soul's presence, or relation of presence, to the organs of sight. But if it be, it must also be a true expression, or formula, of the presence of all spiritual entities, subsisting with corresponding relations, to material forms. It must, particularly, be a true expression of the presence of the Logos, or Deity, considered as the Soul of the soul of all and singular of the human race. The race, considered as thus subsisting in relation to the Logos, or Deity, are each and all as one being, or as God manifest in a multiform humanity, Theanthropoid, or Homo Universalis. Such a form of humanity must, however, be regarded merely as a primordial form, or state—or a form, or state, which logically precedes all others, and in which, could it but continue unchanged, each individual would act direct from the perfect Reason—each in harmony with each and all, and the whole, as one vast human machine, actuated by the will of Deity. Perhaps this is the state in which man originally stood to his Creator—perhaps it is the state into which the assimilative action is now tending to bring him—not by absorbing the individual will into the Divine, but by bringing it to act in coincidence with it.

But though this state may be considered as having a logical precedence in reference to all others, yet it is one which, certainly, is not, and perhaps cannot be, otherwise than changeable, consistently with the laws of its own being. It seems to me, that the integrant parts—that is, the individual forms of which this multiform manifestation consists—cannot do otherwise than acquire distinct finite wills, and consequent individualities; subordinate however, to the absolute will. For, each individual form must, because of its limited relations, have its distinct sensations, its distinct thoughts, and from these, a distinct will, superinduced on the Absolute. If this be so, then must the finite will have its distinct series of actions, subject, nevertheless, to the All-controlling Will, one of whose superinduced modifications it is.

Thus underlying, supporting, and ultimately controlling, all the diversity of the human finite, the Omnipresent Reason still subsists as one, in presence unchanged, and unchangeable. It is itself the *germ* of the human finite; in its growth it accommodates itself to ever changing circumstances, and, in so far, loses its absolute and infinite mode of being, and becomes a quasi free force, a quasi identity, and an individual human being; still, however, always ultimately controlled by the unchangeable laws of the Absolute Reason.

The Theanthropoid, considered only in its relation to Deity, as its actuating soul, is a divine organization and a unit, even as any supposable number of organs of sight are, to the visual soul, as a single organ. Yet this sublime organization, though thus a unit to the supreme Reason, or Deity, is resolved, at once, in the phase in which it presents itself to the *senses*, into a vast multitude of human individualities, all actuated by an infinite variety of motives and conflicting wills.

But does humanity, in every aspect, subsist in the Divine Mind only as a unit or single idea? I answer, that though it subsist in the Divine Reason only as a single form of thought, yet it thus subsists as a universal idea, or form of thought, and must, for that reason, be resolvable in the assimilative Logos, *objectively*, into the generic, specific, and even individual elements of which it consists. It must be resolvable, especially, into the moral and intellectual orders, which constitute it, and those orders, without reference to place, nation, or even the varieties of the race, must take grade according to their degree of assimilation to the Perfect Reason. The highest, and, ultimately, ruling order of individual minds, must consist of those which have been brought, by the assimilative action, nearest in resemblance to the Perfect Reason. Beneath this order, minds must take grade, order after order, down to that which is the most dissimilar and even opposite to the same Reason. It is through these orders of mind, that this Reason everywhere acts to assimilate the each and all of the race to its own perfections.

Now the presence of the Logos, to each of these orders of like individualities, must be perfectly analogous to its presence to the universal man. Each of these orders, from the lowest to the highest, or most interior, must subsist, in the Logos, as a single human form or idea, comprising, in its unity, and tending to assimilate to its ideal, all the individuals of the order. The highest order must be the order of humanity most nearly assimilated to the pure Reason; and must more immediately receive its inspiring influences from it. This order of human beings constitutes the head of the universal man, and rules, in the last result, throughout the entire organization. It is its godlike element. It embodies the prophets, the philosophers, the seers, and sages, of the race. These are they who discover sublime truths, and reveal them to the nether orders, for promulgation, government, and use. These truths may, indeed, involve error to a greater or less extent; but they are, at least, approximations to absolute truth—such approximations as the nether orders of humanity are susceptible of receiving and applying to use. They guide, they direct, the labors of the scientific mind, and are themselves a part of it;—that mind, I mean, which is engaged, not so much with the ideal and the abstract, as with the concrete and sensuous, the social, physical, and tangible. These take the formulas, under which they proceed, from the philosophic mind; the Platos and Aristotles, the Leibnitzes and Bacons of their epochs. Investigation may throw light upon the errors of the formulas, under which the investigation itself is conducted, and corrected; thereby, philosophy may present new formulas, and thus give a new and higher direction to the labors of Science. But at every step of its progress, the scientific mind shall make new discoveries, and thus give birth to new arts, and new inventions, for the use and improvement of the race.

Science and Art reduce the great truths of the perfect Reason to the uses of life. They bring them down to earth; clothe them in ultimates; give them form in matter, and, through the material, give them to operate on the spiritual, man. Beyond the sciences and arts, man can make no safe, certain, or enduring progress. Human progress is a logical process; and consecutive discoveries and inventions are the only firm steps by which humanity advances. Though speculation may guide for a time, yet she must ever give place to the absolute truths of Science. It is thus that the assimilative energy resolves itself into a practical reason, to which the human will, however perverse, must ultimately submit.

For let it not be supposed that man is at liberty to yield, or refuse to yield, obedience to the power which thus presides over him. Humanity is so constituted, so organized by its Divine Author, that he has no choice, but to adopt the existing arts and sciences of the community to which he belongs. He is necessarily educated in their practice or knowledge ; and the necessity is just as imperative upon him to adopt every new and useful discovery and invention. This necessity arises from the fact, that the universal man—the Theanthropoid—has its Not-Me, or absolute Reason, as truly as the individual. This Divine Power, in one of its forms, appears as the principle of self-preservation ; and, in that form acts not merely on individuals, but on communities, nations, and common civilizations. These owe their existence, or whatever of permanence they may have, to their governments. Unlike the absolute truths of Science, which belong to all mankind, governments, as to their forms, are fragmentary, and are framed, each, to satisfy the real, or supposed requirements of a small portion of the race. They have their basis in local interests and prejudices, which are ever changing their character, with the progress of Science and Art.

But, lest I should be misunderstood, I will here add, at the expense of a slight digression, that, though the absolute Reason prescribes no particular form of government, but leaves that to the suggestions of the reflective reason, yet it is the absolute Reason that forces upon every community the necessity of adopting *some* form, and it is also from the same Reason, that government derives all its authority. Let me illustrate. It is the absolute Reason that suggests the existence of a cause for every change ; but it is the reflective reason that indicates, from among the objects of our knowledge, what that cause is. So it is the absolute Reason, acting as a universal law, that requires the existence of government ; but it is the reflective reason that creates, from among the materials which a given people affords, and which are the objects of its knowledge, the particular form of government which seems to be required. Thus the form of government is necessarily, both local and temporary. It is an organization of a portion of humanity; a vital, self-acting organization indeed, but not the less truly a special organization. As an organization, it, even like the animal form, can act only according to its nature. Whatever will moves it, moves it only in accordance with its capacities and character as a living machine. Yet are its relations to the Perfect Reason such, that it is ever susceptible of a further and further development and improvement. For although those who act, in and through this organization, derive a special character from the fact that they are members of the particular community thus organized, yet they do not, thereby, lose their relation to the grand organization of the universal humanity, above described. They are still integral parts of the Theanthropoid—the grand man, and, considered in that relation, they are forms under the government of the absolute Reason. And it is through them, so considered, that the absolute Reason is constantly acting, by a revelation of its truths, on their special organization, to harmonize it with its perfect self. Here, then, in intimate connection with the form which the Omnipresent Reason takes in the universal man, is a portion of humanity, organized as the state, and governed proximately by the finite will—a Me present to a Not-Me, which is the absolute Reason—present as a force somewhat foreign and antagonistical to it, but which, as an ideal form, that Reason is, nevertheless, in constant tendency to assimilate to its own perfect self. It acts upon it, as upon an idea its own. Indeed, communities, nations, and common civilizations, are but ideas in the Divine mind, instinct with a force or activity somewhat foreign to the Divine will, but which are ever in a process of development under its influence. This, again, brings me to the point from which I have digressed; and let us now pursue the inquiry as to the manner in which this process is carried on.

The scientific and inventive order of mind, is not the property of any particular nation, but of the whole humanity ; it has its appropriate place in the Theanthropoid. The truths which it discovers, the inventions which it realizes, are the common property of the race. But that portion of the race, which is at the head of the progressive humanity, will not only generally be first to avail itself of its revelations and inventions, but will, also, generally give birth to the minds that make them.

Now, when a people applies to its use a new scientific truth, or invention, (and applied, if useful, it will be,) it places itself, in this particular, in advance of all communities that have failed to apply it ; and the consequence must be, if the discovery or invention be at all important, that such a nation will advance in the scale of civilization, and other things equal, must either conquer, or assimilate to itself, any people that fails to avail itself of the new truth or invention. Thus it necessarily follows, that when one nation adopts an improvement, in Science or Art, all, acting on the principle of self-preservation, must adopt it, and its use must become general, throughout the common civilization. This common civilization, then, acts on barbarism with newly acquired force, and tends either to civilize, or extirpate it. The truth of this position is well illustrated by the discovery and application of the magnet to maritime purposes, and by the appropriation of gunpowder to military uses. The former pioneered the Genoese adventurer to the New World, and the latter extended civilization over it, by subduing its barbarism.

Nor are the effects of improvements in Science and Art, less manifest in the organization of the states that adopt them, or on the social condition of the individual man. Feudalism disappeared in Europe on the introduction of fire-arms, and on the extension of commerce by the aid of the compass. Protestantism was established, and the general mind liberalized and enlarged, by the art of printing. The invention of labor-saving machinery has given to the poor, the luxuries of life. Useful discoveries and inventions have operated, in modern times, an emancipation of the individual man in most civilized countries, and elevated the common civilization of Christendom over all others, present or past.

All improvements, in Art and Science, are the necessary results of the action (direct, or indirect,) of the Omnipresent Overruling Reason, on the free force. And because they are the results of that Reason, they can be made only in logical order. That is, each discovery or invention must be an orderly development of all that has preceded it. There is no gap or hiatus between the improvement of to-day, and the embodied improvements of all time past ; but such a necessary connection, that without the former, the latter cannot exist any more truly, than an effect can exist without a cause. And then, if humanity be in other respects prepared for the discovery, the new truth goes on to its full development in society, and, by a necessary law of mind, is carried forward to every application of which it is susceptible. And so of every invention ; which is nothing more than the laws of the physical world, brought into action for human use or pleasure, through the media of tangible and visible forms. The absolute Reason deals directly, only with entireties. It suggests the existence of a latent truth—or the idea of a possible invention for a given purpose. The reflective reason then, gathers the facts necessary for the demonstration of the truth, or brings together, in their proper aspects, the materials necessary to the invention ; but it is an inspiration of the perfect Reason, which, in contemplation of the entirety, completes the task, reveals the truth, or gives the required combination.

But discovery and invention require this logical order, not only in the progress of the Arts and Sciences, but in that of humanity itself. They must be made at the appropriate period, in the progress of the race, in order to be available. Men must know how to write and read, before pen, ink, and paper, can be invented ; and the art of printing cannot be advantageously applied to use, until a knowledge of letters has become very general. Could the invention of the plough have been made available, before man had left the hunter state, or tamed the wild horse or ox? Teach the savage to navigate a ship from New Zealand to New York, and to what use can he apply the knowledge, whilst he is possessed of nothing but his birch canoe ? It is manifest, that the condition of humanity must be such as to demand the particular invention or discovery that is made, otherwise it must perish as a premature birth, or, unapplied, await the progress of events. Whatever humanity wants, she demands ; and whatever spirit she evokes in earnest, is sure to make its appearance. No truth, no invention, that she really needed for a further progress, has ever failed to come at her bidding.

I have said, that philosophy directs the course of scientific investigation. Her directions, to be sure, are very general ; for she deals only in abstractions and generalizations. She prescribes method—she limits and defines the old, and strikes out new fields for exploration. She imparts her own character and complexion, to the Arts and Sciences, and, through them, to the whole progressive humanity. Take Plato, for instance ; and his philosophy yields an ideal method reconcilable with the inductive. Take Aristotle ; and his philosophy most obviously leads to a syllogistic method, though according to late commentators, it favors the empirical, or experimental method. What an influence have these two systems had on the progress of the race! If we now come down to modern times, and take the philosophy of Locke, we shall find it to be purely a philosophy of the senses. It, in effect, repudiates spiritualism, and directs the mind, almost exclusively, to the cultivation of the physical sciences and useful arts. The mind, constrained for several ages, to act within this sphere, has indeed wrought wonders—its discoveries and inventions have surpassed those of any similar period. But what has it done for man, as a spiritual and moral being? It has *directly* done nothing, or that which is worse than nothing. Regarding man merely as a sensual being, it necessarily adopts the selfish theory as the basis of the social system, and law and justice, and state and church, are venerated (if venerated at all,) only in proportion as they promote individual interest and enjoyment. Yet the great practical truths which it has revealed, by concentrating the labors of scientific genius within the limited sphere of the senses, has thrown no inconsiderable light on that spiritual nature, which this philosophy itself, does not even recognize; and the consequence is, that an *a priori* method, rectifying itself by the inductive, seems to be acquiring an ascendency. It is in this manner, that the investigations of Science are controlled and directed by the prominent philosophy of an epoch.

These remarks may give the reader an idea of the manner in which the Logos, on the principles of this theory, governs through the higher order of mind, in the progress of the race. It is, in fact, a process by which the inferior, is constantly being assimilated to the superior, order of mind, and, by which, the whole humanity is made to tend, as it were, toward the form of the personal Logos as its

Divine Prototype or Exemplar. That the personal Logos, considered as the supreme of humanity, is the grand central assimilative form of the race, may, it seems to me, be made apparent by a little reflection.

This Divine form, abstractly considered, can be no other than the Creator of man. In logical order, its existence precedes the existence of the material man, just as the soul's faculty of sight precedes the existence of its material organs; which are but the external manifestations of the internal faculty or idea. The internal faculty of sight exists; therefore, its material organs. The personal Logos exists; therefore, its multiple in human forms. That the idea of humanity exists in the Logos, and logically precedes the existence of its form in matter, is as manifest, as that the idea must logically precede the word that expresses it; or, as that cause must precede effect; and if this be so, then this Divine idea of man, or, in other words, the personal Logos, can be, as to man, no other than the Divine Humanity, or Supreme Man. And then, as all human beings are ever present in this form as one, the necessary consequence is, as has been already shown, that there must be a tendency, in each and all from assimilative action, to a likeness of this Divine Image, counteracted, however, to a great degree, by the perverse, or erring will of the individual.

The reader may be surprised, that I have not named the religious principle among the several enumerated elements of human progress. But the truth is, (as it seems to me,) that the religious principle, in that universal sense in which I am here obliged to regard it, is not in, and of, itself progressive. It is indeed an essential element of humanity, and is the moving cause of all progress; but without the aid of Philosophy, Science, and Art, it is ever stationary. It is essentially a sentiment—a feeling of the mysterious and sublime—an intuitive perception of the supernatural. This is its nature, considered as a universal element of the human mind, and without regard to creeds or doctrines. But then, it puts in action the Reason, which supplies the mind with doctrines of some sort. These are necessarily accompanied with a philosophy, which directs investigation, and thus lays a foundation for the sciences. It is a fire which generates the expansive energy that puts in motion the whole progressive humanity ; yet, in itself, it continues one and the same, only changing the mode of its manifestations, according to the human materials on which it acts. These change with the progress of the race. In the infancy of society, this sentiment most naturally takes form in the worship of the fetish and idol, or in the mummeries of witchcraft and magic. There may, indeed, be minds of a high order—such as are capable of contemplating creation as a whole—which are qualified to receive, as an inspiration of the Logos, the idea of the unity of the Divine. But these will be few and far between ; and their doctrines will not readily captivate the common mind. Common minds are as fragments ; theirs as wholes. It is not until Philosophy, Science, and Art, and, above all, the general use of letters, have qualified the common mind for the reception of the great idea of the Divine unit, that society abandons idolatry, and the religious sentiment takes form in a more exalted faith.

The world was not fitted for Christianity, until Christianity actually came ; and when it did come, it came as a logical and necessary development of the progressive humanity. And, unlike other religious forms, it came qualified to adapt itself to all future progress, without losing its identity. These facts alone, establish the Divine mission of its founder. He was truly an incarnation of the Logos, to the production of which the entire Theanthropoid conspired.

The Christian faith undoubtedly contained, originally enveloped within it, all the truths that it has ever evolved. But then it has evolved these, not by its own inherent energies, or direct action, but by occasion of the progress of Philosophy and Science. I speak not here with reference to its influence on the heart, but to our conceptions of Deity and a future state. What a change has the progress of Astronomy alone wrought in these ideas. We now recognize in the Creator, a God of unnumbered worlds, and we neither look beyond the expanse above, nor into an imaginary abyss beneath, for the world of spirits. We find God within us—and we find the world of spirits there.

With this view of the nature of the religious principle, I have not deemed it necessary to name it among those external, and manifest, agencies which are effecting the progress of the race ; but content myself with regarding it as the prime mover of them all.

The general propositions, now offered for consideration, may, at a more convenient time, be illustrated by some historical references. At present, however, I pause here, as at a point more appropriate than any that might hereafter be found, and avail myself of the occasion, which it affords, to review the ground over which we have passed, with a special reference to the subject of this chapter.

I have sought to do little more, throughout the whole course of this volume, than to carry, in something like logical order, certain premises to what appeared to me to be their necessary consequences. Regard them, if you choose, as constituting a system purely visionary. Still, are not those consequences the logical result of our premises? Are they not consistent in themselves, and in accordance with all the known laws or phenomena of matter and mind? Do they not yield, of themselves, a complete system, which harmonizes the material, with the spiritual world? Does not the system thus evolved, render the personal unity of God conceivable, though in the midst of an infinite multiplicity? Without confounding the Infinite with the finite—God with man, or man with God—does it not recognize the Omnipotence of the latter, and still leave the former accountable for his deeds? Does it not render the distinct identity of each conceivable? It may be answered, that though all this be so, yet the system may still rest on erroneous premises, and be without a foundation in truth. True—but then if the system have *really* a basis—if it be legitimately deduced from *sound* premises—can it be false? Imperfectly developed it may be—and—if a thought about language, in reference to a subject so grave, may be excused—it may be uncouthly expressed, but still is it *untrue?* Let me refresh the reader's memory, by naming several of the principal positions that I have endeavored to establish.

First; I find within myself, and infer its existence in others, a Power, or Presence, which I call the Reason, or Logos, and which is in itself perfect, and presides over the will or Me, in some respects, with absolute, in others, with qualified, dominion. And I infer from the nature of its attributes, and from the attribute of Omnipresence in Deity, that this perfect Reason, or Logos, is no other than God, present in the human soul.

Second; I find that from this Reason, Logos, or God, present within me, comes my idea of space and extension. That it is this Power, or Presence, which creates space and extension as a thought, and that, by consequence, all things, as a unit, are present to, and subsistent from it. This is demonstrated from the nature of this Presence in the visual soul and its organs.

Third; this Reason, Logos, or Divine Presence, is shown to be essentially a creative power; since every thought, or idea proceeds from it, and generates its corresponding imagery, or symbolic expression, either internally, or externally.

Fourth; it is shown that this imagery, or symbolic expression, subsists, logically, first in spirit, and then in matter; and that therefore, to the world of matter there is a corresponding world of spirit, from which the world of matter subsists, as effect from cause.

Fifth; it is shown that this world of spirit, *internally* considered, has its corresponding space and extension; and thus, whilst the world of spirit is inextended as to the world of matter, the world of matter is inextended as to the world of spirit—and that each subsists in each, as a unit, and, consequently, that they are everywhere present, each to each.

Sixth; that God, as the Logos, or Omnipresent Reason, with all related spirit, is everywhere present in *His entirety*, in all material entities, or individual forms, animate, or inanimate.

Seventh; that as He is present, through the visual soul, in the organs of sight, in each and both, as one; so, as the Soul of the soul, He is present to each human being, and to all human beings, as one; that therefore the entire humanity subsists, in God, as one human form coincident with the Divine ideal or Prototype, which gave birth to the human multiple.

Eighth; that from this Presence, (man subsisting as an idea, or form in the Divine mind,) results an assimilative action on the each and all of humanity, tending to bring man into a likeness of his Divine prototype, or image, and all social organizations into a correspondent order.—But since this action, were it without condition or limitation, would resolve man into God, and render the Theanthropoid, or Homo Universalis, a mere machine, or instrument of the Divine Will, therefore, it is shown,

Ninth; that this result is in a degree counteracted by the conditional freedom of the human will; which conditional freedom arises from the limited and distinctive relations of the individual, to God, and the Universe.

Tenth; it is shown, that this assimilative action arranges, or tends to arrange, all existences, whether spiritual or material, into an order which does, or would, bring like to like, and thus create, in humanity and throughout all intellectual being, superior and inferior orders of mind.

Eleventh; that the superior order of mind assimilates, or tends to assimilate, the inferior order of mind, throughout the grand intellectual organization; and that the assimilative energy, acting on humanity, through the philosophic and scientific orders of mind, through governments and other social organizations, is ever tending to elevate the race; and that it thus tends, although the devious action of the human will may constantly, in a greater or less degree, counteract the Divine effort.

It appears to me that these several positions are well established; and if they are, they fully account for all individual and social progress, and even for all individual and social retrogression; they give a logical aspect to the history of the race. They prove the existence of a Divine Providence in the affairs of men, and reveal a law, above man, whereby individuals, communities, nations, and the whole humanity, are ever tending toward a more perfect state. This tendency is through a Divine order; and the progress of the race is the result of a logical, consecutive, and necessary action of the Reason, or Logos, in the human mind. The arbitrary determinations of the will may, indeed, check and retard, and, sometimes, even accelerate it, but can never change the law under which it is proceeding.

When governments and other human institutions are not in harmony with this law, (and they are ever more or less at variance with it,) they are, so far, subjects foreign to, and distinct from, the Divine Will; yet ever developing themselves under its influence, according to their inherent tendencies. Such institutions are the creations of the reflective Reason, and can be permanent and become enduring elements of the Theanthropoid, only when they are brought into perfect coincidence with the Divine Reason. Such a coincidence has never yet been accomplished; for the assimilative action of this Reason has found, and perhaps will ever find, its antagonism in the errors and perversities of the will of the social masses.

Like individuals, then, communities, nations, aye, the whole humanity, are, in the Divine Mind, ideas, or forms of thought, somewhat foreign to God's absolute will. They subsist, as to that will, somewhat as the animal self subsists as to the rational self—somewhat as the ideas, passions, and propensities, of the nether sphere of the Not-Me subsist as to the intellectual Me, or reflective self. Thus, as the will of God, considered as the Logos, is a Not-Me to man, so the will of man, acting through the whole humanity, or any of its masses, is as a Not-Me to God; with this difference, that the will of man, in the Divine mind, is a nether force, never subduing, but ever to be subdued.

It is an overawing thought, that these free forces may exist, as one organized Theanthropoid, not merely in this world, but in all the worlds of the Universe, and throughout every sphere of spiritual being; and thus embracing, in one form, an infinitude of existences, may subsist as a Not-Me to the Divine Will, yet everywhere, ultimately, governed and controlled by it, as the thoughts or ideas of Omnipotence. What worlds of action may one thought or volition of the great central unit, so related, produce throughout all things! What an infinitude of phases may the same Divine volition put on, in its transitions through the media of such an organized system of intelligences!

The free force is the necessary complement of the Divine Reason. Without it, that Reason would be without object—its existence would be wholly subjective. It introduces mutability into the otherwise immutable; time into eternity; the finite into the Infinite; and makes everlasting action an attribute of the Mind of Omniscience. We thus see why the free force was created, if indeed it be not coeternal with Deity; and why it was made liable to err.

The action of this assimilative energy, thus at once special, general, and universal, is, in truth, Divine Providence ruling in the affairs of men. Not the capricious Providence of some, but a Providence of order and logical rule. Of its own law, it embraces and acts on every individual, as it does on all mankind taken as one vast moral and intellectual aggregate. The action of gravitation on every particle, being the same as it is on every mass of matter, furnishes an apt illustration of the order and dominion of this Providence. The balloon is borne upon the air, and floats above the cloud; its bulk in lead descends toward the centre of the earth; yet these motions, thus diverse, are given and regulated by the same principle, which regulates the movements of all bodies throughout space. Just so the Supreme Reason, regarded as Divine Providence, acts on every portion, and the whole world, of Humanity. Is it not more than probable, that the very law, which governs the stars in their courses, governs, *mutatis mutandis*, in the progress of nations and the lives of individuals ?

Whilst taking this somewhat distant and general view of the system, do we not perceive in the harmony of all its parts—in that necessary dependence which it reveals, of the each on all, and of the all on each throughout the entire orb of existence, spiritual and material—a confirmation of its truth ? No principle, no elemental part of this grand organization, can be abstracted, without the destruction of the whole, any more than a segment of the circle, or a section of the arch, may be abstracted, without destroying that of which it was a part. Take matter from spirit, or spirit from matter—nay, abstract merely the principle of gravitation, or of life, from the world of the senses, and all order ceases, and the grand objective entirety becomes subjective in Deity. Such a result can never be, until the Everlasting shall will to change the whole order of his existence.

And still, considering the system in the same general point of view, permit me to inquire whether there be aught in it to derogate from any one attribute of Deity ? The Universe is but the imagery of His mind. He is, according to reception, the everywhere present Life. His Will is the ever-present assimilative action, and the essential of all motion and thought. He is the germ of all intelligences ; they are but His finite and imperfect modes. He is the inmost Soul of every rational being on this earth, on the unnumbered earths throughout the immense of space, and in all the regions of the spiritual. He is present to the each and all, as the germ of their existence, and as their one informing soul, and they, each and all, present to Him as one form—as one organic Whole. Centre of centres !—Life of lives !—Soul of souls !—

Canst thou be less than All-creative and All-sustaining ?

We have found in humanity an element, a power, a principle, which has yielded premises that have necessarily presented to us, in their evolution, such a being as this. On them, the system here offered, rests. Out of the materials which they have logically yielded, the superstructure has taken form. And is it erroneous ? Does it derogate from the Supreme Wisdom ? The laws which govern in the material universe are perfect. We deem them Divine, because they are so. The author has endeavored to trace the same laws, the same consequent order, and all-pervading action from matter to spirit, varying only with the changes of substance ; and if they derogate not from the Divine Wisdom here, in matter, shall they be deemed to derogate from the same Wisdom there, in Spirit ? Can there be more than one *perfect*, proceeding from the same Unit ? and can a system, which presents the like perfections throughout the grand order of spirit and matter, be deemed a mere fallacy of the imagination ? Can a doctrine, which gives unity to all things, and reveals the subjection of all to one organic law, or informing unit, have no foundation in truth ?

Let it not be said, that it is a system which rests on a narrow basis. True, were I the only being on earth, and were the system based on the truths revealed by the Logos to my consciousness only, it might be said to rest on a narrow foundation indeed, though it might even then, still be true. But it rests on no such limited basis. As the Logos or Perfect Reason is to me, so it is to every human being, and to all mankind. The system has the breadth and extent of the whole humanity for its foundation, and in the history of the race it finds ample development and illustration. And when we go abroad from man into Nature, we find the evidence of its truth there, in every form of life, in every form of dead matter. Surely, if the system rests on all within us, and be supported by all around, above, and beneath us, it rests on no narrow foundation, and is supported by no feeble props. Like the theory of gravitation, it starts with a simple formula, deduced from undoubted phenomena, but, on the universal application of this formula, this great truth is revealed : that the Logos, apperceived by us as the Reason within us, is, in its entirety, everywhere present, throughout the grand totality of spirit and matter—imparting its own unity to the mighty whole, and every integer thereof, and developing itself in every variety of action and form—as the one organic life and law of all. Is this idea unworthy of the Creator, or can any inference therefrom yield aught repugnant to His Divine attributes ? Is it inconsistent with any phenomenon of spirit or matter, or with any established truth of Science ?

I leave these questions with the reader ; and whatever may be the conclusion to which he shall come, may it be such as shall strengthen his belief in the existence of God, in His Omnipresence, Omniscience, Omnipotence and Benevolence ; and such as shall inspire him with a new faith in an elevated destiny for man here, and with a fresh confidence in a continued existence hereafter.

# APPENDIX.

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## *Note to Chapter II, page* 18.

*Extension and Space.* These ideas concerning extension and space, may be given to the reader with more clearness, perhaps, if expressed with more brevity.

Space—pure space—is but the sum of the geometric relations which the percipient power as a unit ascribes to its coexistent objects. To prove the truth of this proposition, two objects of vision are taken in the text; namely, the two glasses separated by the bow between them. Now, if, by the abstraction of the sum of all geometric relations between these two objects, they appear to be one, and without a separating space, that abstraction will prove that that space, and the sum of those geometric relations are one, and identical. For the sum of those geometric relations is either an ascription to the space, and then the space will remain after its abstraction, or the sum of the geometric relations is itself the space, and then the space itself will cease to exist on its abstraction. This abstraction is made in the manner described in the text, and the two glasses are, to the percipient power, as one. There are as to it, no geometric relations between them; and the space between them, as to the same power, no longer exists; and therefore, as to it, the sum of the geometric relations, and that space, are shown to be one, and identical.

Now, if pure space be nothing but the sum of geometric relations between objects, that, which we call extension in a tangible and visible body, can be nothing but the sum of the geometric relations of its own multiple—its various points, and outlines. And this is proved, as to vision, by the same process. The extension between the two glasses disappears—the extension between the two organs of sight disappears—and the two glasses appear as one, and the two organs as one, on the abstraction respectively of the sum of their geometric relations. Therefore, at least as to one sense, pure space, and extension, are but the sum of all possible geometric relations of coexistent objects, or of the various points and outlines of the object contemplated.

Now, as to the sense of feeling, the proof is analogous; and, as the author thinks, equally conclusive. Thus: one unvaried feeling, like one unvaried color, gives no idea of extension. It is a unit, and as such is the basis of all number—of all variety. But as a unit, it has no limits—no figure—no dimensions. It is only by a resolution of this unit into variety, that we come to the idea of that sum of geometric relations which constitutes the extension of a tangible body. Thus our own physical organism is evolved from its unity, as to the percipient power, by the variety which various impact and movement gives to the sense of feeling. So the reason, reacting as the will of God on itself, evolved the Universe—made it objective to itself in *finite* mode.

Pure space and extension, then, are nothing but the sum of the geometric relations of coexistent objects, or of their simultaneous variety.

But whence come these geometric relations? They do not belong to the objects themselves, taken independently of any percipient being; and they are not objects of sensation. Then whence come they? The answer is, that since they exist only in the presence of the percipient power, they can come only from that power, brought into action by a sensible multiple.

But what is the nature or character of this power, that it should be qualified to give these relations? This power alone, added to the sensible multiple, creates the relations. They come from it spontaneously, and without reflection. Reflection does not give them, and sensation does not give them; they are forced upon us. But if they neither come from sensation nor reflection, then must they come from the spontaneous Reason; and this percipient power must be no other then the spontaneous Reason affected through the organs of the senses, by an objective coexistent plurality, and creating from itself, the sum of the geometric relations of that plurality, by an ascription to it of its own unity. It forms itself, the essence of the geometric entirety, educed by the coexistence. If it be taken from that entirety, the entirety vanishes—goes with the abstracted unit, as truly as the circle vanishes, or goes with its abstracted centre.

I have called the spontaneous Reason, when considered as this unit, the geometric Reason; and extension, and space, may be considered as nothing but the subjective geometry of this Reason, made objective; that is, nothing but this unit passed—without losing its subjective unity—out, as it were, into an objective plurality; that is again, nothing but simple unity resolved into unity in variety, or nothing but the subjective and objective subsisting by correlation, in essence one, but in modality dual.

This unit is, indeed, in its infinite mode, both subject and object. As object, it has a phase; as subject, it has none. It is the subjective, which, without being seen, sees; it is the objective, which, without seeing, is seen. The subjective is ever, in the last result, God, from the absolute, contemplating himself, in and through, a less than absolute, mode of being.

But whence is this objective coexistent plurality—this multiple—this variety, without which we cannot have space and extension?

It must constantly be borne in mind that this unit, of which I have been and am now speaking, is the Absolute Reason, not the reflective; that it exists independent of us, and acts out of us, as well as within us; that it subsists in us, however it may be modified, from its infinite mode, as our perceptive power; that here, limited by a material organism, it sees out of and beyond the organism, its own determinate conceptions, which subsist as such, from its own infinite mode of being. From this, its infinite mode, that absolute unit repeats itself conceptively in that infinite multiple which constitutes what we call matter, and which, perhaps, forms its qualities and masses by the aggregation of mere mathematical points, endowed by the Omnipotent Will, with forces variously repellant and attractive. These, to the Absolute Reason, are mere conceptions. But though mere conceptions to it, in its unconditioned mode of being, and therefore entirely subjective, yet, when present to it in its *finite* and *conditioned* mode, they become objective and multiple, and subsist in all variety.

When the Absolute Reason contemplates itself from its absolute mode merely, all things are ideal; and the finite is swallowed up in the Infinite. When it contemplates itself from one of its ideas, the unity of the Infinite disappears in partial views of coordinate ideas, or conceptions, and is thus resolved into the multiple, and limited. The conceptions, immanent in the absolute unit, are then viewed as its imagery, and in their converse order, backward as it were, toward their source. Hence we have the coexistent objective plurality, to which the geometric Reason gives continuity, by an ascription of its own unity—in other words, by the resolution of its own geometric synthesis into analytic objectivity.

This ascription is one and continuous from the Absolute Reason; but in the organic form, whether spiritual or material, this Reason is subject to limitations, and changes its manifestations with every change wrought in the organism, whether by external objects, or by an act of the will. Thus, when I stretch forth my arm, when I walk, when I cast my eyes over land, and sea, or into the heavens—or when objects themselves move—this Reason, subsisting at once as subject and object, spontaneously reveals its ascription with the movements, or changes wrought, evolves itself with them, and geometrizes for me, extension and space. And this results, not from a pre-established harmony, but from its correlation with the Me, or individual soul, and its material organism. In the Absolute Reason there is indeed no change—no *particular* ascription; but in its finite form, there is a change in relation to its absolute mode, and through that change the ascription, already existing in the eternal mind, becomes manifest to the finite entity, and subsists as an ascription thereof.

The ascription of the absolute unit does not exist for my mind only, or only whilst I am contemplating the multiple. It is an ascription which exists for *all* minds, and that as continually as the Absolute Reason exists; so that space and extension would still continue, though there were not a single human being to contemplate them.

But it may be said that in as far as these operations of the Absolute Reason are out of my consciousness, they are wholly hypothetical. To this objection the answer is, that the Absolute Reason is a unit, and that its operations, *out* of the consciousness, must be, *mutatis mutandis*, what they are *in* the consciousness. If *in* my mind, it creates an ideal extension and space, must it not *out* of my mind and in its own eternal order, create an ever-enduring extension and space? It is a unit, and what it operates *in* me *conditionally*, it must operate *out* of me, and in its own absolute mode of being, *unconditionally*, or *absolutely*.

It should be understood that it is not the object of the author to prove in the text, that the Universe has a mere ideal existence as to finite beings. His object, in reducing it to an idea in the Absolute Reason, is to evolve, therefrom, space, extension, resistance, motion, and generally all the laws and properties of matter, to the end, that it might be manifest that the Universe itself is no other than the imagery of the mind of God, subsisting as material, in its constituent and coordinate forms, to the finite mind.

But it may be further objected, that if the perceptive power be the Absolute Reason, *its* perceptions are not *my* perceptions. I answer, that the Absolute Reason, subsisting in a finite mode—that is to say conditioned, by my organization—is my individual soul, or self; that this is originally only so far distinct from the Absolute, as its organization makes it distinct; and that, consequently, the perceptions of the Absolute, so conditioned, are *my* perceptions. It cannot be objected that this makes man God; for it only makes a finite being subsistent from the Infinite. A special mode of the Absolute Being, acting in very limited and particular relations, cannot be the Absolute Being acting from the depths and heights of His existence, through all worlds and all beings, giving life and thought to all. But even the perceptions, thus derived, are not mine, unless, by an act of the will, they are appropriated by me. That is, the whole individual soul must concentrate itself, by an act of attention, on the perception, before it can become a part of my individual mind, and distinctly exist in consciousness and memory. It is this special appropriation, which ultimately separates the man widely, though never entirely, from his Maker. I say, never entirely; for it is inconceivable that the separation should become absolutely complete, and the soul still exist. God is ever the Soul of the soul, but never the moral and responsible being, which the individual soul makes itself, whilst acting within the limited sphere of its freedom.

I have said that the absolute unit repeats itself *conceptively* as a mathematical point or centre, and, thereby, creates the elementary particles of matter. I will endeavor to make this language more intelligible. A mathematical point has no dimensions, and is a mere conception. It is but the mind itself, repeated as unity. Now, though this unity, repeated simultaneously, might give us an idea of extension, yet it could give us no idea of resisting, solid masses of matter. For the mathematical point—this mere conception—to give this idea, it must be armed (so to speak,) objectively, by the Omnipotent Will, with resisting forces. If it be true, that there is no possibility of absolute contact between bodies, or the elementary particles of which they consist, then these forces must exist, and the Supreme Will, acting through mathematical points, or centres—which can exist only in conception—gives us the impenetrability of the atom, and the solidity of the mass.

If a magnetic bar be divided at the neutral point, each of the two parts becomes a magnet with its neutral point—if this be divided at the neutral point, the result is the same; and if this division be conceived as repeated down to the mathematical point, we shall then have the atom—that is a mathematical point and its forces. Boscovich accounts for the various qualities of matter, on the supposition of various forces emanating from an infinitude of mathematical centres. But these forces, in the last result, can be no other than the action of the Supreme Will—

"His one eternal, self-affirming act."

B. F. L. A.
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